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Abstract 
 
This dissertation examines the issue of foreign investment in African resources from the 
theoretical perspective of ecological imperialism and ecologically unequal exchange 
theory (EUE).  Pulling from Marxist ecology, critical political ecology, and an 
environmental reading of Polanyi, this dissertation seeks to theoretically deepen and 
clarify the concept of ‘ecological imperialism.’ It posits that the wave of neoliberal 
policies that swept through the developing world in the 1980s can be interpreted as a 
historically distinct moment of ecological imperialism, a ‘counter-countermovement’ to 
the era of economic nationalism that sought to bring developing world resources under 
state control.  Focusing on Africa and a case-study on Tanzania, it examines the extent to 
which foreign investment regimes since Africa’s colonial era reproduce a neocolonial 
situation whereby African political economic structures are subjugated for the 
‘metabolic’ needs of core economies, in a manner amenable to the ever expanding needs 
of capital accumulation. It also addresses the relation of ecological imperialism to one of 
the most currently important theories concerning global environmental inequalities, 
ecologically unequal exchange theory (EUE). Building on world-systems 
theory/dependency theory and integrating ecological economics, EUE theory holds that 
the global economy is characterized by unequal, asymmetrical transfers of ecosystem 
goods and services from developing to developed economies in a manner that 
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systematically reproduces global environmental inequalities through the mechanism of 
international trade and foreign investment.  This topic is central to issues of 
environmental justice and inequality, particularly in regards to North-South relations.  In 
order to contribute to the ongoing empirical research agenda of EUE, the dissertation 
engages in a standardized empirical model known as an economy-wide material flows 
account (EW-MFA) for Tanzania over the years 1970-2010.  EW-MFAs trace resource 
flows driven by economic activities and have been used to operationalize the concept of 
EUE.  The dissertation finds that though MFAs have been widely used in EUE literature, 
they insufficiently capture many forms of environmental degradation that could be 
categorized as ecologically unequal exchange.  This is particularly true for countries like 
Tanzania whose main exports are high-value, low-weight preciousities, as MFAs measure 
resource flows in physical weight.  In sum, the dissertation argues for a comprehensive, 
nuanced, and non-reductionist approach to the issue of ecologically unequal exchange, 
and more broadly, to issues of ecological exploitation and environmental justice, one that 
examines unequal resource flows but also other potential forms of exploitation that can 
occur in the political economic and social dimension. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In the summer of 2010 I had the opportunity of spending several months 
researching in Bolivia, and it was in this small country where the seeds of my future 
dissertation originated.  At the time I was staying in Cochabamba, a city which only a 
few months before had hosted the World People’s Conference on Climate Change and 
the Rights of Mother Earth.  This event drew tens of thousands of activists, journalists, 
policy makers and scholars from around the world to discuss the worsening global 
ecological crises. The summit aimed to be a ‘Southern’ counter-event to the ‘Northern’ 
Copenhagen climate summit and the message was distinctly political; the Earth is 
undergoing an ecological crisis of global and historical proportions, and the solutions 
posed by world leaders are shamefully inadequate, reflecting the entrenched political and 
economic interests of the wealthy and powerful.   
 Up until Cochabamba, however, I had not conceptualized inequality in 
environmental terms; indeed, I had not thought much about the environmental dimension 
to international political economy at all. The Earth’s ecosystem goods and services that 
provide the material basis of the economy- of life itself- are scarcely mentioned against 
the backdrop of economics and politics in the orthodox political sciences.  But as climate 
change, devastating loss of biodiversity, land degradation, collapse of oceanic stocks, 
declining resources, among many other alarming signifiers of environmental crisis 
increase in severity, the social science literature on environmental issues and 
sustainability has proliferated.  Much of the literature remains apolitical, with no 
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systematic discussion on power and inequality. Yet increasingly topics such as 
environmental justice, environmental inequality, and ecological debt, have gained 
traction as it is clear that benefits from the exploitation of the environment, and the 
burdens from environmental degradation, are distributed unequally across different social 
groups-  and in particular, across different world regions. 
This dissertation seeks to contribute to the literature on environment and 
inequality through focusing on the current inflow of foreign investment in African 
resources, with a case study on Tanzania, from the theoretical perspective of ecologically 
unequal exchange theory (EUE) and ecological imperialism.  It is a central contention of 
this dissertation that a discussion of ‘ecological’ exploitation, whether of the Global 
South by the Global North, or now increasingly of certain developing regions by 
emerging economies, necessitates the revival of a theory of imperialism, one that can 
grasp the relationship between the ever expanding drive for capital accumulation and the 
ever multiplying ecological concerns of today. Because of this, much of the theoretical 
work of this dissertation is devoted to addressing the question, how we can conceptualize 
an ecological rendition of imperialism?  How can we clarify and deepen a concept of 
‘ecological imperialism,’ so that it can be used as an analytical tool that allows us to 
make sense of the logic of the system?  Or more specifically, to grasp the relation 
between the expanding drive for capital accumulation and the subsumption of peripheral 
resources?   
Relatedly, this dissertation attempts to contextualize neoliberal policies in the 
framework of ecological imperialism, and offers a critical re-interpretation of the policies 
that structure our global economic integration from a political ecological perspective.  As 
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such, a central guiding research question is how can a theory of ecological imperialism 
help us to make sense of the connections between neoliberal policies, capital 
accumulation, ecology, and exploitation and resistance? In regards to the specific subject 
matter of this dissertation, how can a theory of ecological imperialism help us to grasp 
the deeper dynamics and potentially negative consequences of the current inflow of 
foreign investment in African resources?  
Finally, this research looks more closely at other current theories that address 
Northern exploitation of Southern resources, in particular the important theory of 
ecologically unequal exchange.  Building on world-systems theory/dependency theory 
and integrating ecological economics, EUE theory posits that the global economy is 
characterized by unequal, asymmetrical transfers of ecosystem goods and services from 
developing to developed economies in a manner that systematically reproduces 
environmental inequalities across different social groups through the mechanism of 
international trade and foreign investment.  This topic is central to issues of 
environmental justice and inequality, particularly in regards to North-South relations.  In 
regards to ecologically unequal exchange, the central research questions which guided 
this dissertation were what do we already know about such ‘environmental’ disparities 
between different regions of the globe? What has been theorized in the extant literature 
and what has been empirically measured?  What are the theoretical as well as practical 
challenges to empirically measuring ecologically unequal exchange to-date?   How would 
a theory of ecological imperialism complement the research agenda of ecologically 




Economic integration, technology and the environment: the literature and central 
debates  
One of the major schisms among different socio-environmental schools of thought 
concerns perceptions of the market system, industrial development and technology.  A 
broad and nuanced debate surrounds these issues originating since at least the 1970s, and 
this section presents only the key ideological differences with the aim of situating this 
dissertation within it.  Overall, ‘ecological modernization theory’ is a school that 
theorizes that the economy and environment can reinforce each other positively.  Further, 
ecological modernization theory views industrial development and technological 
innovation as offering the best solution to the environmental crises of the developing 
world.   
While ecological modernization theory has been used in multiple contexts, certain 
core characteristics of the theory consistently promulgate this view (Spaargaren, Mol, and 
Buttel, 2000).  First, ecological modernization theory identifies modern science and 
technology as central institutions that can be used to avoid or mitigate ecological crises. 
The reasoning behind this assertion is that scientific and technological trajectories, 
through confrontation with ecological crisis, are able to adapt and reform reflexively. 
Second, and most salient to the issues of this dissertation, in contrast to theories that 
propose a direct conflict between the market and the environment, EM theory argues that 
market dynamics can be conducive to ecological reform.
1
  Innovators, entrepreneurs, and 
                                                 
1
 The possibility of a green capitalism was first introduced to Ecological Modernization theory by Joseph 
Huber and has generated major debates.  Ecological modernization theory, according to its major theorists, 
holds a nuanced position regarding capitalism.  Mol and Spaargaren argue that in EM theory capitalism is 
not considered to be essential for environmentally sound production and consumption, but neither is 
capitalism inherently at odds with sustainability. Rather, capitalism is viewed as constantly changing in 
relation to environmental concerns.  As such, environmentally sound production and consumption is 
 
 5 
other economic agents can act as social carriers of ecological restructuring, in addition to 
state agencies and new social movements. It rejects the argument that there is any 
fundamental opposition between the market economy and ecology. Rather, EM theorists 
argue that modern economic institutions and mechanisms can be, and are to an increasing 
extent, reformed according to the criteria of ecological rationality.  Third, while wary of a 
strong bureaucratic state, ecological modernization theory does maintain that the state can 
play a vital role in environmental management.  Finally, ecological modernization theory 
argues that social movements are increasingly used to support the ecological 
reconstruction of modern society (Spaargaren, Mol, and Buttel, 2000).  
Along these lines an extended argument has gained much attention within recent 
years. Theorists from the neoclassical school claim that with industrial/technological 
development and economic growth, spurred by the development of market relations, 
nations can become ‘post-consumerist.’  That is, the world’s wealthier nations are 
‘dematerializing’ their economies as people become post-consumerist in their 
consumption pattern, increasingly valuing consumption of services and experiences over 
material products (Adriaanse et. al, 1997).
2
  
Because of this, wealthier nations are supposedly decoupling economic growth 
from the use of energy and materials and from waste flows into the environment, 
reducing the environmental impact of each additional monetary increment of GDP    
                                                                                                                                                 
possible.  Therefore, the focus should be on redirecting or transforming free market capitalism in a way that 




However, later research has revealed that while several studies have found examples of ‘relative’ delinking 
for various indicators of materials use, examples of absolute delinking are hard to find.  Relative delinking 
means a reduction in environmental impact in terms of resource consumption or pollution per unit of GDP.  
Absolute delinking refers to the situation when economic growth continues, but the absolute amount of 
materials used declines (Fisher-Kowalski and Amann, 2001).   
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(World Bank, 1992). What is needed is not a reduction in economic growth, but to 
accelerate the trend toward dematerialization and to ensure that the environment is 
integrated within a more knowledge-driven, innovative economy. This hypothesis is often 
portrayed in terms of an ‘environmental Kuznet’s curve,’ an inverted U-shaped curve, 
applicable to advanced capitalist economies, which are said to be decreasing their 
physical inputs per unit of GDP after having reach a peak in this respect in the mid-to-late 
twentieth century. The relevance for developing countries, then, is a solution for their 
own ecological crises born of ‘modernization,’ that is, economic growth, rising incomes 
and technological advancement.    
Also compatible with the above concepts of EM theory and post-consumerism is 
the contention that increasing economic integration between developed and developing 
countries is desirable, with environmental benefits arising from an inter-play of economic 
and technological factors.  The basic logic is that with increasing economic integration 
between developed and developing countries, developing countries will experience 
higher economic growth and technological spill-over, which will eventually spur 
ecological modernization.   Bhagwati, for example, argues that furthering policies of free 
trade would stimulate economic growth, leading through a variety of mechanisms to 
higher environmental standards.  For example, the economic growth that would follow 
from an increase in free trade would allow for an increase in tax revenues, enabling 
governments to provide more financial resources for environmental protection. These 
resources could then be used to satisfy the desire for a clean environment, which is 
supposedly increasing with rising incomes (Bhagwati, 2003). In addition, the institutional 
capacities to respond to environmental problems in general increase with growth in 
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income per capita (Dasgupta, Mody, Roy and Wheeler 1999).  In general, higher 
environmental pressures stemming from the expansion of economic activities would be 
overcompensated by other effects.  
Like ecological modernization theory, proponents of free trade emphasize that in 
the developing countries, rising incomes will reduce the pressures that poverty places on 
the environment. With continuing development, Southern countries can shift their 
economic structures away from activities in the resource-intensive primary sectors toward 
more environmentally benign services.  International trade can also foster the transfer of 
clean technologies.  With the implementation of effective environmental policies, 
economic growth and liberalization of international trade would improve environmental 
quality.
3
    Similar logic is also applied to other policies of economic integration, such as 
FDI, which is perceived as an important source of technological spill-over (OECD, 
2002). In regards to the expansion of market relations and the developed and developing 
world and the environment, a basic set of premises from the mainstream position can be 
briefly summarized in the following: 
1. A deepening of market relations between the developed and developing world 
promotes economic growth and technological development. This is amenable to 
the ecological modernization, since technology and economic systems are 
dynamic and adaptive to environmental needs.  It is also amenable to socio-
political institutions that support sustainability and occur with rising incomes.     
2. Without such factors, developing countries will most likely remain mired in 
poverty and resource-intensive economic activities, and will lack the means- 
                                                 
3
See Giljum and Eisenmenger (2004) for a review of the mainstream position on trade and the environment. 
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economic, technological, and institutional- to adequately address their 
environmental problems. 
3. Environmental losses that may be associated with economic integration and 
increased exchanges between the developed and developing world are relatively 
minor or reparable, and can be compensated for with the gains discussed above.    
4. Differences in environmental standards, and unequal distributions of 
environmental burdens, are a reflection of discrete stages of development. All 
nations, regardless of history or position within the world economy, have the 
potential to pass through such stages, and global market relations do not pose a 
fundamental obstruction.   
5. Production, consumption patterns, and overall lifestyles in advanced industrial 
economies are increasingly sustainable and can be generalized at a global level. 
(And if they are not currently sustainable, they will be so in the future when 
technological advances and further dematerialization occurs).   
 
The critical perspectives:  issues of sustainability and environmental distribution 
Ecological modernization and mainstream approaches to environmental crises 
have been criticized on a number of grounds, including their prescriptive undertones, 
feasibility and desirability, as well as on empirical grounds.
4
  From a theoretical 
perspective, and in terms of relevance to this dissertation, two primary issues are of 
particular importance, namely criticisms concerning the problem of scale and 
                                                 
4
For example, Foster has written on the ‘myth of dematerialization.’ The problem with the ‘myth of 
dematerialization,’ according to Foster, is that increased efficiency in use of physical inputs is nothing new.  
Increased efficiency has occurred throughout the history of industrial capitalism, but it has also been 
accompanied by expansion in the scale of the economy, more intensive industrialization, and widening of 
environmental degradation (Foster, 2002). 
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sustainability, and the unequal distribution of environmental goods and services between 
different social groups.   
The first criticism- that of scale and sustainability- arises from what ecological 
economists insist is a fundamental theoretical fallacy in neoclassical environmental and 
resource economics.  In general, the assumption by mainstream economists is that with 
economic expansion societies can utilize new technologies to conserve scarce resources, 
as well as to offset any adverse effects that increased economic activity might have on the 
environment.  Growth is a solution rather than cause of environmental problems. Further, 
environmental problems arise from problems of resource misallocation and the failure of 
markets to generate appropriate prices for natural resources. The scarcity of natural 
resources is not an inherently binding constraint, as scarcity of resources should lead to 
the increase in price and substitution away from scarce resources into other relatively less 
expensive factor inputs.   The idea is that natural capital (renewable and non-renewable) 
and manmade or reproducible capital are substitutes, so depletion of natural capital 
should affect their supply price and induce substitution away from natural capital into 
reproducible capital (Daly and Farley, 2004). 
Ecological economists criticize this approach because it treats the economy as if it 
is a self-contained system, with the planet, resources, animals and people existing as 
components of the economic system. Neoclassical economics considers the environment, 
along with the planet’s resources, as a sub-part of the economic system, and ignores that 
in reality the economy is part of a larger ecosystem, which is the source of natural 
resources used in the economy and also the sink for wastes produced in it.  Inputs such as 
energy and material resources from broader natural systems, and outputs such as 
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produced wastes and pollution are known as the ‘material throughput’ of an economy.
5
 
Ecological economists maintain that viewing the economy as a sub-part of the larger 
ecosystem of the Earth, rather than the other way around, is significant.  The issue is not 
solely an issue of allocation, but also the overall scale of the economy. At the global 
level, as the economy grows bigger and bigger, it reduces the capacity of the Earth’s 
ecosystem to perform its source and sink functions more and more.  There are global 
limits to economic growth, and once the global economy passes a certain size, the 
benefits of consuming produced goods and services are outweighed by the costs of 
environmental degradation and decreasing planetary resources (Daly and Farley, 2004).  
Also of importance, ecological economists are skeptical about the notion of 
substitutability between natural capital and man-made capital, and argue that ecosystem 
goods and services and manmade goods and services are only complementary, and in 
many cases, not seamlessly substitutable.  Sustainability requires society maintaining 
intact its natural capital to ensure that future generations have the same production and 
                                                 
5
 In ecological economics, the economic process is viewed as an entropic process.  Applying the First and 
Second Laws of Thermodynamics, Georgescu-Roegen (1971) argued that the economic process was 
essentially an entropic process.  Through his intellectual heirs, notably Herman Daly, this concept of 
entropy as underlying economic processes forms a fundamental theoretical pillar of ecological economics. 
As expressed in a rather metaphorical and general way by Daly and Farley (2004), the First Law of 
Thermodynamics tells us that we cannot make something from nothing, and hence all human production is 
based on resources provided by nature. The Second Law, the entropy law, tells us that whatever resources 
we transform into something useful must disintegrate into something useless, returning in the form of waste 
to the sustaining system that generated the resource.  And, referring to the First Law again, any waste 
generated by the economy cannot simply disappear but must be accounted for as an integral part of the 
production process.  Thus, EE views the economy as an ordered system for transforming low-entropy raw 
materials and energy into high-entropy waste and unavailable energy, providing humans with a ‘psychic 
flux’ of satisfaction in the process.  (Daly and Farley, 2004)  Importantly, this ‘order’ in our economic 
system must be maintained by a steady stream of low-entropy matter-energy, and this high quality, useful 
matter-energy is only a finite fraction of the gross mass of matter-energy of which the Earth is composed.  
All societies, then, must reproduce themselves through the continuous input of matter and energy and 
expulsion of waste. Recognition of this process has led scholars to metaphorically apply the term 




consumption possibilities that are available to current generations
6
 (Daly and Farley, 
2004). 
The second major criticism germane to this dissertation (and often coupled with 
the first criticism over scale and sustainability), derives from the observation that 
environmental distributions are highly disproportionate among different social groups- 
both within nations and between global regions.  That is, in a world-system marked by 
inequities in wealth and power, certain social groups and countries also seem to benefit 
disproportionately from the use of ecosystem goods and services, while others suffer 
disproportionately from their depletion and associated waste.  Political ecology and 
Marxist ecology are growing hybrid fields that combine insights from ecological 
economics with social science approaches to address such issues of inequality and power 
imbalance.  Political ecology is essentially the study of the relationships between 
political, economic and social factors with environmental issues. It differs from apolitical 
ecological studies by politicizing environmental issues, seeking to understand the 
relations of power that generate and maintain unevenly distributed environmental impacts 
in the global society and between classes.   
Like political ecology, Marxist ecologists are fundamentally concerned with 
unequal relations of power and inequalities in environmental distribution.  However, 
Marxist ecologists situate their arguments within a distinctly Marxian discourse and 
maintain that there is a fundamental conflict between capitalism and ecology, whereas 
                                                 
6
 Daly has identified four basic principles that economies could follow to ensure that natural capital is 
maintained at a sustainable level.  These include 1.) The health of ecosystems and their life support services 
should be maintained, 2.)  Renewable resources should be extracted at a rate not more than their rate of 
regeneration, 3.)  Non-renewable resources should be consumed at a rate not more than the rate at which 
they can be replaced through renewable substitutes, 4.) Waste disposal should be done at a rate not higher 
than the rate of absorption by the environment (Daly, as quoted in UNCTAD, 2012). 
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not all political ecologists would self-identify as Marxists. Capitalist economies, Marxist 
ecologists argue, are geared first and foremost to the growth of profits, and hence to 
economic growth at virtually any cost.  This unending expansion, and the short-time 
horizon in determining investment, generally means rapid absorption of energy and 
materials and the dumping of wastes into environment.  Inherent to these dynamics are 
issues of inequality between social classes and globally between the North and the South 
(Foster, 2002). 
 
Global environmental distributional issues and ecologically unequal exchange 
Pulling from ecological economics, political ecology, and to some extent Marxist 
ecology, ecologically unequal exchange (EUE) has emerged as an important approach to 
conceptualizing the causes and consequences of environmental inequalities at the global 
level.   Ecologically unequal exchange is an explicitly trans-disciplinary research agenda, 
drawing from a variety of disciplines such as anthropology, sociology, economics, other 
social sciences and the physical sciences. Situated within a dependency theory/world-
systems theory framework, ecologically unequal exchange perceives the expansion of the 
industrial capitalist system, beginning with the European colonial conquest, as the origin 
of an international division of labor that has led to the current uneven global distribution 
of wealth, power, and associated ecological burdens. While EUE pulls from ecological 
economics in terms of conceptualizing the interaction between the economy and the 
environment, like in dependency and world-system theories, the global economy is seen 
as world-system in which economic tasks are geographically distributed across a core and 
periphery. Core countries are characterized by high development of forces of production, 
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including high-paid labor, capital-intensive production, and technological advancement.  
In contrast, peripheral countries are characterized by low level forces of production, 
including low-paid labor and labor- intensive production such as the export of raw 
materials. Geographically, the core is constituted by the advanced industrial countries, 
including Europe, North America, and Japan.  Peripheral countries include regional areas 
such as Africa and Latin America, though specific countries within those regions, such as 
South Africa, could be considered semi-peripheral.   The semi-periphery, according to 
world-systems theory, exhibits both core and peripheral characteristics, and includes, for 
example, the newly emerging economies such as the East Asian countries.
7
 As of yet, 
however, EUE has yet to fully develop a theoretical position on the semi-periphery, 
                                                 
7
I use the terms dependency theory and world-systems theory throughout the dissertation, though they are 
not the same.  While both attribute the lack of development in the Global South to the legacies of 
colonialism as well as hierarchical international power relations, in world-systems theory there is the 
theoretical addition of the semi-periphery, which provides a more complex model than the basic core-
periphery dichotomy of dependency theory.  In WST, the semiperiphery includes countries that have 
organizational characteristics of both core countries and peripheral regions. The addition of the 
semiperiphery includes societies that remain dependent, and to some extent underdeveloped, but have 
achieved notable levels of industrialization, like China, India, or Mexico.  Such countries cannot readily be 
included in the dependency categorization of ‘periphery.’   Further, the addition of the semiperiphery 
theoretically helps to explain an important mechanism through which the world-system is stabilized.  
Importantly, WST perceives the semiperiphery as political buffer zone in that while they are exploited, they 
are also exploiters. Some scholars such as Mittelman (2000) have argued that globalization has rendered 
the simple categories of core, semiperiphery, and periphery inadequate.  This may be particularly true for 
emerging economies in Asia. Even in terms of Africa, there may indeed be ways in which globalization 
seems to have blurred the category of ‘periphery.’ Mittelman (2000) argues that “…varied regional 
divisions of labor are emerging, tethered in different ways to global structures; within each region, 
subglobal hierarchies have formed, with poles of economic growth, managerial and technological centers 
and security systems.” (p. 41) Such an insight could apply to Africa, for example, in the growing economic 
dominance of South Africa.   It is no longer the case that solely core or semiperipheral regions exploit 
solely peripheral regions.   
But in other ways the concept of periphery or core still remain important, particularly in regards to 
Sub-Saharan Africa, much of which could be still classified as ‘peripheral.’ As will be discussed at length 
in this dissertation, the global power imbalances that leave peripheral regions in a state of economic, 
technological, political, and even ideological dependency are still very much real, even if globalization is 
blurring the capacity for us to generalize entire regions as ‘peripheral.’   In sum, globalization may be 
blurring the strict ‘categories’ of core, semiperiphery, and periphery, as varied regional divisions of labor 
may be developing, but central concepts from dependency theory can continue to help us conceptualize the 




leading to some analytical confusion in regards to certain empirical study results (to be 
discussed in further detail below).   
Both dependency and world systems theory are extensive research schools in their 
own right, with a substantial number of scholars having contributed to their research 
agendas, of which some of the most prominent include Immanuel Wallerstein, Andre 
Gunder Frank, Samir Amin and Galtung. Further, these schools subsume a number of 
variants, including Marxist and non-Marxist variations, and have undergone revisions 
throughout the years.   Relevant to EUE, however, are the basic assumptions that due to 
their historically enforced positions as raw material exporters, peripheral economies 
continue to face a global economic system characterized by hierarchy and structural 
disadvantages of dependency and domination. For EUE, such structural disadvantages are 
implicated in the unequal distribution of global ecological burdens witnessed today.  EUE 
reformulates its own conception of the world-system as characterized by core economies 
which draw upon peripheral economies as source (of low-entropy resources) and sink (of 
high-entropy wastes).   
Aside from the broad adoption of world systems theory’s concept of core and 
periphery, however, EUE draws more specifically from (and critically departs from, in 
the case of some theorists), the original concept of unequal exchange as originally 
conceived by Arghiri Emmanuel, who argued that wage disparities between different 
countries generate an ‘imperialism of trade’ in the sense of an unequal exchange of hours 
of labor.  Emmanuel pointed out that low-wage countries have to export more products in 
exchange for a given volume of imports from high-wage countries than they would need 
to if wage levels were uniform between all countries, a characteristic of the global 
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economy which allows for the asymmetrical drain of surplus value from peripheral to 
core economies.  In a somewhat similar sense, ecologically unequal exchange posits an 
asymmetrical transfer of resources between core and peripheral economies which leads to 
a systematic deterioration in the ecological situation of peripheral economies (with the 
associated social and economic losses) to the benefit of core economies (with the 




The perpetuation of these uneven ecological burdens is predicated on the capacity 
of core industrial nations to engage in trade, or other forms of exchange, with peripheral 
nations that is fundamentally ‘ecologically unequal.’ In the literature, ecologically 
unequal exchange has been defined by Rice (2009) as 
….the environmentally damaging withdrawal of energy and other natural 
resource assets from the periphery and the addition or externalization of 
environmentally damaging production and disposal activities within the 
periphery of the world system. It constitutes both the obtainment of natural 
capital or the stocks of natural resources that yield important goods and 
services and the usurpation of sink-capacity or waste assimilation 
properties of ecological systems in a manner enlarging the domestic 
carrying capacity of industrialized countries to the detriment of peripheral 
societies (p. 221). 
 
Ecologically unequal exchange, then, can be interpreted as an overall 
asymmetrical transfer of natural resources and sink-capacity (the capacity of the Earth’s 
ecosystems to absorb waste and pollution) from peripheral to core countries underlying 
                                                 
8
EUE as interpreted by Hornborg departs from earlier theories of unequal exchange in a number of ways.  
First, Hornborg argues that that forms of unequal exchange can be identified in metrics not limited to labor, 
but should include more generally biophysical material flows, time, energy, and so on. Also, Hornborg 
argues that the concept of unequal exchange must be divorced from theories of value.  That is, theories of 
value which seek to correlate the ‘value’ of labor or energy embodied in a commodity with the actual price 
of the commodity are analytically untenable, as prices also reflect the normative standpoint of consumers, 
such as culture and preferences.  Thus, while an unequal exchange of labor, time, energy, or resources may 
underlie an exchange, and if sustained results in the systematic deterioration of the position of one trading 
partner, the concept of unequal exchange should be kept distinct from normative theories of value which 
seek to calculate the ‘correct’ price of the commodity exchanged (Hornborg, 2011).  
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nominally equitable monetary exchanges (Hornborg, 2011). More broadly, Hornborg 
interprets ecologically unequal exchange as the asymmetrical, net transfer of productive 
potential by which the productive capacity of one social group is augmented at the 
expense of another. Productive potential in this sense refers to the ‘productive forces’ of 
any production process, such as labor or energy, and in the case of EUE specifically, 
refers to the exergy (available energy) embodied in natural resources. Ecologically 
unequal exchange is argued to be quantifiable and measurable (Hornborg 2011), though 
in practice measuring EUE can be problematic for a number of reasons, as will be 
discussed below.   
EUE theory, like ecological economics, also takes issue with the concept that 
global economic growth, and economic growth of developing countries, can continue 
indefinitely without substantial redistributions of wealth.  In contrast to ecological 
modernization theory, development and accumulation within a capitalist world system is 
what Hornborg terms a ‘zero-sum game’ in regards to low-entropy matter and energy 
(Hornborg, 2001). That is, Earth’s ecosystems good and services, as complementary but 
non-substitutable with man-made goods, can only provide so much, and over-utilization 
and consumption by particular social groups deprives other social groups, in the present 
or in the future.  And at this point, there exists considerable evidence that core industrial 
countries are using more than their share of Earth’s resources.   From the vantage point of 
EUE, the contention that modern industrial capitalism is sustainable, and even more 




The dynamics of accumulation, underdevelopment and ecologically unequal 
exchange   
 One immediate criticism of EUE has been that there is nothing inherently and 
normatively unjust with a globally unequal environmental distribution.  If, through 
international trade or other form of exchange such as FDI, developing countries are able 
to import technology and manufactured goods which they would not be able to develop 
on their own in exchange for their resources and/or sink capacity, as well as the foreign 
exchange needed to develop, how would EUE indict the prescriptions of comparative 
advantage?   
 Ecological economists have criticized the theory of comparative advantage on 
sustainability grounds (Daly and Farley, 2004). To begin, this logic presupposes that 
manmade goods and ecosystem goods and services are fully substitutable. From the angle 
of production, technological spill-overs associated with exchange can be positive 
externalities, but assumptions that natural resources can be exchanged un-problematically 
for the benefits of technological spill-overs or manufactured goods is problematic.
9
  
Ecological economists criticize the theory of comparative advantage for failing to 
account for ecological losses and conflating ‘substitutability’ with ‘complementarity’   
(Daly and Farley, 2004). Such reasoning becomes increasingly difficult to sustain in a 
world of increasingly depleted resources and environmental strain.  As we move from an 
empty world to a full world, resources grow scarcer and become a limiting factor of 
                                                 
9
 In contrast to the neoclassical model which treats all inputs into the production process- labor, capital, and 
resources- as the same, ecological economists insist on a qualitative difference.  According to ecological 
economics, labor and capital are ‘transforming agents,’ funds that transform the flow of resources into a 
flow of product, but which are not embodied physically in the product.  Labor and capital are agents of 
transformation (efficient causes), while resources are that which is being transformed (material causes). 
Ecological economists argue that while one material resource can be substituted for another, and efficient 
causes can be substituted for another (capital for labor, and vice versa), the relation of efficient cause to 
material cause is mainly one of complementarity, not substitutability (Daly and Farley, 2004).    
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production. For example fish catches, Daly and Farley explain, are no longer limited by 
the manmade capital of fishing boats, but by remaining natural capital of stocks of fish in 
the sea and the natural funds that support their existence (Daly and Farley, 2004).   
If ecological resources were infinite or fully substitutable, ecologically unequal 
exchange in itself (abstracted from the global power inequalities in which it is embedded) 
would not pose a problem for peripheral economies per se.  But as ecological economists 
have argued, the world has already reached levels of overexploitation in regards to a 
number of important ecosystem goods and services, including rapid depletion of fossil 
fuels, degradation of agricultural land, increasing scarcity of mineral resources, imminent 
shortages of freshwater, loss of biodiversity, and excessive accumulation of waste.  
Increasingly strained global ecosystems undermine neoliberal prescriptions of economic 
growth as a panacea for the environmental problems of developing countries. Not all 
countries can be net importers of resources, and not all countries can usurp global sink 
capacity beyond what would be sustainable within their own national borders.     
 In addition to the above criticisms made on sustainability grounds, EUE theorists 
have pointed out that ecologically unequal exchange is structurally linked to the 
underdevelopment of peripheral economies.  In this, certain EUE work echoes the core 
contentions of dependency theory, attempting to ground EUE in a politico-economic 
context and demonstrate how EUE- in a capitalist world-economy- is inextricably linked 
to issues of underdevelopment. A number of points raised by Stephen Bunker are worth 
consideration. Bunker, in a pioneering work that laid important theoretical foundations 
for EUE theory, Underdeveloping the Amazon:  Extraction, Unequal Exchange, and the 
Failure of the Modern State, discusses how the socio-economic structural differences 
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between core ‘productive’ economies versus peripheral ‘extractive’ economies, combined 
with more or less intractable ecological factors, systematically lead to the increased 
development of one and the impoverishment and underdevelopment of the other.  The 
central assertion of Bunker’s argument is that the flow of matter and energy from 
extractive economies (peripheral) to productive economies (core) reduces complexity and 
power in the former but increases complexity and power in the latter in the long-term. 
This is due to a complicated interaction of socio-economic, political and ecological 
factors arising from characteristics inherent in extractive versus productive modes of 
production (Bunker, 1985). 
According to Bunker, extractive exports are associated with the loss of ‘ecological 
values.’  Bunker argues that when natural resources are extracted and exported, the 
resource-exporting region loses values that occur in its physical environment.
10
 Such 
losses can affect various aspects of society, from destroying the environments on which 
local populations depend for their own reproduction to depleting the extraction of 
commodities for export itself.  Important to the dynamic of underdevelopment, while 
extractive economies may receive some compensation in the form of foreign exchange or 
technological spill-over, the general characteristics of extractive economies tend to set in 
motion internal dynamics that obstruct these economies from fully capturing the benefits 
and utilizing them for development purposes.  Bunker (1985) lists these characteristics as 
the following: 
                                                 
10
 Now, loss of ecosystem goods and services is becoming recognized as a serious issue even among 
orthodox studies.  While considerable debate remains over how to place a dollar value on ecosystem 
services, or even the desirability of doing so, the World Bank has published reports on the need to account 
for losses of natural capital as a loss of national capital (World Bank, 2011). 
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1. An extremely low ratio of both labor and capital to value, which may allow 
rapid initial rises in regional incomes, but rapid collapses with depletion of 
easily accessible resources. This trend may lead to a series of demographic 
and infrastructural dislocations, and consequently economic disruptions.   
2. Little contribution from extractive economies to the labor and infrastructural 
requirements of subsequent economies. What changes they do bring about in 
the distribution of the population and within the physical environment serve 
little purpose when specific resources are depleted or no longer in demand.
11
  
3. Low level of linkages to other economic activities and social organization in 
the same region. 
12
 
4. Tendency to export extractive resources raw or unfinished so that the creation 
and realization of additional values from processing and industrialization 
occur in and benefit other economies.
 
 
5. Even the limited contribution of extractive exports to regional economies 
tends to be unstable due to reliance upon fluctuating world demand. 
 
In contrast, the internal dynamics of productive economies are conducive to the 
technological advancement, economic growth and sophistication of social organization. 
                                                 
11
 For example, most of the infrastructure developed for extractive export economies is specific to the 
requirements of resource removal and transport. Obviously, this infrastructure only adds to the eventual 
depletion of resources, and adds little to the integration of the wider economy (Bunker, 1985). 
 
12
 For example, extractive enterprises must be located in close proximity to the natural resources they 
exploit, which may be far removed from existing demographic and economic centers, hindering linkages 
with the broader society and economy.  This trend is not a coincidence either.  Bunker has written 
extensively on ‘diseconomies of space’ that are created from economies of scale.  As economies of scale 
deplete easily accessible resources first, ‘diseconomies of space’ are created in which more distant and less 




For example, unlike extractive economies, productive economies create linkages between 
industries and the broader economy and society, which stimulates the accumulation of 
physical infrastructure, as well new research and technical and social organizational 
development.  Further, productive enterprises typically are located in close proximity to 
each other.  These contrasting internal socio-economic dynamics, inextricably linked to 
ecological factors, contribute to the conditions that allow for the core’s economic and 
political dominance within the world system. Overall, what is important about Bunker’s 
work is his attempt to integrate the politico-economic dynamics of underdevelopment 
more explicitly with the ecological dimension.  
 Hornborg, one of the foremost theorists of EUE, conceptualizes accumulation 
within the world-system as essentially zero-sum, from a perspective which he terms 
‘thermodynamic.’   Hornborg (2001 and subsequent work) argues that the industrial 
metabolism of core economies necessitates the appropriation of peripheral hinterlands’ 
resources and the usurpation of peripheral sink-capacity.  Drawing from Prigogene’s 
concept of ‘dissipative structures,’ within Hornborg’s conceptualization, societies 
maintain their internal structure by drawing order (in the form of exergy, or available 
work) from their environments and expelling disorder (Hornborg, 2001). 
For industrialized cities or world systems centers the maintenance of structure and 
‘order’ relies on ecologically unequal exchange with peripheral hinterlands, for example 
post-colonized extractive economies in Africa or Latin America, which are more directly 
involved in the extraction of exergy from nature. In contrast to the societal metabolism of 
previous human societies, industrialized societies rely upon limited stocks of low-entropy 
fuels and metals, which, when used up, remain in the biosphere as pollution and waste 
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and are not readily absorbed into the natural environment.   Because the quantity of 
limited resources necessary for industrial metabolism, and the sink capacity necessary to 
absorb the pollution, exceeds the ecological capacity of industrial centers, they must draw 
upon their peripheral hinterlands.   It is this biophysical process that Hornborg refers to as 
‘the thermodynamics of imperialism’ (Hornborg, 2001). 
That ecologically unequal exchange is a necessary outcome of the industrial mode 
of production creates a situation which is, to Hornborg, essentially zero-sum, in terms of 
accumulation and modern industrial technology.  In The Power of the Machine: Global 
Inequalities of Economy, Technology and Environment, and in subsequent work, 
Hornborg argues for an understanding of modern industrial technology that is at once 
both counter-intuitive and critical.  In contrast to our modern ‘fetishism’ of technology 
which views machines as generative and growth producing in-and-of themselves, 
technology is actually a displacement of time, labor, energy, space, and resources from 
one social group to another more privileged social group.
13
  On a global scale, the 
metabolic processes of industrial technology are predicated on asymmetrical transfers of 
both labor and natural resources from peripheral hinterlands to industrial centers. These 
asymmetrical transfers are dependent upon specific social relations of exchange in which 
the rates paid for those productive factors allow for resources, capital, and ultimately 
industrial technology to continuously accumulate in core industrial centers to the 
detriment of the peripheral hinterlands.
14
   In the global economy, Hornborg (2011) posits 
                                                 
13
 Hornborg gives the example of the railways, which have historically saved time (and accessed space) 
primarily for those who can afford them, but at the expense of labor time and natural space lost for other 
social groups with less purchasing power. He argues that the productive potential of the fuels and other raw 
materials is at work in machines, not machines in themselves (Hornborg, 2001).  
14
 Broadly, this is achieved according to Hornborg through the current structure of production. Value-added 
accrues at the higher stages of production, and natural resources are paid relatively less than the 
manufactured goods they are transformed into.  This allows capital to accrue in core industrial centers and 
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low market prices for primary commodities in relation to manufactured goods as the 




Hence, Hornborg argues that while localized accumulation or the discovery of 
new resources may give the illusion of endless growth, at a global level we must 
understand asymmetrical transfers of resources/productive potential as occurring within 
an essentially zero-sum world of finite resources. The really crucial argument Hornborg 
makes is against the supposed ‘cornucopia’ of technology by positing that industrial 
technology itself is the outcome of unequal exchanges of resources, labor-time, and space 
made possible by hierarchical levels of purchasing power found in the global economy.  
 Ecological Marxists, such as Clark and Foster, have contributed some to the 
discussion on ecologically unequal exchange, though they more explicitly attempt to 
connect EUE with processes of capital accumulation and capitalist social relations of 
production (Clark and Foster, 2009). While other modes of production have resulted in 
environmental degradation and even ecological collapse, the patterns, global extent, and 
intensity of environmental degradation witnessed today are resultant of the capitalist 
mode of production. Specific to the capitalist mode of production is the ceaseless drive 
for profit, which results in a capitalist system that is expansion-oriented and accumulation 
                                                                                                                                                 
ultimately translates into the core’s increased purchasing power and ability to command more peripheral 
resources, in a recursive process (Hornborg, 2001). 
 
15
 Much of EUE literature, including Hornborg’s work, has utilized the words ‘underpayment’ or 
‘undercompensation’ to describe the rates at which raw materials are accessed from the periphery.  In email 
correspondence with Hornborg, there is acknowledgement that these particular words are confusing, as they 
seem to indicate that there would be in fact a ‘fair’ payment for resources, which is problematic on several 
grounds.  For one, fair pricing of ecosystem services is highly debatable as it implies some form of 
reductionism of the environment to a dollar price, and in fact this issue is one of the primary debates of 
ecological economics. For another, in Hornborg’s view at least, EUE must be disentangled from normative 
theories of value which seek to posit the ‘correct’ pricing of commodities.        
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driven.  This drive for capital accumulation pushes the system to impose a ‘totalizing’ 
framework of control, overcoming political, social, and natural boundaries, whereby 
everything must prove its productive viability and profitability.  In this process, nature, 
formerly both a use-value and a public wealth, is privatized, transformed into an 
exchange value, and used to expand private riches, while the negative externalities of 
pollution are generally absorbed by society at large (Foster, 2002). At the global level, as 
EUE theorists point out, asymmetrical power dynamics initiated during colonization 
continue to allow the privatization and usurpation of the periphery’s natural resources and 
sink capacity by the core.  This usurpation, in which the environment of the periphery is 
transformed into profit ultimately appropriated by the core nations, is facilitated by 
ecologically unequal exchange (Clark and Foster, 2009).  
 
Empirical research and ecologically unequal exchange 
Ecologically unequal exchange is supposedly measurable as biophysical flows of 
resources.  As such, a substantial part of the research agenda is devoted to empirical 
studies.  Included in this dissertation is a case-study of Tanzania utilizing an economy-
wide material flows account (EW-MFA) presented in Chapter 5. However, 
operationalizing EUE has proved complicated and challenging for a number of reasons.  
One chief issue is that EUE is conceptualized rather broadly as the unequal transfer of 
ecological resources and sink capacity- a categorization that spans a great range of 
ecosystem goods and services.  Yet obtaining an ‘overall’ picture of whether or not EUE 
exists often necessitates the use of an aggregate indicator of some sort, which can hide or 
obscure the nuances of EUE, or may not even pick up on certain forms of EUE in specific 
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contexts.  Further, while there may be an overall asymmetrical transfer of resources from 
peripheral regions to core regions, the sociometabolic profiles of individual peripheral 
countries are greatly varied.  That is, an individual peripheral country may export a net 
amount of certain types of resources, for example, metals, but it may also be a net 
importer of, say, biomass.  How to determine if such a peripheral economy is therefore 
subjected to ecologically unequal exchange, and by what criteria, is not at all clear.   
Chapter 5 discusses these issues in more detail, as they are salient to the Tanzania case 
study and highlights the difficulties of empirically testing for ecologically unequal 
exchange.   
Ultimately, however, whether or not ecologically unequal exchange exists is an 
empirical question.  Core regions (and semiperipheral regions) either shift their 
environmental burdens onto peripheral regions in a manner that threatens the 
sustainability of peripheral environments, or they don’t.  As such, despite practical 
challenges and limitations, through various methodologies a number of scholars have 
exposed ecologically unequal exchange theory to empirical testing, and a positivist 
approach makes sense. But it appears that the study of EUE necessitates numerous 
individual studies to contribute to a larger, composite picture, from which a more 
complete understanding of EUE at the global level can be derived. 
 I roughly classify works-to-date as the following: a.) studies concerning the 
overall patterns of asymmetrical transfers underlying exchanges between core and 
peripheral economies concerning both withdrawals and additions, b.) studies of specific 
politico-economic factors and their connections to EUE, and c.)  studies of the 




Asymmetrical transfers of resources  
 
At the Institute of Social Ecology in Vienna scholars working on the concept of 
‘societal metabolism’ have noted that globally certain regions tend to be net importers of 
resources while certain regions tend to be net exporters.  Some have contended that the 
study of societal metabolism can be utilized for the study of EUE, and synthesized with 
world-systems theory (Singh, 2010; Eisenmber and Giljum, 2007). The basic intent 
behind the study of societal metabolism is to understand the links between the material 
and energy flows a society uses for its reproduction and maintenance, and its social 
organization. Material and Energy Flows accounting (MEFA) are accounting frameworks 
that quantify the concept of societal metabolism.  In terms of EUE, material flows 
accounting in particular has been one primary methodology used for assessing 
asymmetrical flows of energy and materials from periphery to core. From MFAs Physical 
Trade Balances (PTB) can be derived, which express whether resource imports from 
abroad exceed resource exports of a country or world region, and to what extent domestic 
material consumption is based on domestic resource extraction or on imports from 
abroad.  The case study on Tanzania in Chapter 5 uses a time-series, economy-wide 
material flows account (EW-MFA) to operationalize ecologically unequal exchange 
(EW-MFAs are MFAs conducted at the national level), and discusses the strengths and 
weaknesses of this approach. 
  Empirical work using national MFAs at both the regional and national level have 
generally corroborated the central tenet of EUE theory that peripheral countries act as 
‘source’ for the metabolic needs of core industrialized countries (Roberts and Parks, 
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2007). For example, a comprehensive study employing MFA in an examination of the 
EU-15 region concluded that the EU runs a substantial trade deficit in physical terms 
(PTB) with all other major world regions, while maintaining balanced external trade 
relations in monetary terms.  Primarily owing to the import of fossil fuels, semi-
manufactured products, and abiotic materials, the EU imports, in physical terms, more 
than four time what it exports.  Yet, the EU-15 exports have a money value of 4 times 
that of imports. Even more striking is with regard to trade relations with Southern regions 
such as Africa and Latin America. One ton of EU exports embody a money value 10 
times higher than one ton of EU imports (Giljum and Eisenmenger, 2004).  
Overall, researchers employing an MFA methodology have consistently 
illustrated that bulk natural resource exports predominantly move from the periphery to 
industrialized countries,
16
 which some argue provides empirical evidence that the 
periphery generally serves as a resource-tap for more dominant industrialized countries 
(Hornborg, 2011). Also utilizing indicators from MFA, a recent UNEP report on 
decoupling (UNEP, 2011) reiterated the significance of international trade in 
redistributing resources across the globe in a manner that allows some countries to export 
resources and other countries to be supplied with primary products for manufacture and 
consumption (both domestic and abroad).  The report looked at a wide variety of 
countries globally, and found that industrialized countries tend to be net material 
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 Ibid.  Also, Behrens, A., Giljum, S., Kovanda, J. and Niza, S. (2007) “The Material Basis of the Global 
Economy: Worldwide Patterns of Natural Resource Extraction and Their Implications for Sustainable 
Resource Use Policies” Ecological Economics 64(2):  444-53.  Also,  Muradian, R. and Martinze-Alier, J. 
(2001). “Trade and the Environment from a Southern Perspective” Ecological Economics 36: 281-97.  
Also, Muradian, R. and Martinez-Alier. (2001) “South-North Materials Flow:  History and Environmental 
Repercussions” Innovation:  European Journal of Social Sciences  14(2): 171-87 
 
 28 
importers, while developing countries serve as net exporters.  European countries, the US 
and Japan are the most important net importers of resources in the world economy.   
In recent years, however, a new pattern is also becoming apparent- several 
emerging economies, particularly Asia (such as China, India, and South Korea) have now 
also become net importers, augmenting domestic resource use with resources imported 
from abroad. This seems to corroborate the theory that as countries transition to 
industrialization, resources from within national boundaries become insufficient for 
production and consumption demands.  In contrast, important net exporters of material 
resources in 2005 were Russia, Kazakhstan, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Brazil, 
Argentina, and Venezuela. In some countries that specialized in natural resource exports, 
such as Peru and Chile, domestic material extraction grew faster than GDP, resulting in a 
rising material intensity of these economies. However, some industrial countries are 
among the group of net exporting countries, in particular Australia and Canada. Further, 
it is important to note that other researchers (Singh and Eisenmenger, 2010) have found 
that other important intervening variables, such as population size in large countries such 
as China, can the mitigate the standard core/periphery trend, suggesting a need for a more 
nuanced model of EUE.
17
   
Concerning asymmetrical additions of waste and pollution to the periphery, Frey 
(1995) has documented the transnational movement of hazardous products, waste, and 
manufacturing production processes from industrialized countries to the periphery.  Frey 
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 Their work also suggests problems which can arise with using nations as the primary unit of analysis.  
Certain large population countries in the global South, due to population size alone, are forced to be net 
importers of raw materials.  However, the per capita resource usage remains significantly lower than in the 
per capita usage in core industrial countries, underscoring inequalities in resource consumption across core, 
semi-periphery, and periphery as the original EUE model suggests.  From a theoretical perspective, 
however, this important issue has not yet been resolved.  
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also argues that TNCs appropriate the ecological carrying capacity for and displace the 
risks from the industrialized countries through such transfers to the periphery. In addition,  
Muradian and others (2002) illustrate that embodied air pollution emissions in trade 
between Japan and Western Europe and their developing country trade partners are 
increasingly unbalanced to the detriment of the latter over the period 1976-94.  That is, 
Japan and Western Europe illustrate improving ‘environmental terms of trade’ with 
peripheral countries as embodied air pollution in imports exceeds that incorporated into 
exports.   
The potential trend that core industrial states may be offshoring the production of 
their energy-intensive products to developing countries is not the only issue. There are 
the stark inequalities in responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions which equates to the 
pollution of a global environmental commons (or usurpation of sink capacity). The US is 
responsible for over 20 percent of all global emissions, which can be compared to 136 
developing countries that together are only responsible for 24 percent of global 
emissions- the term climate justice is increasingly used to characterize the disparities of 
responsibility and impact (Roberts and Parks, 2009).  
  
Politico-economic factors and EUE 
 
A number of studies have examined specific politico-economic issues within the 
context of the theory of ecologically unequal exchange, such as deteriorating terms of 
trade for primary commodities and the impact of foreign debt on the environment.  
Concerning deteriorating terms of trade for primary commodities, Muradian and 
Martinez-Alier (2001) find that falling prices correlate with large export drives for 
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primary products, and of the eighteen natural resource exports from developing countries 
they examine, all but two had their prices fall between the 1970s and 1990s, yet fourteen 
of the exports increased dramatically in volume over the same period in physical terms. 
From a monetary perspective, the movement of natural resources from the periphery to 
the industrialized countries frequently appears to be decreasing but in physical terms 
there is often evidence of an increasing volume of trade.  
Case studies have also found that the Physical Trade Balance (imports minus 
exports) deficit of individual countries has increased as terms of trade for primary 
commodities has deteriorated. Vallego (2010) finds that in the Ecuadorian economy there 
is a structural trend towards decreasing terms of trade, which is verified by the increasing 
gap observed between import and export price between 1970 and 2007, and this has been 
accompanied by an increasing PTB deficit.  Such trends, Vallego finds, pushes countries 
like Ecuador towards irreversible exhaustion of their environment, as even renewable 
resources are exploited at excessive rates.  Ecuador’s deforestation rate, for example, is 
one of the highest in Latin America (Vallejo, 2010).     
A study on the Colombian economy by Perez-Rincon found, again, a growing 
deficit in Colombia’s PTB accompanied by a deterioration of terms of trade.  Like other 
Latin American countries, this trend has been accompanied with large scale 
environmental loss precipitated through mining activities, oil extraction, and cash crops 
agricultural production. Tellingly, eighty-five percent of the total tonnage exported by 
Colombia is directed at satisfying the material and energy of high-income Northern 
countries (Perez-Rincon, 2006).  More recently, a study by conducted on the Argentinean 
economy using a MFA, conducted for the period 1970-2009, showed that Argentina 
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follows a resource-intensive and export-oriented development model with a persistent 
physical trade deficit.  Also, Argentina’s terms of trade (the average weight in tons of 
imports that can be purchased through the sale of 1 ton of exports) show a declining trend 
in the period of study. The authors argue that comparisons between Argentina’s 
metabolic profile and the metabolic profile of other countries in Latin America and of 
Australia and Spain show that the Argentinean economy presents the same pattern as 
other Latin American exporting economies, and its terms of trade are opposite to those of 
industrialized economies (Manrique, Brun, Martínez, Walter, and Martínez-Alier, 2013).  
This trend, also corroborated by Vallejo, is not necessarily surprising, as terms of trade 
decreases, more has to be exported physically since the demand curve for export is 
normally downward sloping.  With the price of imports relatively increasing, less can be 
imported for a certain amount of export.     
Aside from the factor of falling prices of primary commodities, the impact of 
foreign debt has also been examined.  Using a cross-national model for sixty-two poor 
nations, from 1990 to 2005, Shandra and others (2008) finds that foreign debt and 
structural adjustment increase deforestation.  Both factors seem to push peripheral nations 
to increase export earnings in order to finance interest and principal payments (Shandra, 
Shor, Maynard, and London, 2008). The above are some examples of empirical research 
concerning EUE, or ecological distributional issues.  
While far from an exhaustive empirical literature review, such studies underscore 
disparities in resource use across global regions, transfers of resources from periphery to 
core in terms of weight, as well as the ecological losses associated with economic 
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policies that are unaccounted for when exchange is measured solely in monetary terms.  
However, there is a major theoretical issue that I argue needs to be resolved in order to 
sharpen and continue the empirical research agenda of EUE.  I would argue the 
increasing trend for emerging economies to become net importers points to the need for 
EUE to incorporate, at minimum, the semi-periphery conceptually within its theoretical 
model.  This is really quite important, as semi-peripheral countries do not occupy the 
same position as either core or periphery within the international division of labor. An 
even more accurate model of EUE would necessitate the addition of nuances beyond the 
core, semiperiphery, and periphery categorizations; it would start first by building upon 
the newest studies of how the current international division of labor actually manifests 
under globalization, and then seek to understand how environmental inequities are 
distributed as they are associated with the specific economic activities of each 
country/region. As it stands, EUE is building upon an a priori categorization of 
core/periphery or developed/developing, a simplistic dichotomy that has been 
consistently challenged by studies of globalization (Mittelman, 2000). This can easily 
lead to confusion in the interpretation of empirical results.  A more complex model of the 
international division of labor does not mean that inequalities or power differentials do 
not exist any longer under globalization, obviously, but it means that even within 
peripheral regions hierarchies and differentiation of economic activities are beginning to 
emerge, and a finer grained analysis is necessary.  Unfortunately, this large task is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation but remains perhaps the largest unresolved 
theoretical issue in EUE. 
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  Concerning the topic of this dissertation, EUE in Africa and foreign investment, 
overall as a region Africa is a net exporter of resources to the rest of the world, 
particularly in terms of fossil fuels, metals and minerals (UNCTAD, 2012).  However, 
counter-intuitively according to the results of the EW-MFA in Chapter 5, the results of 
this dissertation indicate Tanzania is a net importer of resources across all material 
categories, and this trend appears to be increasing, and not decreasing, with increased 
economic integration.  Tanzania, from the standpoint of political economy, is a typical 
extractive and peripheral economy, with foreign control over the major extractive 
industries and a highly liberalized foreign investment regime, a situation some in 
Tanzania have criticized as neo-colonial.  The results from the EW-MFA for Tanzania, in 
terms of apparent lack of EUE but an arguably neo-colonial situation in regards to its 
political economy and exploitation of resources, point towards the need for conceptual 
clarity on a number of issues that are at the heart of this dissertation. 
Towards a theory of ecological imperialism  
Ecologically unequal exchange offers a novel and vital theoretical framework for 
conceptualizing the ecological dimension to accumulation, global inequality, and 
structural biases in the world-system, even as ecological economics give us analytical 
tools to understand why these issues matter. This dissertation builds upon these critical 
perspectives, but it seeks to ground them in concrete historical, political-economic 
conditions, in particular the subject matter of foreign investment in African resources. 
This is necessary for a further understanding of the relations and processes through which 
ecologically unequal exchange occurs.   
 
 34 
To the extent that the world-system is characterized by ecologically unequal 
exchange, it occurs within a global economy shaped by the demands of industrial 
capitalism, within the specifically capitalist mode of production, with definite social 
relations of production, and a historically distinct class that derives both its wealth and 
power from the accumulation of capital.  Obviously, forms of resource transfer and 
usurpation most likely occurred under different modes of production.   But in a global 
economy where the capitalist mode of production is dominant, the primary mechanisms 
through which EUE can occur- international trade and foreign investment - are ultimately 
the primary mechanisms of capitalist global economic integration and are conditioned by 
the demands of capital accumulation.    
For example in terms of foreign investment, the focus of this dissertation, it is 
capital (generally from ‘core’ industrial centers but also increasingly from ‘semi-
peripheral’ or emerging economies) that directly appropriates peripheral resources, 
conditioned by the drive for capital accumulation.  Further, as this dissertation goes to 
some length to explicate, the appropriation of peripheral resources by first or emerging 
world capital demands an amenable political economic context, both in terms of global 
economic policy and within the peripheral country.  One might therefore conceptualize 
ecological imperialism as, broadly, the subjugation of the economic, political, and/or 
social institutions of a (generally peripheral) country for the biophysical, metabolic needs 
of the (generally core or semi-periphery), and inextricable from the purpose of making 
such resources accessible and amenable (in the right quantities and for the right price) to 
the needs of capital accumulation.
18
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 Previous theorists of imperialism do discuss the need to secure raw materials for capitalist production as 
an imperial drive.  In particular, the works of Magdoff, who has written considerably on imperialism 
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Clark and Foster (2009) appear to be the first to coin the term ecological 
imperialism in their work on the guano trade during the colonial era and ecologically 
unequal exchange, but do not specifically define it.  The following briefly summarizes 
some of the essential characteristics of ecological imperialism as conceived in this 
dissertation, though the chapters go into the necessary depth and explanation.  The 
characteristics pointed out here are but a preliminary step towards a fuller theory of 
ecological imperialism, and much works remains to be done on this complex topic that is 
outside the scope of this dissertation.  However, the following should help to 
conceptually clarify ecological imperialism, and distinguish it from other forms of 
imperialism, as well as closely related topics such as ecologically unequal exchange. 
1.)  Ecological imperialism defined, broadly, as the subjugation of the economic, 
political, and/or social institutions of a (generally peripheral) country for the 
biophysical, metabolic needs of the (generally core or semi-periphery)
19
, and 
inextricable from the purpose of making such resources accessible and amenable 
(in the right quantities and for the right price) to the needs of capital 
accumulation.  
                                                                                                                                                 
related to resources, ties the imperial search for resources to the mechanization of industry and rise of 
industrial and financial firms.  Essentially, Magdoff argues that shifts in technology during the final 30 
years of the 19
th
 century required large amounts of capital and large production units, pushing the imperial 
powers to secure overseas resources (Magdoff, 2003).   Yet as Foster and Clark (2009) note, previous 
theories of imperialism tend to analyze imperialism in terms of its effects on the flows of economic surplus, 
rather than in terms of ecological damage wrought by the robbing of Third World countries of their 
resources and the destruction of their environments.   
 
19
 I use ‘generally’ here because outside the realm of theory numerous exceptions and variations always 
exist.  It is possible that ecological imperialism may occur between two peripheral countries, for example, 
and increasingly it is occurring between semi-peripheral and peripheral countries.  Again, even finer 
distinctions could be made within regional hierarchies; for example, South Africa has been accused by 
certain scholars as being a ‘subimperial’ force within Sub-Saharan Africa.  However fine the distinctions 
we make power differentials remain in the global economy. It would be rare, for example, for a peripheral 
country in the current world system to have the economic or political power to subjugate the economic or 
political institutions of a core country in order to attain its metabolic needs.    
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2.) Concerning the inner logic of ecological imperialism in the world-system, 
ecological imperialism as rooted in the expansionary tendency of capital, driven 
fundamentally by the endless drive for capital accumulation.   Chapter 2 discusses 
the varied dynamics, contradictions, and specificities of the capital/nature 
relations that push capital to continuously subsume peripheral resources for the 
processes of capital accumulation.    
3.) Ecological imperialism as occurring under capitalist relations of production, with 
classes broadly separable into the owners of the means of production and direct 
producers within core countries, and elites and non-elites within peripheral 
countries.
20
  Though consumers within core countries may benefit in terms of 
consumption from EUE, as pointed out, it is core or semi-peripheral capital that is 
directly involved in the extraction of peripheral resources, the accruing profits, 
and direct negotiations with peripheral elites.  Chapter 4 discusses this issue in the 
Tanzanian case study. 
4.) Ecological imperialism as necessitating amenable political-economic contexts 
within the periphery. Within the periphery, this entails an ongoing process of 
‘continuing primitive accumulation,’ whereby peripheral resources are privatized, 
                                                 
 
20
 The work of Frank and Baran discusses a “comprador class,” that is, the elites in a peripheral country 
whose interests and profits are closely intertwined with their capitalist class counterparts in the developed 
or metropolitan countries. For both Baran and Frank, the peripheral bourgeoisie was parasitic in nature.  
Likewise, Galtung (1971) identified a peripheral elite whose interests overlap with the interests of the 
capitalist class from core economies.  For all three theorists, the interests of the peripheral bourgeoisie 
conflicted with the interests of workers and peasants of the periphery. The basic idea of such dependency 
theorists/theorists of imperialism is that peripheral elites are an important mechanism through which the 
exploitation of the periphery is perpetuated, and it is in this sense that I use the term ‘elite’ in this 
dissertation, and not as used in ‘elite theory.’  ‘Elite theory’, especially by Mosca and Pareto, is quite 
different than Marxist class analysis.  Mosca and Pareto believed that in every country there is a small 
group of elites that hold power through some sort of individual superiority- intellectual, psychological, or 
some other quality. Nor did Pareto see any normative problem with social inequality.  Further, while 
Marxism acknowledges potential conflict among multiple classes, Mosca and Pareto and their followers 
posit opposition between elites and the masses.   
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made accessible in the right quantity and at the right price for capital 
accumulation.  Chapter 2 discusses the concept of ‘continuing primitive 
accumulation’ in regards to ecological imperialism, as well as neoliberal 
economic policies regarding FDI.  Chapters 3 and 4 discuss continuing primitive 
accumulation in regards to Africa at large and Tanzania specifically.  
5.) Ecological imperialism as hinging upon dynamics of unequal power and 
dependency within a hierarchical international division of labor in the world-
system, as a historical result of colonialism and uneven development. Unequal 
power can mean economic, political, military, ideological, and so on, and can 
manifest in large variety of ways, for example direct policies (such as FDI 
regimes in Africa as will be discussed), structural economic characteristics 
(example, VA tends to congregate in core, not periphery), or even through more 
indirect channels of dependency, such as peripheral dependence on technology 
and conceptions of development.  Chapters 3 and 4 deal with dynamics of unequal 
power in terms of FDI in Africa and as a case study, Tanzania.    
6.) In terms of resource transfer, ecological imperialism as occurring through two 
primary mechanisms- international trade and foreign investment (though illegal 
activities such as smuggling can occur, and under colonialism, transfer occurred 
through direct occupation of land/resources).  It cannot really be called 
imperialism if hypothetical country A decides to give hypothetical country B 
resources in solidarity, for example, even if such a transfer results in EUE.
21
 
                                                 
21
 In terms of ecological imperialism and sink capacity, usurpation of peripheral sink capacity can occur 
through international trade and foreign investment.  For example, environmental regulations concerning 
mining can be re-written under foreign investment regimes.  However, ecological imperialism can also 
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7.) Ecological imperialism as resulting in some sort of negative socio-ecological 
impacts for the peripheral country. Ecologically, for example, this could be in 
terms of the draining of resources and/or the degradation of sink capacity, 
socially, for example, this could include dispossession of land or resources, or 
health issues related to pollution.  For the draining of resources, this includes the 
draining of non-renewables, or the use of renewables in an unsustainable manner.  
On the sink side, ecological imperialism can result in degradation of sink 
capacity, pollution, waste, and so on.  Overall, ecological imperialism allows for 
displacement of environmental burdens outside of core/semi-peripheral national 
borders. 
8.) Ecological imperialism as historically contingent, mutable, and unfolding 
dialectically according to a number of factors, including: a.) resistances within the 
periphery, such as internal, domestic class conflict or anti-imperial struggles; 
Chapters 3 and 4 discuss this in depth, b.) changes in the metabolic needs of 
imperialist nations- whether due to technological changes, geopolitical 
considerations (example competitive capital in Africa), ecological considerations, 
and so on.  Chapter 2 discusses this dynamic in more detail.   
In addition, as Bunker had initiated in his work on unequal exchange and the Amazon, 
there exists a structural tendency for extractive economies to be plagued with 
underdevelopment.  Similarly, one could generalize that ecological imperialism has a 
tendency to produce certain internal socio-political characteristics within the peripheral 
                                                                                                                                                 
occur through non-trade mechanisms where there is global commons, such as the usurpation of global 




country, as certain socio-political characteristics are conducive to the operation of 
ecological imperialism.  Such characteristics can be thought of as ‘internal supportive 
structures’ to ecological imperialism, and often result in a mal-developed state plagued 
by high levels of inequality and social conflict over resources.  Chapter 4 discusses such 
characteristics in regards to Tanzania. Such features include: 
1. Lack of democratic control over resources, instead resources tend to be controlled 
by a peripheral elite, either a bureaucratic elite associated with political power, 
domestic elites associated with capital, or some combination thereof.  
2. Elite/foreign investment collusions and overlap of interests. 
3. Conflict of interests with the non-elite peripheral citizenry. 
4. Social conflict arising from conflict of interests between elites and non-elites. 
Though ecological imperialism has a tendency to produce these characteristics, 
hypothetically speaking, it could still exist even for a state where democratic control of 
resources and equal distribution of gains from resources existed.  This would be the case 
if the peripheral country remained operating in a global economic system where global 
economic policies placed the peripheral economy at a structural disadvantage.  
In terms of internal economic characteristics that ecological imperialism has 
tendency to produce, Bunker’s concept of discontinuous economies, with the issues 
identified by Bunker as listed above, remain an important road map, and will not be 
repeated here.  In the case of FDI more specifically, ecological imperialism has a 
tendency to produce skewed economic policies that disproportionately favor investors.  
Again, Chapters 2, 3 and 4 go into the necessary depth for further explanation of these 
core features of ecological imperialism.  
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Ecological imperialism and its relation to ecologically unequal exchange 
Constructing a theory of ecological imperialism sheds light on the political 
economy that ecologically unequal exchange is embedded in, and can potentially clarify 
the relationship of EUE to the issue of imperialism.  In terms of the relationship of 
ecologically unequal exchange to ecological imperialism the issue is not always clear in 
the literature, and a counter-intuitive finding of this dissertation is that while ecological 
imperialism and ecologically unequal exchange may be related and mutually reinforcing 
in many cases, they should be kept analytically distinct as they are not actually 
synonymous. 
The above empirical studies suggest that the world-system is characterized by 
overall asymmetrical transfer of resources from periphery to core or semi-periphery, with 
unequal environmental distributions globally.  This has been linked to the overall 
structure of international trade, and international trade is, in the EUE literature, most 
often mentioned as the central mechanism through which EUE occurs. Given that the 
current structure of international trade has its origins in the subjugation of peripheral 
countries during the colonial period, EUE can be conceptualized as an overall historical 
consequence of ecological imperialism.  As such, the study of ecological imperialism is 
essential to understanding the political economy of ecologically unequal exchange.  
However, not every typically peripheral, extractive economy always exhibit EUE, 
though it may be subject to ecological imperialism.  As will be discussed in some detail 
in Chapter 5, this was the case for Tanzania, which proved to be something of an 
anomaly in contrast to the general biophysical trend of the African continent in terms of 
EUE.  Likewise, a country may be experiencing EUE, but not experiencing the same 
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socio-economic-political aspects of ecological imperialism.  Hypothetically speaking, a 
country could export fossil fuels, but under nationalized conditions, whereby profits are 
used for development purposes.  This country would be qualitatively different from 
another country where fossil fuel profits are all controlled by MNCs with highly 
liberalized FDI regimes.  However, both countries would share the concerns raised by 
EUE and ecological economics, that is, the draining of non-renewable resources in a 
world-system where production and consumption standards in core countries appear to 
necessitate EUE.    
In any case, nuanced analysis on a case- to-case basis- that does not conflate EUE 
and ecological imperialism while also seeking to investigate the relation between them- is 
important. This is especially important for empirical studies of EUE where indicators are 
used to quantitatively measure environmental distributional inequalities, and track 
resource flows, ecological footprints, embodied pollution, and so on in order to 
investigate the trend of core regions shifting environmental burdens onto peripheral 
regions.  Tracking biophysical flows does not capture unequal dynamics of power per se, 
though it can demonstrate the environmental effects of such unequal power.  For 
example, Africa has become a net importer of food and agricultural products.  Studies 
have argued that this is a result of population growth, low and stagnating agricultural 
productivity, policy distortions, weak institutions and poor infrastructure.  For poor 
African countries, this has meant difficulties in paying for their food imports 
(Rakotoarisoa and Iafrate, 2011). The import of foodstuffs in Africa does not indicate a 
position of power in this case; it indicates a position of vulnerability given issues of 
poverty and malnutrition.  Though both EUE and ecological imperialism are 
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fundamentally concerned with issues of inequality and power imbalance in hierarchical 
world-system, unequal power imbalances are often only apparent through the analysis of 
economic policy, history, political configurations, directional flow of profits, among 
many other factors.    
 
The chapters and methodology 
Pulling from Marxist ecology, critical political ecology, and an environmental 
interpretation of Polanyi, Chapter 2 provides the theoretical foundation for this 
dissertation.  It discusses the fundamental contradiction and tensions between the endless 
drive for capital accumulation and nature, and the dynamics of crises and expansion that 
underlie ecological imperialism and the subsumption of peripheral resources.  It also 
contextualizes neoliberal policies that affect the periphery as a historically distinct 
moment of ecological imperialism.  Chapter 3 provides a critical political ecological 
perspective on the era of economic nationalism in the Third World, and the subsequent 
era of neoliberalism.  It historically traces the ideological basis and economic policies 
behind Third World attempts to achieve economic independence and sovereignty over 
their own resources, and how these attempts were met with a neoliberal ‘counter-
countermovement’ following the debt crisis of the developing world.   
Chapters 4 and 5 focus on a case study of Tanzania, and are based upon a six-
month field research period. Chapter 4 examines the political economy of the mining and 
land sectors of Tanzania in regards to FDI, addressing the concerns of ecological 
imperialism as conceptualized and explored in earlier chapters.  Chapter 5 returns to the 
issue of ecologically unequal exchange, and provides the results and analysis of an 
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economy-wide material flows account (EW-MFA) for Tanzania.  In Chapter 5, I pose a 
rather straight-forward research question:  how has increased economic integration 
throughout the neoliberal years affected Tanzania’s metabolic profile?  Specifically, has 
increased economic integration, especially foreign investment, resulted in ecologically 
unequal exchange, and if so, what are the effects over time from 1970-2010?   The results 
of the EW-MFA are counter-intuitive, and invoke a discussion on the limitations of the 
use of EW-MFAs in measuring EUE in Chapter 5, particularly for countries like 
Tanzania whose main export is in preciousities.   
The primary (and official) goal of the in-country research was to gather national 
level data for the EW-MFA.
22
  This entailed gathering data from the Tanzanian National 
Bureau of Statistics, the Ministry of Energy and Minerals, the Tanzanian Petroleum 
Development Corporation, and numerous conversations with statistics officials to clarify 
issues of data.  All data gathering occurred in the main city of Dar es Salaam,
23
 and was 
eventually combined with international sources as indicated in Appendix III.  Chapter 5 
provides an overview of the structure, methodology and theory behind the EW-MFA, 
along with results and discussion. 
Though my primary research in Tanzania was limited to data gathering for the 
EW-MFA, I also had the opportunity to gather a number of secondary resources on 
foreign investment in Tanzania’s mining sector and land. These included newspaper 
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 National data can often diverge considerably from data available from international sources, and during 
my several month visit to the Institute of Social Ecology Vienna for the purposes of learning the EW-MFA, 
I was encouraged to examine possible discrepancies between different sources. In Tanzania’s case, 
however, the discrepancies were surprisingly not very large.   
 
23
 Living in the main city of Dar was revealing in a number of ways, as the effects of environmental 
degradation in the rapidly growing city saturated every aspect of daily living in terms of constant pollution, 
lack of basic infrastructure for sanitation, and urban slums.  This reality contrasted sharply with the obvious 
wealth of elites and expats, who could afford to live in closely guarded compounds on the nicer part of the 
Dar peninsula.       
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articles, reports from various NGOs, and academic books, from which I was able to 
construct Chapter 4.  I was also able to engage in a number of informal conversations and 
ask questions germane to the topic of my research, including perceptions on foreign 
investment (in particular concerning the conflict surrounding the mining sector and land), 
the government, rising inequality in Tanzania, environmental problems, and foreign 
political and economic influence.
24
 Though formal interviews were not possible given the 
political sensitivity of my research matter and the limitations to my stated research 
purpose,
25
 it was from such informal interviews that I perceived a general feeling of 
discontent among Tanzanians; more than once the term ‘neocolonial’ arose to describe 
the situation with foreign investment, and much anger was expressed at the level of 
corruption of the political elite who were seen as responsible for making dubious 
contracts with investors.  Though such interviews and discussions were only informal, 
they gave depth and concrete reality to my research.  Observations derived from such 
discussions are peppered throughout this dissertation.    
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 Informal interviews included an interviews with an economist at Tanzania’s Policy Research for 
Development (REPOA), a member of Tanzania Natural Resource Forum (TNRF), a local agricultural 
development officer from the district of Lushoto, a community development officer in Morogoro, and 
another community development officer in Iringa, plus a number of ordinary Tanzanians, including 
secondary school teachers, villagers, taxi drivers, hotel managers, and business owners from the Asian 
diaspora.  Having lived in Tanzania as a Peace Corps volunteer from 2002-2004, many of the contacts with 
ordinary Tanzanians were former students, old friends and acquaintances, so there already existed a level of 
trust and openness.    
 
25
 The grant was a Fulbright-Hays doctoral research dissertation grant.  As a US government agency, 
Fulbright must obviously strive not to offend host countries, and grant proposals are screened for political 
sensitivity.  Further, obtaining research permission from the Tanzanian government is difficult. The process 
takes many months, and when research is approved, the researcher agrees to only research in restricted 
areas according to their research proposal.  Research that deviates from the stated purpose is illegal. With a 
stated research purpose of gathering national level data for the EW-MFA, I had to be quite careful in 
gathering information on conflict surrounding foreign investment, as it is perhaps one of the most political 
sensitive topics right now.   
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Chapter 2:  Ecological Marxism, Ecological Imperialism, and a Critical 
Re-Interpretation of Neoliberalism in the Periphery   
Introduction 
  
In Chapter 1, I had discussed the major approaches in the extant literature of an 
issue of increasing salience; global environmental distributional inequalities in a context 
of global environmental crises.  In conjunction with this topic, I had offered my own 
preliminary sketch of ecological imperialism.  This chapter seeks to explore the concept 
of ecological imperialism in more theoretical depth, as well as its relation to neoliberal 
policies, pulling from ecological Marxism, Polanyi’s concept of double-movement, and 
critical political ecology.  
During the mid-20
th
 century, a form of developmental state emerged throughout 
many post-independence countries that adopted various state-centered, interventionist 
development plans and programs.  (Haque, 2008; Leftwitch, 1995; Meyns and Musamba, 
2010).  But by late the 1970s, state interventionist policies were being increasingly 
replaced throughout both the developed and developing world by market-oriented 
principles under the rubric of stabilization, efficiency, productivity, and competitiveness. 
While neoliberalism has been criticized on a wide variety of grounds, including its impact 
on the welfare of the working class, relatively little has been written on its relation to the 
environment (Heynen, 2007). Building on the work of Marxist ecologists, critical 
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political ecologists, and an environmental reading of Polanyi, this chapter makes a case 
that this neoliberal
26
 trend is a historically distinct moment in the expansionary 
tendencies of capital to subsume peripheral resources-  that is, as a historically distinct 
moment of ecological imperialism and part of the most current strategy of accumulation. 
On the one hand, the neoliberal turn can be interpreted as a ‘counter-countermovement’ 
against the protective measures post-independence countries constructed, in regards to 
their natural resources, against the vicissitudes of the international market and in their 
quest for national sovereignty. On the other hand, the neoliberal turn can be 
conceptualized as enabling the political-economic context for opening up new 
environmental vistas of previously uncapitalized nature for integration and regulation by 
the market.    
The first section of the chapter examines the following: first, the fundamental 
tensions and contradictions arising in the capitalist mode of production between the 
endless accumulation of capital and the sustainability of nature, second, how these 
tensions and contradictions generate ecological crises and crises of capital accumulation, 
third, the role of spatial geographical expansion in attenuating capitalistically produced 
ecological crises and restoring the conditions for accumulation. Overall, it seeks to probe 
more deeply into the logic and dynamics of this historical tendency for capital to subsume 
peripheral resources, or the logic underlying ecological imperialism. The second section 
of this chapter examines the ‘neoliberalization of nature’ and addresses, first, nature as an 
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 Neoliberalism in regards to nature, and in regards to specific economic policies, are discussed and 
defined throughout this chapter and proceeding chapters.  However, in certain places neoliberal economic 
policies are broadly referred to.  Khan offers a succinct list for neoliberal (Washington Consensus) policies 
in the African context, including:  privatization (of state-owned enterprises), deregulation (in terms of 
abolishment of government regulations for firms entering the market, or restrict competition), property 
rights secured by law, financial liberalization, trade liberalization, removal of restrictions on foreign direct 
investment, fiscal discipline, and government expenditure priorities whereby economic criteria rather than 
political criteria determine allocation of expenditures (Khan, 2005). 
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inherently politicized sphere, second, drawing from an ecological reading of Polanyi, the 
neoliberalization of nature as a counter-countermovement, third, the neoliberalization of 
nature as accumulation by dispossession and as restoring the conditions necessary for 
capital accumulation.  The last section looks more closely at specific neoliberal policies 
and effects from these central concepts of counter-countermovement and accumulation 
by dispossession.   
 
The capital/nature dialectic:  contradictions and tensions 
In Marxist ecology, characteristics inherent to the capitalist mode of production 
are argued to conflict with, dominate, contradict, or undermine nature, with deleterious 
consequences to both the greater environment and human beings.  Perceived as 
fundamentally antagonistic, the capital/nature relation is, alongside the antagonistic 
labor/capital relation, a principal contradiction.
27
  It arises from and is ultimately 
unresolvable within the capitalist mode of production.  This principal contradiction has 
several primary aspects. First, capitalism as a social relation is defined by the complete 
social separation of the direct producers from the necessary material conditions of 
production,
28
 starting with the appropriation of land through the process denoted as 
primitive accumulation.  Second, forced to sell their labor-power for wages, these ‘freed’ 
material conditions and ‘freed’ labor, are recombined in the wage-labor production of 
commodities in pursuit of the endless accumulation of capital. Hence, in contrast to other 
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 A contradiction, Bertell Ollman wrote in a book on Marxist dialectical thinking, is the incompatible 
development of different elements within the same relation, which is to say between elements that are also 
dependent on one another.  Whereas non-dialectical thinkers in every discipline are involved in a non-stop 
search for the outside agitator, Ollman states, dialectical thinkers attribute the main responsibility for all 
change to the inner contradictions of the system or systems in which it occurs (Ollman, 2003).   
 
28
 Excepting labor power, which for Marx was also among the material conditions of production. 
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modes of production, in the capitalist mode of production the drive for capital, that is the 
advancement of value in money form in order to produce more value (M-C-M’), 
dominates production. From the standpoint of capital, as Marx wrote, the natural 
conditions of production become ‘free gifts’ of nature, to be freely appropriated by 
capital, providing use-values that capital needs to produce and realize surplus-value.  This 
conversion of nature’s gifts into conditions of surplus value production was and continues 
to be enabled by the freeing of labor power from the land and other necessary conditions 
of production, in a mutually bound process (Burkett, 2006). 
Thus in the capitalist mode of production labor and nature, freed from previous 
social constraints, are regulated to being inputs in the production process in the endless 
drive for capital accumulation.  Nature becomes, as neoclassical economists categorize it, 
natural capital.  Marxists have long well-noted the consequences for human development 
that the deepening of alienation and exploitation of labor has; concerning nature, 
Marxists ecologists argue that the consequences are no less.  From the standpoint of 
human development, Marx himself had pointed out that the system’s treatment of labor 
power and natural conditions as separate capital assets appears as a ‘loss of control over 
our own lives, which necessarily includes our relationship with nature’ (Burkett, 2006).  
As Polanyi later elaborated, in making land and labor available for sale as commodities, 
the price of which is to be determined by the self-regulating market for the first time in 
history, market society had ruptured the articulate whole, which labor, life, land and 
nature had formed, tied up with the organizations of kinship, neighborhood, craft, and 
creed, with tribe and temple, village, guild, and church (Polanyi, 1957). 
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Building on these initial insights, Marxist ecologists have tried to grapple, in one 
manner or another, with exactly why the conversion of labor and nature into separate 
capital assets for the purpose of creation of profit is so fundamentally destructive to 
nature and human development. Marxist ecologists such as Burkett, O’Connor, Foster, 
and others such as Vandana Shiva point towards the antagonistic relation between 
capitalism’s reproduction requirements and the sustainable reproduction requirements of 
labor and natural conditions, considered as ecologically co-evolving entities.  
Capitalism’s reproduction requirements are autonomous from the sustainable 
reproduction of labor-power and natural conditions; in other words, for capitalist 
production, all that matters is that labor-power and material conditions be separately, 
reliably and widely available in forms that can be combined as commodity production by 
wage-labor. As such capitalist reproduction does not recognize any limit to the entropy 
level in its matter-energy environment, and given its drive of endless accumulation has an 
inherent tendency to overextend the limits of its natural conditions (Burkett, 2006).  
In capitalist economies, individual capitals use profits to make more profits, 
which become self-expanding capital. Quantitatively, capitalist self-expansion has no 
strict limits per se. Nature, however, does, as it organizes itself on very different 
principles. Biological and physical systems, hydraulic cycles, heat/energy systems, soil 
cycles, ecosystem diversity, and so on, are organized without regard to the needs of 
capitalist reproduction, and the reproduction of such cycles may span millennia.  
(O’Connor, 1998) 
Aside from the antagonistic relation between the requirements of capitalist 
reproduction and the sustainable reproduction of labor-power and natural conditions, 
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Foster et al. argue that capitalist social relations of production, that is, the separation of 
the workers from their means of production, are both cause and condition of a historically 
distinct and environmentally destructive capitalist geography.  Re-formulating Marx’s 
original concept of metabolic rift, Foster and others argue that capitalism necessitates an 
epochal shift in the town-country division of labor.  Marx had noted that capitalism 
concentrates population and manufacturing industry in urban centers in a way that 
prevents the return to the soil of its constituent elements consumed by man in the form of 
food and clothing; therefore it hinders the operation of the natural condition for the 
lasting fertility of the soil.  The separation of the direct producers from the means of 
production implied a new geography of wealth and power, whereby all manner of 
biophysical wealth, including laboring bodies and the cheap food to nourish them, were 
directed towards urban spaces (Moore 2001, 2003, 2011).  
In the transition to capitalism, a metabolic rift appeared as these original sources 
of wealth were largely produced in agrarian spaces, but increasingly consumed in urban 
spaces.  Without a systemic mechanism to recycle urban-industrial wastes to the 
countryside, historical capitalism tends to produce nutrient depletion in the countryside, 
and pollution in the cities, a central dynamic in escalating biophysical exhaustion and 
pollution.  That is, internal to and constitutive of capitalist geography is a metabolic rift - 
a disruption accentuated by industrial capitalist agriculture that intensifies the robbing of 
soil of its nutrients and fertility.  Burkett, Foster, Clark, and York have generalized the 
concept of metabolic rift to include a growing list of metabolic rift mechanisms, such as 
the disposal of non-biodegradable items, biospheric disruptions such as in the ozone, and 
the problems of climate change (Burkett, 2006; Foster, Clark and York dates here). 
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Capital, ecology and crisis 
O’Connor (1998) was one of the first to link the potential relation between 
ecological crises and crises in accumulation. O’Connor’s second contradiction of capital 
theory has been criticized by ecological Marxists (Foster 2002, Burkett 2006) on a 
number of grounds, as will be discussed.  But it remains important nonetheless, not least 
because its subsequent criticisms can contribute to the theoretical framework of 
ecological imperialism.  I suggest that through incorporating elements of O’Connor’s 
theory as well as elements of the criticisms against it, together with the work of Marxist 
ecologist Jason Moore, aspects of the expansionary tendency of capital under ecological 
imperialism can be construed.   
Incorporating the work of Marx and Polanyi, O'Connor (1998) argues that 
capitalism necessarily undermines the "conditions of production"-   which he defines as 
all services not directly produced by capital, but which capital needs in order to 
accumulate, including nature, labor, and various forms of infrastructure produced by the 
state. In Marxist theory, capitalism has a tendency to generate economic crises, and such 
crises are rooted in antagonistic labor/capital relations.
 29
 However, O’Connor also argued 
that capital creates its own limits because of its self-destructive capitalization of external 
nature.  That is, capitalism has a tendency to degrade the external or natural conditions of 
production.   The gist of O’Connor’s argument is that degradation of natural conditions of 
production generates rising costs for capitalism, leading to a profit squeeze, and 
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 In Marxist theory an economic crisis implies the rupture in the money, productive, or commodity circuit 
of capital, or more generally, a disjuncture or break in the reproduction and accumulation of capital as a 
whole (O’Connor, 1998).  In the endless drive for extraction of surplus value, in the capitalist mode of 
production the working class must produce more value than they are paid. With the rising rate of surplus 
value, crises can result from barriers to the realization of surplus value through the sale of goods and 
services, due to the low purchasing power of the non-capitalist class.  This first contradiction represents an 
economic crisis that manifests itself on the demand side, that is, on the realization of profits.   
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consequently the ‘second contradiction of capital.’  Like other eco-Marxists argue, 
O’Connor recognized that under capitalism profits are both the means and ends to 
economic activity, and as such capitalist self-expansion has no strictly economic limits, 
though Nature does.  O’Connor argued that because capitalism necessitates a constantly 
expanding economy, the demand for raw materials will grow (everything else being the 
same). In this case, increases in the demand for resources and expanded resource 
exploitation raise average costs, tending to depress the rates of profits and accumulation, 
and potentially generating a crisis.
30
  Alternatively, cheap raw materials pose the danger 
of rapid depletion and exhaustion of resources, as when they are comparatively 
inexpensive, profit rates are relatively high and hence the demand for resources and 
accumulation will be relatively rapid (O’Connor, 1998). 
Overall, the tendency for capital to undermine its natural conditions of production 
underscores an inner contradiction in the capitalist mode of production that, in turn, 
potentially creates economic problems.  For example,  the destruction wrought by climate 
change, the depletion of easily accessible raw materials for the production process, and so 
on, may be conceived as capitalistically produced ecological crises as well as 
capitalistically produced barriers to capital accumulation. In addition, just as a disciplined 
labor force may act as a barrier to capital accumulation, environmental and other social 
movements defending natural conditions may also raise costs and make capital less 
flexible. Hence capital through undermining its conditions of production might raise the 
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 To his credit, O’Connor did recognize that individual capitals (alone or combined with other capitals)  
attempt to overcome bottlenecks by investing in equipment, technology and infrastructure to open up new 
mineral and fuel deposits, arable land, and so on. Relatively expensive raw materials and energy also create 
incentives for individual capitals to recycle, to use substitutes or to produce or use a given quantity of 
materials more efficiently. He also recognized that the latter is arguably the most important way that capital 




costs of the elements of capital, which, in turn, might bring about an economic crisis of a 
particular type, an ‘underproduction of capital.’
31
  This form of crises has been central to 
the work of Marxist ecologists such as O’Connor and Moore in conceptualizing the links 
between ecological crises and crises of accumulation.
32
   
As stated, O’Connor’s model has been criticized on a number of grounds, but in 
keeping both parts of O’Connor’s argument as well as points brought up by his critics, 
one can move forward toward an understanding of the ecological dynamics that push 
capital to expand spatially.  First, O’Connor’s contribution recognizes that 1.) capitalism 
has a tendency to undermine its objective or natural conditions of production, and this is a 
primary contradiction, 2.) at a certain point, this may threaten capital accumulation 
through crisis of underproduction, thus we must conceive of certain forms of crises as 
capitalistically produced, e.g. capitalism has inherent contradictions that act as limitations 
to its own growth.  
But O’Connor’s critics have also raised important points.  Foster (2002) criticizes 
O’Connor, acknowledging that though rising costs from ecological degradation may have 
some effect on regional developments, in itself the theory of the second contradiction 
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 Marx argued that shortages of natural resources can arise from natural conditions external to the 
production process (e.g. bad harvests arising from forces outside the control of humans).  But he also 
argued that the dynamism of capitalist production itself leads the portion of constant capital that consists of 
fixed capital to run significantly ahead of the portion consisting of organic raw materials, so that the 
demand for these raw materials grows more rapidly than their supply, i.e., the overproduction of machinery 
on the one hand, and the underproduction of raw materials on the other.  It was O’Connor, however, who 




 In Marxist ecology, therefore, capitalist crises of accumulation can bear two forms: one arising from the 
capital-labor antagonism (a first contradiction of overproduction) and the second from a capital-nature 
contradiction (a second contradiction of underproduction).  For O’Connor, these two forms of crises were 
not mutually exclusive, but could interact and reinforce each other.   O’Connor proposed that rising costs 
issuing from the degradation of the conditions of production has, since the 1970s, set in motion a dynamic 
that will fetter accumulation from the supply side, reinforcing difficulties the system already faces in the 




cannot account for the stagnation of the world economy since the 1970s.  The global 
ecological crisis threatens humanity but is not, Foster argues, implicated in the ripening 
of accumulation crisis (Foster, 2002). Burkett (2006) states a similar critique, arguing that 
Marxists must distinguish clearly between two types of crisis.  In the first kind of crisis, 
capital accumulation itself is threatened by environmental constraints on supplies of its 
requisite material use-values, for which he gives an example of the 19
th
 century cotton 
crises, and the more recent oil and other materials-price shocks.  The second kind of 
environmental crisis involves capitalism’s degradation of the conditions of human 
development though not necessarily the obstruction to the accumulation of capital.  
Burkett criticizes O’Connor’s second contradiction in that O’Connor emphasizes the 
rising costs to capitalists stemming from various defensive expenditures against 
environmental degradation.  Burkett argues that O’Connor treats these defensive 
activities instigated by environmental degradation as ‘pure costs’ for capitalism.  But, 
O’Connor’s analyses neglect the possibility that such activities may represent profit-
making opportunities for capitalist enterprise insofar as they can be converted into 
commodities produced by wage labor.  All that capitalism requires from the environment, 
Burkett insists, are conditions consistent with the reproduction of exploitable labor power 
and the objectification of abstract labor in commodities.  It does not require any 
reproduction of natural resources in their extant state, unless such a reproduction is a 
requirement for conditions above. Indeed, the creation of substitutes, as well as the 
tapping of previously unexploited resources, provides many opportunities for profitable 
investment and production (Burkett, 2006). 
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Thus, Foster and Burkett’s criticism is important as it draws attention to the 
important insight that ecological crisis may be used as a new source of investment and 
profit.  This is a point crucial to understanding some of the primary expansionary 
tendencies of capital in regards to the subsumption of peripheral resources. 
 
Contradiction, crisis, and the expansionary tendencies of capital accumulation 
Foster and Burkett raised a critical point for understanding the capital-nature 
dialectic: while environmentally produced crises may act as a fetter to capital 
accumulation, this exists as potential only and crisis of accumulation does not necessarily 
follow ecological crisis.  Rather, both orthodox Marxists and ecological Marxism posit 
that one of the most significant characteristics of capitalism is its dynamic capacity to re-
create itself through crises and restore, renew, and re-establish the necessary conditions 
of accumulation.  Capitalism may be crisis-ridden but it is also crisis-dependent, and 
economic crises can act as disciplinary mechanisms, forcing individual capitals or the 
economy as a whole to increase flexibility, restructure and readjust (O’Connor, 1998). 
More to the central point of this chapter, crises have been key to explaining the logic 
underlying the dynamics of imperialism.  Theorists such as Luxemburg (1964) linked 
together the inner contradictions of capitalism, crises of accumulation, and the necessity 
of global expansion in the restoration of the conditions for accumulation. Similarly, crises 
can arise from the inherent contradiction between the drive for endless capital 
accumulation and the sustainable reproduction of natural conditions, for which the 
expansion of capital into previously uncapitalized nature becomes central to restoring the 
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conditions of accumulation. Capitalism is not a closed system, but requires the wide 
casting of a global net to stabilize the system.   
While the whole of world-systems theory and dependency theory deals with the 
appropriation of peripheral resources by the core capitalist economies, the Marxist 
ecologist who has gone the furthest in specifying the connections between ecology, 
accumulation, crises and expansion is probably Jason Moore.  Moore, similar to some 
EUE theorists, argues that the emergence of a capitalist world-economy in the early 
modern era also marked the creation of a historically distinct world-ecology.  Through his 
research on the sugar and silver frontiers, Moore’s remarkable work traces a repeating 
pattern in the history of capitalism:  ecological crises of capital accumulation have 
historically led to new spatial expansions of capitalism and new capitalist appropriation 
of natural wealth, which, in turn, create new ecological crises and crises of human 
development while setting the stage for future accumulation crises.  
Though stated differently, similar to O’Connor, Moore argues that capitalism has 
a tendency to undermine its conditions of production.  Specifically, increasing the 
extraction of surplus value hinges on increasing labor productivity, which does involve 
technical and social innovation, but most importantly from an ecological perspective, it is 
the abundance of ‘free gifts’ which has fueled capitalism’s technological dynamism. 
Essentially, new technology allows a geometrically rising volume of extra-human nature 
to attach to an average hour of work performed. Capitalism, Moore asserts, has sustained 
itself on the basis of cheap inputs and through revolutionizing the ecological relations of 
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production on a system-wide level, and through mobilizing a succession of great leaps 
forward in the relative ecological surplus
33
  (Moore, 2001, 2003, 2011, 2012). 
But these dynamics necessarily pushes expansionary tendencies on a global scale, 
as they typically reward the rapid exhaustion of nature (and human nature), and instigate 
ecological crises, which can act as fetters on the accumulation of capital.  Thus what 
Moore discusses can be seen as a fundamental dynamic of ecological imperialism: when 
the exhaustion of human and biophysical natures becomes significant to fetter labor 
productivity in a serious way, capitalists and empires begin to look for new frontiers. 
Expansion across space and usurpation of previously uncapitalized nature represents one 
fix, which drives down the costs of raw materials; innovation through time represents a 
second fix, allowing for the production of more commodities with fewer workers in less 
time, driving down costs of variable capital (labor power).  This dialectic of plunder and 
productivity, Moore insists, is at the heart of capitalism’s recurrent waves of geographical 
expansion, and he cites the examples of sugar, silver, forest products, fish, iron, and 
copper, all having moved with the same rhythm: occupying, producing, and exhausting 
the ecological formations of the North Atlantic
34
  (Moore, 2003). 
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 Moore defines ecological surplus as the share of world surplus value produced through two forms of 
accumulation by appropriation, one pivoting on processes of biophysical reproduction (labor power, 
forestry, agriculture), the other, on geological extractions (energy and minerals).  He proposes that both 
forms are implicated in raising labor productivity and reducing the costs of reproducing labor power.       
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 Moore argues that the long history of capitalism, from 1450s to early 19
th
 century was actually one of 
recurrent ‘underproduction crises,’ e.g. the insufficient flow of food, energy, and materials relative to the 
demands of value production. Moore argues that if a sufficient mass of cheap energy and raw materials can 
be mobilized, rising organic composition can be attenuated and the tendency towards a falling rate of profit 
checked and reversed, for a time. Also, he suggests, the same logic applies for variable capital.  If a 
sufficient volume of cheap food can be supplied to workers the rate of surplus value may be augmented in a 




Moore of course is not the only one to realize the link between ecological goods, 
labor productivity, and the increase in economic growth and wealth.  Though 
encapsulated in a different framework, this is a more fundamental assertion of ecological 
and environmental economics.  Ayers and Warr, in The Economic Growth Engine, for 
example, have carried out empirical investigations, and found that access to energy and 
its efficient use can explain the bulk of post-1900 income changes in Japan, Britain, and 
the USA.  Further, they see rising real prices for fossil fuel and stagnating efficiencies of 
converting raw energy into useful work as a threat to continued income growth.  Such 
accounts are necessarily partial, however, and generally unable to illuminate 1.)  the inner 
logic as to why labor productivity is so vital in the first place, which necessitates an 
understanding of the capitalist social relations of production and the concept of surplus 
value, 2.)  the necessity of global relations of exchange which allow for the continued 
spatial expansion and usurpation of peripheral resources, as theorists such as Moore and 
Hornborg have painstakingly pointed out.  
Additionally, Foster and Moore have utilized the above discussed concept of 
metabolic rift in explaining the geographical patterns underlying the expansionary 
tendencies of capital.  Drawing from Foster, Moore (2011) posits that the metabolic rift 
created during the transition to capitalism, with its origins in the new division of labor 
between town and country, expanded to become a global geographical pattern both on a 
world scale and within regions. It was with this metabolic rift that nutrients were pumped 
out of one ecosystem in the periphery and transferred to another in the core.  The result 
was a progressive widening and deepening of the metabolic rift not only between town 
and country but also between country and country, greater regional specialization, and 
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intensified metabolic rifts through the introduction of such specializations as 
monocultures.  And importantly, Moore has theorized that through the dialectical process 
of the endless drive for capital accumulation and the endless conquest of nature, capital 
and nature mutually shape and constitute each other.  In capital’s attempt to subsume 
nature into its drive for profits, it literally changes local and global ecologies, depleting 
forests, simplifying landscapes into monoculture plantations, driving climate change.  In 
turn, nature as well constitutes the forms, possibilities, and strategies of capital 
accumulation.  Nature can resist capital’s control, superweeds can affect crop yields in 
the face of increasing fertilizer use, global warming can potentially cause untold 
economic damage, or forests, fisheries, etc. can simply become depleted (Moore, 2009). 
Capital must then find new strategies and forms of accumulation- largely, as Moore 
notes, through a combination of technical innovation and expansionary plunder into 
peripheral areas. 
From their work, and those of scholars such as Magdoff, some of the essential 
dynamics underlying the issue of expansion and ecological imperialism can be 
postulated.  1.) Capital, in its drive for endless accumulation, undergoes technological 
changes that require specific and strategic resources, many of which are largely found 
overseas. Competition between capitalist powers intensifies the expansionary dynamic 
(Magdoff, 2003)  2.) Additionally, the primary capital/nature contradiction being the 
antagonistic relation of capital to nature causes capital to degrade its natural conditions of 
production, and this in turn raises the potentiality for crises of capital accumulation 
(O’Connor, 1998).  3.) Ecologically produced crises of capital accumulation (e.g. crises 
of underproduction) can be, and have historically been, attenuated through spatial 
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expansion (Moore, 2001 and subsequent works). 4.) On the level of individual capitals, 
attempts to overcome ecologically produced crises of capital accumulation can become a 
new source of profit and investment (Foster, 2002; Burkett, 2006). This can result in 
expansion, for example, in the search for new sources of resources overseas.  Building on 
these insights, I would also add an additional source of expansions, 5.)  Creation of 
scarcity through ecological degradation can be a source of profit for individual capitals, 
through the regime of private property, and this can lead to expansion and subsumption 
of peripheral resources.  Foster and Clark noted in their reformulation of the Lauderdale 
Paradox
35
, that capitalism feeds off of scarcity. Scarcity is a necessary requirement for 
something to have value in exchange. In contrast to public wealth, scarcity augments 
individual wealth.  Thus, perversely increases in scarcity in such formerly abundant but 
necessary elements of life such as air, water, and food, potentially enhance individual 
private riches, if exchange value is attached to them, though at the expense of the 
common wealth (Foster and Clark, 2006). The global drive to privatize scarce water 
resources, speculation on fuel and food, among other examples, are attempts within the 
system to directly expand private riches by exploiting scarcity.  Such direct attempts to 
profit off of scarcity are today an important dynamic behind certain expansionary 
appropriations of peripheral resources.  Thus not all expansionary tendencies to subsume 
peripheral resources can be understood solely as attenuations of ecologically produced 
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 Lauderdale argued that there is an inverse correlation between public wealth and private riches such that 
an increase in the latter often served to diminish the former.  Public wealth consists of all that man desires, 
as useful or delightful to him. In Marxian terms, public wealth has use-value and constitutes wealth.  But 
private riches, as opposed to wealth, is all that man desires as useful but exists in a degree of scarcity.  
Scarcity is a necessary requirement for something to have value in exchange, and to augment private riches, 
but this is not the case for public wealth, which encompasses all value in use, not only what is scarce but 
also what is abundant.  The paradox led Lauderdale to argue that increases in scarcity in such formerly 
abundant but necessary elements of life as air, water, and food, would, if exchange values were then 
attached to them, enhance individual private riches, and indeed the riches of the country- conceived of as 
the sum total of individual riches- but only at the expense of the common wealth (Foster and Clark, 2006). 
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crises of accumulation, but may involve in complex ways both dynamics of crisis 
attenuation and new forms of profiting off scarcity. Foreign firms can attempt to privatize 
water sources, as in the case of the Cochabamba water wars, and this can be interpreted 
as a direct subsumption of peripheral resources with the intent of transforming public 
wealth into private riches. Or the rising costs of food, fuel, or arable land itself, due to 
increased demand and shrinking supply, can encourage foreign firms in a new scramble 
for African resources, as has happened since 2003.  In this example, both the tendencies 
of crises attenuation and capitalizing off of scarcity can be perceived. Importantly, it is 
likely that with increasing global ecological degradation this particular dynamic will 
become increasingly visible, as the problems of global large scale land investments 
(discussed in Chapter 4) demonstrate.  
Finally, it is worth noting that none of the above approaches have fully integrated 
finance capital into discussion.  Taking a Marxist/Leninist approach, Haider Khan
36
 
makes a preliminary but promising attempt to ground the concept of ecological 
imperialism in Marx’s circuits approach from Volume 2 of Capital.  Khan’s approach 
relates to the specifically imperialist or export phase of monopoly capitalism, in which 
the export of finance capital from the advanced capitalist countries to the less advanced 
countries of a world-capitalist system plays a crucial role in their relations.  Khan argues 
that ecological imperialism and ecologically unequal exchange are both aspects of 
monopoly capitalism and finance capital, operating in a world-capitalist system of uneven 
development that can be roughly divided into core, semi-periphery and periphery.  The 
export of capital globally leads to the formation of global commodity chains in major 
areas of production in the periphery, but the control of finance capital gives the core 
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Unpublished paper, 2012, “Ecological Imperialism:  A Circuits Approach.”  
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countries enormous leverage over the periphery.   With the enormous scale of production 
and global marketing, Khan states, the ecological damage to the periphery is colossal by 
historical standards. On this issue, however, much empirical work of real world cases 
needs to be done to integrate finance capital into a theory of ecological imperialism.   
 
The neoliberalization of nature 
Contradictions inherent to the capitalist mode of production in its relation to 
nature may drive expansion, but the process of accumulation itself is never static.  Rather, 
accumulation is a dynamic process, unfolding through space and time, and constantly 
changing in its forms and strategies.  At any given point in space and time the political-
economic and policy context that allows for accumulation, and the ideologies supporting 
it, are in a manner distinct, and respond to a capital-society dialectic of resistance and 
counter-resistance.  In Chapter 1, I had defined ecological imperialism broadly as the 
subjugation of the economic, political, and/or social institutions of a (generally 
peripheral) country for the biophysical, metabolic needs of the (generally core or semi-
periphery), and inextricable from the purpose of making such resources accessible and 
amenable (in the right quantities and for the right price) to the needs of capital 
accumulation.  A primary characteristic of ecological imperialism, I had argued, is that 
the particular form it takes is historically contingent, mutable, and at any given moment 
the result of a dialectical unfolding.   In this section I apply this concept for a critical re-
interpretation of the neoliberal reforms that swept through the developing world 
beginning in the 1970s.  Neoliberal policies arguably embody a counter-response to what 
can be conceived of as a Polanyian ‘double-movement’ that arose post-independence in 
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many peripheral countries. This neoliberal ‘counter-countermovement’ has re-established 
the political-social and economic policies and institutions necessary for the restoration of 
the natural conditions of production and subsumption of peripheral resources.  
 
Nature as a politicized sphere 
It is only through a conceptualization of nature as a politicized sphere that 
neoliberal reforms can be comprehended as a counter-countermovement.  Unlike 
orthodox approaches to the environment, whereby nature is regarded as a mere input to 
the production process, Marxist ecologists, political ecologists, and critical environmental 
studies insist that nature is an inherently politically contested sphere.  Building on the 
insights of Polanyi and Marx, O’Connor (1998) for example recognized that neither 
human labor power, nor infrastructure, nor external nature are produced ‘capitalistically,’ 
although capital treats these conditions of production as if they are commodities or 
commodity capital. Because neither labor power nor external nature are produced and 
reproduced in ways governed by the law of value, their price cannot be explained strictly 
in terms of exchange value.   There is no guarantee, for example, that either labor power 
or nature will be available in the form of  what O’Connor, following Polanyi, termed 
‘fictitious’ commodities-  commodities not produced capitalistically but still sold on the 
market as commodities.  Much less is it guaranteed that labor power and nature will be 
reproduced under conditions that permit or favor capitalist production and accumulation 
(O’Connor, 1998). As Marxists have long recognized, wages not only depend on the state 
of the economy, supply and demand, profit rates, and so on, but also on class struggle, 
feminist struggles, nationalist struggles, and so on. Similarly, O’Connor argues, natural 
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conditions, all forms of natural wealth, have no exchange value strictly defined, as there 
is no law of value at work in making land, soil, water, and other natural elements.  
Rather, nature like labor must be made available to capital in requisite quantities, and 
qualities, at the right place and time (O’Connor, 1998).  
However much neoclassical economics and concomitantly environmental 
economics attempt through various methods of valuation to attach prices to clean air, 
attractive views, and other ecosystem services, the exchange value of such ecological 
goods remains an inherently politically contested issue.  Nationalization of natural 
resource firms, attempts by peripheral countries to form cartels to raise the price of 
primary commodities, localized indigenous struggles over the destruction of forest 
homelands, among many other examples all contest the view that ecological goods have 
an inherent price independent of political struggles, and issues of structural inequality and 
power. Hence, the ‘value’ of external nature depends not only on market demand and 
ground rent but also on the class struggle, anti-imperialist struggles, and environmental 
struggles pertaining to the ways that nature may or may not be used and by whom.
37
 Like 
labor-power, nature is an inherently politicized sphere, where the conditions under which 
nature is made available to capital- the price of ecological goods, the requisite quantities, 
and the availability of access- reflects the outcome of contest and resistance and power 
configurations.      
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 The possibility of even locating a ‘correct’ price on nature has developed into a full-fledged debate in the 
field of ecological economics (see Daly and Farley, 2004 for review of debate), and theorists such as 
Martinez-Alier among others have argued that any such ‘correct’ pricing- viewed as the primary solution to 
solving the current environmental crises by orthodox approaches- will inevitably reflect income and power 
inequality (Martinez-Alier, 1995).  From a world systems perspective, Hornborg has argued that the 
capacity of core industrial centers to obtain the necessary biophysical inflows hinges on world market 
prices, which are low enough to allow for continuous accumulation and ecologically unequal exchange, but 
he does not advocate the attempt to calculate any ‘correct’ price for resources (Hornborg, 2011). 
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And it is because of these reasons, as Marxist ecologists such as O’Connor (1998) 
point out, that the conditions of supply must be regulated by the state or capitals. In 
general, capitalist production requires the politically guaranteed existence of labor-power, 
urban infrastructure and space, and environmental conditions.  This also means that 
whether or not these conditions of production are available to capital depends on the 
political power of a host of actors; the political power of capital (and the relative power 
of factions of capital), the power of social movements challenging capitalist forms of 
production conditions (with their various ideological differences and divisions), and state 
structures, ideologies, and institutions (O’Connor, 1998). OPEC and the example of the 
1970s oil price hike, which effectively sent the global economy into recession, is but one 
example of the politicized nature of natural resources, and how power struggles over such 
resources can act as potential barriers to capital accumulation.   
 
Neoliberalism as a counter-countermovement 
Polanyi (2001) argued that the dynamics of 19
th
 and early 20
th
 society was 
governed by a double movement:  the self-regulating market economy expanded 
continuously but this movement was met a by a countermovement checking the 
expansion in definite directions.  Such a countermovement was vital for the protection of 
society, though ultimately incompatible with the self-regulation of the market, and thus 
with the market system itself. This countermovement manifested through a great variety 
of forms, which he argued was due to the broad range of the vital social interests affected 
by the expanding market mechanism. In particular, the countermovement consisted in 
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checking the action of the market in respect to specific factors of production; labor, land, 
and money.  
What is significant about Polanyi’s insight is that it captures an ongoing dialectic 
of movement and countermovement.  It demonstrates how accumulation as a dynamic, 
unfolding process through time and space is shaped by and responds to social resistance. 
Already implicit in Polanyi’s own work, we can more explicitly broaden this concept of 
countermovement to include not only countermovements against the expanding market at 
the national level, but also countermovements against an expanding global market.  This 
would include various resistances against the current era of globalization, as other 
theorists utilizing Polanyi have pointed out (Mittelman, 1998).  It could also include 
many of the developmental policies enacted in the mid-20
th
 century by developing 
countries in their quest for protection from the vicissitudes of the international market 
and national sovereignty.   
During the post-independence period, there emerged a form of developmental 
state in many developing countries that adopted various state-centered, interventionist 
development plans and programs to reduce foreign ownership, enhance economic self-
reliance, redistribute income, develop infrastructure, and promote the overall living 
standards of the people (Haque, 2003).  While the developmental state was far from a 
uniform phenomenon- ranging from varieties of import substitution, state capitalism, 
Marxist-Leninist states, among others, all with varying ideologies and motivations, 
political systems and social institutions- the major point is that many of the states did not 
leave important sectors of the economy to the regulation of the market, and the whole of 
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the neoliberal project was oriented towards the removal of these obstructions.  In 
Polanyi’s brief mention of colonialism, he states:  
But if the organized states of Europe could protect themselves against the 
backwash of international free trade, the politically unorganized colonial 
peoples could not.  The revolt against imperialism was mainly an attempt on 
the part of the exotic peoples to achieve the political status necessary to 
shelter themselves from the social dislocations causes by European trade 
policies. The protection that the white man could easily secure for himself 
through the sovereign status of his communities was out of reach of the 
colored man as long as he lack the prerequisite political government (Polanyi, 
1957, p. 192). 
 
But by late 1970s, in the name of such goals as stabilization, efficiency, productivity and 
competitiveness, the developmental state was replaced by market-oriented principles. 
This restored once again the unfettered expansionary tendencies of the market, which 
today is encapsulated in the more ambiguous term ‘globalization.’ The accessibility of 
the conditions of production for accumulation of capital- labor and nature- were restored 
in varying degrees through such principles as free trade, comparative advantage, 
openness to foreign direct investment, labor and tax reform, financial liberalization, and 
downsizing of the interventionist and redistributive functions of the state.  It is in this 
sense, then, that I argue that the neoliberal reforms beginning in the 1970s for developing 
economies were a counter-response to the second part of Polanyi’s double movement.  
They attempted to repeal the policies that had been put in place by formerly colonized 
states.
38
   In regards to the ecological dimension, the adoption of neoliberal reforms had 
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 Yet this is not to be confused, as some theorists have, with the obsolescence of the state.  Rather it 
should be seen as a redefining of the role of the state, from (at least ideologically) redistributive and 
interventionist, to the liberal conception of the state as protector of private property, and more recently as 
documents from the World Bank and IMF demonstrate, as the enforcer of rule of law.  As Polanyi 
contended, laissez-faire itself was enforced by the state, despite the myth of liberal writers that laissez-faire 
was a natural development. And nowhere is the liberal story more off-base than in regards to former 
colonies, whose integration into the world economy, with specialization in their ‘comparative advantage’ 
and opening up of resources to foreign investment, were made through the forced and often brutal 
 
 68 
clear repercussions for the restoration of the accessibility of natural conditions of 
production, in this case peripheral resources, to the accumulation process, through a 
general thrust to remove obstructions to the accessibility and regulation of peripheral 
resources to foreign capital and the international market.  
In sum, we can conceptualize the environment as an inherently contested political 
sphere, where the expansionary tendencies of capital accumulation (or a self-expanding 
market in Polanyian terms) push towards the subsumption of nature as a crucial factor of 
production, and against which various counter-movements, with variegated motivations 
and ideologies, resist.   Indeed, a number of scholars such as Mittelman (1998), Bernard 
(1997), Bridge (2007) have extended the Polanyian framework in conceptualizing 
environmental resistance politics as a countermovement against the market.  However, I 
would caution against regarding only consciously environmental movements as the only 
countermovement with ecological consequences.  More broadly, any movements, 
political, economic, local or national, motivated by any number of reasons, which contest 
the market subsumption of nature as an input in the production process should be 
interpreted as a countermovement. Polanyi himself had argued for a broad-based 
conception of counter-movement in regards to labor. Nationalizations, restrictions on 
foreign investment/control/ownership, impediments on free trade, primary commodity 
cartels, and so on, all may have different motives but can obstruct the expansionary 
tendency on the part of capital to subsume peripheral resources.    
                                                                                                                                                 
integration, as world system theorists have documented amply.  Similarly, while the fall of the 
developmental state is a complex story, it would be far too reductionist to view the neoliberal turn as 
anything natural and inevitable, as it involved structural adjustment programs under the threat of debt 
crises, state enforcement, often times brutal, against unions and other social resistances, etc.   Neoliberalism 





Neoliberalism and accumulation by dispossession: restoring the ecological 
conditions of accumulation 
While aspects of neoliberal reforms, such as the cracking open of peripheral 
economies to foreign investment, suggest a counter-countermovement against peripheral 
policies of the post-independence era, they are also arguably part of a broader global 
agenda towards the environment. Heynen and others denote this broader agenda as the 
‘neoliberalization’ of nature, consisting of a number of cohesive ideological and policy 
attributes, even as this ‘neoliberalization’ often manifests differently according to 
localized context and reality. (Heynen, 2007)  It is worthwhile looking more closely at 
the central characteristics of the neoliberalization of nature.
39
  Ecological crises are often 
dealt with in a piecemeal and disconnected manner, but should be integrated into the 
broader issues of ecologically unequal exchange and ecological imperialism.  From the 
literature on neoliberalism and nature, what seems to characterize the general thrust 
behind neoliberal policies is, on the one hand, a push towards the enclosure of previously 
uncapitalized resources and land.  That is, the neoliberalization of nature appears to be an 
intensification of the commodification of resources that were unregulated or even 
untouched by humans in general.  On the other hand, there is the counter-
countermovement aspect as described above, the repealing of policies put forth most 
often by the state, to regulate or protect ecologies from their total subsumption and 
regulation by private capital, in particular foreign capital in the case of the periphery.   
Both phenomena have been described with a variety of terms- enclosures, 
continuous primitive accumulation, dispossession, among others.  As already discussed, 
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 To be sure, ecological crises in the periphery are not solely due to neoliberal policies.  Issues such as 
overpopulation, lack of clean technology, etc., are important as well.    
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underlying all these concepts is the contention that neoliberalism has resulted in a 
restructuring of the social and property relations governing access to and control of 
nature allowing for the enclosure of land/nature and its subsumption to capital. A 
collection of case studies both within the developing and developed world (Heynen, 
2007), for example, found that neoliberal reforms such as the re-structuring involved in 
increasing individuation, exclusivity, private control, and marketization.  Such reforms 
are typically legitimated and represented in terms of enhancing individual freedoms, 
economic efficiency, and environmental quality.  (Heynen, 2007)  
Closely related to this neoliberal process of restructuring of property relations and 
enclosing of land/resources is Marx’s concept of primitive accumulation. The core idea 
of Marx’s primitive accumulation is that the establishment of capitalist relations, and the 
subsequent potential for capital accumulation, necessitates an initial and “…complete 
separation of laborers from all property and the means by which they could realize their 
labor,” e.g. a separation of the workers from the means of production.  In this process of 
separation, the social means of subsistence and of production transforms into capital, and 
the immediate producers into wage-laborers (Marx Volume I).  Modern interpretations 
not only contend that primitive accumulation is on-going, but that it is an elementary, 
extra-economic prerequisite to capitalist production.  De Angelis, for example, argues 
that primitive accumulation is an essential and continuous element of modern societies 
and its range of action extends to the entire world. That is, the dynamics of capital 
accumulation hinge on a continuing process of primitive accumulation, whereby 
(extended) accumulation in one place corresponds to primitive accumulation in another 
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place, and neoliberalism, he argues, is the current manifestation of continuing primitive 
accumulation (DeAngelis, 2001).  
Similarly David Harvey (2005) encapsulates the concept of continuous primitive 
accumulation in his concept of ‘accumulation by dispossession.’  Like Luxemburg, 
Harvey insists that capitalism must perpetually have something outside of itself in order 
to stabilize itself.  ‘Primitive’ or original accumulation constitutes an important and 
continuing force in the historical geography of capital accumulation through imperialism.   
Further, accumulation based upon predation, fraud, and violence very much persists; the 
predatory practices of ‘primitive’ or ‘original’ accumulation within the ‘long’ historical 
geography of capital accumulation remains, and constitutes an important feature of 
neoliberalism since 1973.
40
  Harvey’s view includes the ecological dimension (the 
enclosure of environmental commons or resources) but also essentially all 
transformations from state (or other forms of commons) regulation into the hands of 
private capital.   
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 Harvey links neoliberalism to an over-accumulation crisis that began in the early 1970s (over-
accumulation being the surplus of capital, and potentially also labor, lying idle and having no profitable 
outlets).  He argues that accumulation by dispossession helped solve the over-accumulation problem 
through releasing a set of assets, including labor power, at a very low and in some cases zero cost.  In 
Harvey’s formulation, over-accumulated capital can seize hold of such assets and immediately turn them to 
profitable use.  Privatization, he argues, has opened up vast fields for over-accumulated capital to seize 
upon. As such, if capitalism has been experiencing a chronic difficulty of over-accumulation since 1973, 
then neo-libieral project of privatization was one way to solve the problem. Another solution to over-
accumulation, Harvey argues, would be the release cheap raw materials, such as oil, into the system, 
whereby input costs would be reduced and profits thereby enhanced.  Hence, it seems possible that not only 
crises of under-production, but also crises of over-accumulation, may have implications for the 
expansionary tendency of capital under ecological imperialism.  In era of neoliberalism, and up unto today, 
it is quite possible that both tendencies have been intertwined and present.  If we agree with Harvey that 
there has been a crisis of over-accumulation, and that this is linked to the global push for privatization, 
including of natural resources, it is still clear that resource depletion and problems of underproduction are 
involved when we witness land grabs, military imperialism and fossil fuels, etc.  Determining which 
tendency is the dominant or key tendency, how they interact, and what specific expansions they underlie is 
an important and interesting question- though beyond the scope of this dissertation as it would need 
considerable historical study of concrete conditions. Such an analysis might also shed more light on the 




This link between neoliberalism and primitive accumulation (De Angelis, 2001; 
Harvey, 2005; Perelman, 2000; Heynen et. al, 2007) is an important insight to 
understanding the relationship between neoliberalism and the environment for several 
reasons.   First, as scholars in Neoliberal Environments: False Promises and Unnatural 
Consequences have demonstrated in their case studies, similar to the original processes of 
enclosures, neoliberalization of nature has been predicated upon state involvement, 
enforcement, and legitimization, at the behest of some social class. This brings us back to 
the recognition of nature as a politicized sphere and the importance of movement and 
countermovement in understanding historical change in regards to institutions and social 
relations governing resources, especially peripheral resources. This also challenges one of 
the central myths of the neoliberal model, that privatization means getting the state off 
the back of the economy and rolling back the regulatory red tape (Heynen, 2007). Rather, 
although state power may have changed in form, scale, type of practice, or effectiveness, 
it remains constitutive of neoliberal schemes and regimes.  It also echoes Polanyi, who 
had argued years ago that laissez-faire had never come about naturally, but necessitated 
the enforcement of the state, often at the behest of a specific social group. 
 
Accumulation by dispossession in the neoliberal era, policies and effects 
           This section looks at a set of core, interlinked and interdependent neoliberal 
policies from the angle of accumulation by dispossession and the restoration of the 
ecological conditions of production, including privatization, the downscaling of state 
environmental functions, trade liberalization, and foreign direct investment.  Foreign 
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investment in the African context will be discussed further in Chapter 3 and for Tanzania 
in Chapter 4. 
           Central to the neoliberal project, as noted, is privatization. This process can refer 
to enclosures of land/resources previously ‘uncapitalized,’ or can manifest as 
privatization or counter-countermovement by private capital to subsume commons 
previously regulated by the state. Harvey denotes privatization as ‘the cutting edge of 
accumulation by dispossession,’ citing how assets held by the state or in common were 
released into the market where over-accumulated capital could invest, upgrade, and 
speculate on them.  Privatization is also pivotal in rendering other neoliberal policies 
possible.  In foreign direct investment, for example local governments have allowed 
MNCs to take over resources, water, forests, land for mining operations, and even 
ownership of food by privatizing its genetic codes, all of which hinge on the 
reformulation of property relations.  A number of case studies have been conducted 
describing this process of intensified enclosures and privatization throughout both the 
developed and developing world (Robbins and Luginbuhl, 2007). 
In addition to the re-formulation of property relations in the favor of private 
capital, a number of scholars have documented the scaling back of environmental 
protections by the state.  True to the idea of the double movement, McCarthy (2007) 
argues, early predecessors of environmentalism had some success in resisting liberalism, 
most notably expanding the power of state to administer nature. Increasing environmental 
protection under the Keynesian state in advanced capitalist countries came to represent 
constraint on capitalist accumulation strategies. Assaults on Keynesian era environmental 
regulation, McCarthy contends, is as central to neoliberalism as are assaults on labor and 
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social entitlement programs.  In the developing world, the American Lands Alliance 
conducted a case study of 15 countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America and found that 
due to austerity requirements under neoliberal structural adjustment programs, countries 
where pressured to reduce government spending on environmental programs.  The study 
concludes that this has resulted in the hampering of enforcement capabilities, the 
weakening of protections for forests, the thwarting of efforts to prevent illegal logging of 
protected areas, the instigating of poaching of endangered species, the breeding of 
corruption, and the curtailing of demarcation of indigenous lands (Tockman, 2001).  
Concerning international trade, theorists of EUE have examined the role of the 
structural position of a country in the world system in terms of ecologically unequal 
exchange  as discussed in Chapter 1.  EUE theorists such as Giljum and Eisenmenger 
have argued that neoliberal policies have reinforced the role of peripheral economies as 
source and sink for the metabolic needs of core economies (Giljum and Eisenmenger, 
2004). The ideological stress on comparative advantage that encourages specialization in 
primary commodities, the push for trade liberalization through the reduction of tariffs 
used to promote protection of nascent industries, and the promotion of export-oriented 
growth form the basis of the neoliberal framework in regards to international trade. Chief 
among the sectors that are targeted for export promotion are mining, agriculture and 
forest products.  But the promotion of exports in absence of real improvements in 
countries’ environmental safeguards has been a recipe for environmental destruction, 
including increased deforestation rate (Tockman, 2001).  Other scholars have linked trade 
liberalization with monocroping and its harmful effects on ecosystems (Haque, 1999).  
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Further, multilateral trade agreements have also contained sweeping new 
protections for investors. Looking at multilateral trade agreements, McCarthy (in 
Heynen, 2007) notes that NAFTA, and other recent trade agreements, all share the 
primary goals of increasing FDI and homogenizing regulatory environments across and 
within national territories, and shifting important state functions to the private sector or 
NGOs. Especially important has been the inclusion of substantial investor protections in 
NAFTA and FTAA, and similar ones in WTO.  As a result, major sectors such as mining 
and manufacturing have come under direct control of foreign investors, especially due to 
acquisition of privatized SOEs (Haque, 1999; Bridge, 2007). In the ten year period from 
1985 to 1995, for example, over ninety countries globally adopted new mining laws or 
revised existing legal codes in an effort to promote foreign investment in their mining 
sector.  Overall, some insist that attracting foreign investors aimed at stimulating growth 
and providing hard currency to developing countries is prioritized (Tockman, 2001; 
UNCTAD 2005), above other important social and environmental objectives. 
Unsurprisingly, one of the most consistent outcomes from the IMF imposed increases in 
foreign investment has been the intensification of natural resource extraction for export 
markets (Tockman, 2001).  Thus an argument could be made that foreign direct 
investment constitutes an important mechanism of ecologically unequal exchange at an 
overall global level, is a crucial pillar in the neoliberal counter-countermovement against 
former state protections concerning peripheral resources, and opens new natural vistas 
and terrains for profit. Again, Chapter 3 will provide more details in terms of the African 





Moore theorized that through the dialectical process of the endless drive for 
capital accumulation and the endless conquest of nature, capital and nature mutually 
shape and constitute each other.  In capital’s attempt to subsume nature into its drive for 
profits, it literally changes local and global ecologies, depleting forests, simplifying 
landscapes into monoculture plantations, driving climate change, and so on.  In turn, 
nature as well constitutes the forms, possibilities, and strategies of capital accumulation.  
Nature resists capital’s ongoing efforts for control and subsumption, even if such 
resistance manifests as depletion or ecosystem collapse.  Capital must then find new 
strategies and forms of accumulation- largely, as Moore notes, through a combination of 
technical innovation and expansionary plunder into peripheral areas. 
In the above I have argued that neoliberal policies reflect this manifestation of the 
broader, historical tendency of capital accumulation towards expansion.  Ecological 
imperialism is an outcome, therefore, of a nature-capital dialectic as well as the 
dialectical unfolding of movements and countermovements that hinge upon the social 
resistances and institutions at any given time. Neoliberalism is, arguably, a temporally 
distinct moment in ecological imperialism.     
However, what is new is that both these dialectical unfoldings are occurring in a 
global ecology characterized by resource depletion, soil exhaustion, ecosystem collapse 
and loss of biodiversity in vital spaces that are difficult or impossible to repair, such as 
the destruction of rainforests, depletion of global fish stocks, mass extinction of 
mammals, and overloading of global sinks. In short, as Moore puts it, the era of 
neoliberalism is marked by the end of truly substantial resource frontiers.  
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In this context neoliberalism as a set of policies, often described as cannibalistic 
rather than productive by Harvey and others, has managed to repeal important protections 
put into place in both the developed and developing world.   And, as a number of 
Marxists have noted, as a regime of accumulation it is marked by the hegemony of 
finance, which, with its short-term profit priorities, pushes cannibalistic rather than 
productive tendencies.  Further, the industrializing rise of the emerging economies has 
pitted both core and semi-peripheral nations in competition for resources.  Perhaps 
nowhere are all these dynamics more manifest than in the ‘new scramble for Africa’ of 
the 2000s.   
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Chapter 3:  From Post-Independence Economic Nationalism to the 21
st
 Century 
Scramble for Africa:  a Critical Political Ecological Perspective 
  
 Roughly half a century has passed since the wave of decolonization across Africa, 
and excepting perhaps a brief period of economic nationalism during the post-
independence era, foreign powers continue to occupy a dominate role over African 
resources.  Today, foreign affiliates account for virtually all non-artisanal production in 
metals and minerals in countries such as Mali, Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana, Gabon, 
Ghana, and Namibia among others. Ian oil and gas, foreign affiliates account for over 
half of the production on average in Sub-Saharan Arica (UNCTAD, 2007).   
 The first decade of the 21
st
 century has witnessed a virtual scramble for the 
totality of African resources, including its water supplies, timber, fisheries, minerals and 
fossil fuels, with tens of millions of hectares of land already leased to foreign investors.   
The proximate cause for this ‘new scramble for Africa,’ as some scholars have dubbed it, 
is high commodity prices. The deeper causes includes the tension between a growing 
global capitalist economy and a world of finite natural resources- and, importantly, the 
outcome of a historical struggle that has made African ecologies both cheap and 
accessible.   
 As argued in Chapter 2, nature is a politicized, contested sphere, a point often 
overlooked in apolitical discussions on sustainability and development.  Who holds 
control over, access to, and gains profit from peripheral resources reflects the outcomes 
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of historical contestations of power. The neoliberal policies that currently govern the 
integration of African ecologies into the global economy are an outcome of such 
contestation, policies I had suggested can be conceptualized as a form of continuing 
primitive accumulation.   
This chapter is a historical analysis of the post-independent period in Africa 
(1960s to the mid-1970s), until the neoliberal period and the ‘new scramble for Africa’ of 
the 2000s from a critical political ecological perspective.   During the post-independence 
era, Africa, and much of the Third World, had engaged in concerted efforts to increase 
their sovereignty over and rents from their resources.  This era of economic nationalism 
is scarcely mentioned in mainstreams discussions on African development and 
environment, or often dismissed as a period of inefficient and failed alternative economic 
models.  But from the perspective of political ecology, this era and the subsequent 
transition to neoliberalism is critical to understanding the dynamics of continuing 
primitive accumulation.    
The first section examines the economic nationalism of the 1960s and 1970s.  
Drawing from Polanyi, I had in Chapter 2 termed this era a ‘countermovement’ posed by 
the Third World against the subsumption of their resources by the international capitalist 
system.  The second section examines the transition to the neoliberal era and the political 
economic/political ecological context that engendered a ‘counter-countermovement.’  
The third section looks more in-depth at particular neoliberal policies that governed the 
shift, once again, to foreign control and contrasts these policies with the policies of the 
era of economic nationalism.  The final section provides a broad overview of what a 
number of scholars have dubbed the ‘current scramble for Africa.’  
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The Third World countermovement: The demands for a New International 
Economic Order and resource sovereignty 
Like much of the Third World, after decolonization post-independent African 
countries found themselves politically liberated but in a state of economic dependency 
and underdevelopment, a situation former leader of Ghana Kwame Nkrumah 
characterized as ‘neo-colonial’ (Nkrumah, 1965).  Despite having obtained the status of 
sovereign and equal states, African countries perceived the economic order since WWII 
as continuing an international division of labor that put Africa at a disadvantage while 
largely benefiting the West (Adeniran, 1986).  In pursuit of greater economic 
sovereignty, African leaders undertook the restructuring of their economies along 
developmentalist lines. Laissez-faire capitalism, being the ideology of the former colonial 
powers, was questioned or rejected by most African states, and various forms of 
socialism or state capitalism were implemented (Thompson, 2000).  State intervention 
was seen as integral to overcoming the structural weaknesses of Africa’s economic 
position. Although African economies mainly continued their traditional roles as 
exporters of primary commodities, surpluses from the primary sector were channeled to 
meet the requirements of import-substitution driven industrialization through the 
developmental state (Saul and Leys, 1999).  As with much of the Third World, some 
form of economic nationalism characterized the development paradigm for post-
independent African nations, which for African economies lasted roughly from the 1960s 
to the mid-1970s. 
  As argued in Chapter 2, the meaning of Third World economic nationalism can be 
understood within the context of the contradictions generated by the expansion of the 
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capitalist world system- broadly, as a type of countermovement to the economic 
dependency created under colonial expansion.  More specifically, though, it can be 
understood as a countermovement against the transnational capitalism characterizing the 
post-WWII era. Colonialism had looted Africa in terms of both labor and resources. It 
also involved a radical re-structuring of state borders and political, social, and economic 
systems to meet the metabolic demands of the colonizing countries.  Under colonization, 
the means of production, whether in natural resource industries or the tertiary sector, 
were controlled entirely by the colonists.  Yet even with independence, foreign control 
continued to dominate African economies (Rodney, 1981).  In the post-WWII era, as 
theorists of imperialism (Girvan, 1976 and 1975; Magdoff, 2003) have pointed out, 
transnational corporations (TNCs) became dominant actors in the system of production 
and accumulation.  Features of transnational capitalism, according to Girvan (1976), 
included diversified internationalized production under centralized control; the massive 
size and huge financial resources of the basic institutional unit; technological dynamism 
and vanguardism; and high and continuously growing concentration of economic power. 
This new system came to dominate the world economy, whether developed, 
underdeveloped or socialist (Girvan, 1976).  In the early 1960s, power remained heavily 
in favor of multinational corporations.  
But the advance of capitalism, whether within the boundaries of the nation-state 
or at the level of the world system, has historically been characterized by tensions, 
conflict, and crisis.  Concerning the relation of the Third World to the international 
capitalist system, the major conflict or contradiction after independence arose regarding 
the issue of economic sovereignty- in general the threat to economic sovereignty posed 
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by foreign control and decision-making in major sectors of the domestic economy 
(Girvan, 1975 and 1976). The political status of the newly independent states, formally 
sovereign and equal to all other states with admittance into the United Nations, contrasted 
with their state of economic dependency, and economic sovereignty became inseparable 




In the 1960s Third World countries, with African countries amongst the most 
vocal, began to challenge the power of transnational capital and their neo-colonial 
situation under the aegis of economic sovereignty.
42
 Central to this issue of economic 
sovereignty was sovereignty over their own natural resources, manifest in a series of 
events from the 1960s to the mid-1970s.  Such events included numerous state 
expropriations of foreign-owned natural resource industries (and industries in the tertiary 
sector), the formation of primary commodity cartels such as OPEC, and sets of proposals 
that voiced Third World grievances put forth through the United Nations platform. 
Despite their economic dependency, during this time period Third World states 
discovered that they also had powerful new sources of leverage in international economic 
relations.  The changing international political climate with the rise of the Non-Aligned 
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 At the level of class analysis, Girvan argues that economic nationalism was actually a conflict wrought 
by the contradiction between international capitalism and particular social classes in the Third World. 
Imperialism, he argues, led to the continuous impoverishment of the mass of the population in the 
periphery.  But it also created a dependent comprador bourgeoisie, dependent upon international capital and 
regulated to such parasitic activities as commerce, real estate, light manufacturing, and so on. Normally, he 
states, this class allies itself with foreign capital. But if the nation-state possesses sources of leverage over 
international capital and core countries, such as supply of vital products, and a viable set of domestic class 
alliances, the comprador class can assert its independence.  The result, Girvan argues, is economic 
nationalism.  Hence, radical scholars such as Girvan and Amin sometimes critically refer to the economic 
nationalist movement as ‘bourgeois nationalism’ (Girvan, 1976; Amin, 1990). 
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 Again, radical scholars such as Girvan and Amin criticize that these efforts only sought modifications in 
the relative power structures of the international capitalist order, rather than fundamental changes in the 




Movement, the growth of the socialist bloc, the influence of the UN, the rise within the 
capitalist bloc of Western Europe and Japan, and the emergence of the Soviet Union and 
China as major economic powers, meant increased competition among major industrial 
nations for the natural resources of the Third World (Lozoya, 1980). 
Significantly, from the perspective of political ecology, during this time period 
access to energy and raw materials became crucial to the developed world’s economic 
machinery.
43
 The Third World began to realize that this dependency constituted a 
potential source of economic power and sovereignty for exporters of primary 
commodities (Lozoya, 1980).  In fact, the years 1972-1974 witnessed a shortage of many 
primary commodities, especially those of strategic importance in high-growth industries, 
such as petroleum, bauxite and phosphates (Girvan, 1976). As the Third World controlled 
the supply of a number of important fuels and raw materials and also absorbed some 25% 
of exports, their demands for a more equitable international economic system became 
increasingly potent (Lozoya, 1980). 
Advanced industrial dependency on strategic resources combined with Third 
World recognition of their own economic power, and these circumstances catalyzed in 
the OPEC oil embargo of 1972-1973.  Even while Third World importers of oil suffered 
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 Magdoff  had noted the significance of First World reliance on Third World resources in the dynamics of 
imperialism resources throughout his writings (Magdoff, 1969, 1978, 2003).  According to Magdoff, by the 
end of the 19
th
 century, within each of the industrialized nations, economic power had shifted to a relatively 
small number of large, integrated industrial and financial firms.  With the development of new technology 
came concomitant drives for new energy sources. During this time period, industry became mechanized, 
and technology required investment of large amounts of capital, large production units, and large amounts 
of strategic metals and fossil fuels. Technological advancement in steel, electricity, industrial chemistry and 
oil also allowed for large scale production through large scale transportation, electricity, and advances in 
industrial chemistry.  These advances consequently allowed for large concentrations of economic power in 
the industry and finance, and accelerated monopolistic trends and the rise of big business, which in turn 
further spurred the drive for raw materials.  Hence, the new industries, the new technology and the rise of 
competition among industrialized nations gave a new importance to the role of raw materials. All these 




from increased oil prices, in general the Third World’s reaction was largely supportive.  
OPEC represented, as Bhagwati points out, a set of primary producers from the Third 
World who successfully demanded their fair share of the world incomes by their own 
actions. From the OPEC experience, developing countries inferred that their primary 
commodity exports, which had traditionally been viewed as a sign of weakness, could be 
turned instead into weapons of collective action (Bhagwati, 1977).  The concept behind 
primary commodity cartels was to allow countries in the Third World to actively control 
their terms of trade with industrialized world and the returns they got from the powerful 
MNCs in contrast to their historical subjugation.  The OPEC action inspired similar 
attempts from dozens of other Third World exporters of primary commodities.  For 
example, seven leading bauxite exports formed the International Bauxite Association and 
six leading phosphate produces tripled their prices (Girvan, 1976).  
Third World states also actively contested the power of transnational capital and 
neocolonialism through the expropriation of foreign natural resource industries. Conflicts 
between Third World states and MNCs involved in their natural resource industries took 
place as early as 1937/38 in Bolivia and Mexico with expropriations of foreign oil 
companies. However, expropriations reached their zenith by the mid-1970s. Kennedy 
(1992) divides the relations between TNCs and governments of host countries since 1945 
into three eras:  TNC domination, confrontation between governments of host countries 
and TNCs, and negotiation between TNCs and governments of host countries. The first 
era lasted into the early 1960s and the second era was at its height during the 1970s.  By 
the1980s, the third era had begun. In the mid-1960s, the number of expropriations had 
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begun to rise, but expropriations reached a zenith in the 1970-1979 period. By the1980-
1985 period, the number of expropriation acts dropped dramatically (Kennedy, 1992). 
However, during this period Third World leaders also realized that despite 
ambitious programs of national development poverty was not diminishing and rates of 
economic growth were slowing down; yet service charges on past loans began to put 
enormous pressures on developing countries’ balance of payments. With the breakdown 
of the Bretton Woods system and the erosion of the value of the US dollar, difficulties 
were created for many Third World countries that held their reserves in dollars. Further, a 
mid-term review of the achievement of the second development decade’s goals showed 
mixed results, especially in the area of agricultural production and official development 
aid (Lozoya, 1980). The Third World realized that without major structural changes in 
the international economic system, economic independence and development would be 
difficult.  This realization, together with OPEC success, spurred the Third World to adopt 
a series of coherent demands, despite major ideological differences among individual 
nations.  Known as the New International Economic Order, these demands were 
presented on a platform to the UN.   
By the 1970s demands for a New International Economic Order were vocalized 
when   Presidents Boumediene of Algeria and Echeverria of Mexico, among others, 
called for structural reforms in the international economic system. Their initiatives 
resulted in the adoption of UN resolutions such as the Sixth and Seventh Special Session, 
and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. These were followed by a long 
series of declarations, resolutions, position papers, and studies on various NIEO issues by 
the UN and the international community at large (Lozoya, 1992). African states, in 
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conjunction with other states of the South, were among the most vocal supporters of the 
NIEO. During this time period, the ideological position they adopted was that the 
international economic system should be made more equitable, making it possible for 
African states to industrialize and be relieved of debt to the Western capitalist countries.  
The goal, ultimately, was to achieve economic independence and development 
(Adeniran, 1986). 
The New International Economic Order- however overly optimistic or naïve 
according to some critics
44
- was in many ways the apex of Third World collective 
demands for sovereignty over their resources and increased returns for their resource 
exports.  Because neoliberal policies would come to dominate the economic policy space 
of many developing countries, especially in Africa, it is worthwhile to look more closely 
at the demands of the NIEO and to recognize the extent to which these demands were 
discarded and replaced by nearly diametrically opposed economic policies. The 
neoliberal counter-countermovement against the NIEO-type demands- more broadly 
against the economic nationalism of the Third World- was to have profound impacts in 
regards to African sovereignty over their own resources and their attempts to regulate the 
activities of TNCs.  This counter-countermovement in turn continues to critically shape 
the dynamics of ecologically unequal exchange and ecological imperialism in the 21
st
 
century.   
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 Some scholars accuse the proponents of the NIEO as having been overly optimistic, and even naïve, in 
hoping that Western countries would concede to the demands of the NIEO.  The NIEO proposed a 
transformation in the international order under the auspices that it would be mutually advantageous to all. 
Amin, for example, criticizes that this view was based on a naïve illusion as to the laws governing existing 




Essentially, the NIEO demanded the sovereign equality of states and self-
determination of all peoples; the non-interference in the internal affairs of States; the 
right of every country to adopt the economic and social system that it deems the most 
appropriate for its own development and not be subjected to discrimination of any kind as 
a result; and full and permanent sovereignty of every State over its natural resources and 
all economic activities.  In order to safeguard these resources, the NIEO demanded that 
each State is entitled to exercise effective control over them and their exploitation with 
means suitable to its own situation, including the right to nationalization or transfer of 
ownership to nationals.  This right was seen as being an expression of the full permanent 
sovereignty of the State. The NIEO demanded that no state may be subjected to 
economic, political, or any other type of coercion to prevent the free and full exercise of 
this inalienable right.  Further, all States, territories, and peoples under foreign 
occupation, alien and colonial domination or apartheid were to be entitled to the 
restitution and full compensation for the exploitation and depletion of, and damages to, 
the natural resources and all other resources of those State, territories and peoples (NIEO 
Charter).   
The NIEO demanded the right for developing countries to regulate and supervise 
TNCs operating within their territories, and the right to implement measures regulating 
TNCs in accordance with plans of national development.
45
  Concerning greater returns 
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 The ‘Action Programme,’ contained in the section on regulation and control over the activities of TNCs, 
demanded the formulation of an international code of conduct for TNCs and the enforcement of it by 
international agreement.  The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States refers in Chapter 1 
(“Foundations of International Economic Relations”) to the general requisites of control over TNCs such as 
the principles of national sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence of state.  Article 2, 
another example, is quite clear about the right of states to regulate the control over foreign investments in 
the area under its sovereignty in keeping with its legal and other provisions and in accordance with its 
national objectives; these include the right to nationalize, expropriate or transfer the ownership rights over 
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from the exporting of their natural resources, the NIEO sought to establish a more just 
and equitable relationship between the prices of raw materials, primary commodities, 
capital goods, and equipment imported by them with the aim of bringing about sustained 
improvement in their unsatisfactory terms of trade and the expansion of the world 
economy. Importantly, it advocated the right for the developing world to utilize 
producers association (primary commodity cartels) within the framework of international 
co-operation
46
 (NIEO Charter). 
At the heart of these stipulations lay the recognition of the inextricable relations 
between political and economic sovereignty and the capacity for the formerly colonized 
states to have full and permanent sovereignty over their resources.  The rhetoric of the 
NIEO gives strong recognition of the injustice engendered by colonialism, and the 
necessity of the formerly colonized states to be free from any form of neocolonialism, 
including the structural inequalities of the international economic order which remained 
deeply unequal.   
Not surprisingly, economic nationalism as signified by the expropriations, the 
growing number of primary commodity cartels, and sets of proposals such as the NIEO, 
was not received well by the developed countries.  Even before the NIEO, Northern 
hostility to the increasing economic nationalism and perceived threat from the Third 
World was manifest (Girvan, 1976; Bergstein, 1973). The main issue was simple to 
understand; at a time when the developed countries became crucially dependent on 
                                                                                                                                                 
foreign property.  Above all, no state was to be coerced into granting any kind of preferential treatment for 
foreign investments (Asante, 1986). 
  
46
  The NIEO also demanded securing favorable conditions for the transfer of financial resources to 
developing countries; giving developing countries access to achievements of modern science and 
technology, promoting transfer of technology and creation of indigenous technology, and fair solutions to 
the mounting debt crisis of the Third World (NIEO Charter). 
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various resources from the periphery, the push for greater returns for their exports and 
full sovereignty over their own resources ran directly counter to the concerns of 




  Thus the reaction of the West to the Third World’s demands for adjustment of 
the international economic order was a resounding rejection, heralding what Samir Amin 
regards as a new phase of aggressive anti-Third Worldism (Amin, 1990). For one, the 
demands were deeply at odds with the rising currents of neoliberalism and 
neoconservatism, and threatened a free market based international economic system.  
From these ideological standpoints, the USA argued that the principal cause of 
developing countries poverty was not external but internal, in particular its incapacity to 
internally mobilize resources for economic development due to Third World socialism 
(Bhagwati, 1977).  Whatever the ideological standpoint or reasoning, the NIEO and Third 
World economic nationalism threatened developed world interests in continuing the 
secure and cheap access to resources that had been established under colonialism.   
As such, due to developed world rejection, the demands from the NIEO were 
dead in the water before any real implementation of the adjustments they called for.  
Despite the push of the United Nations for a NIEO, the actions of the IMF, World Bank 
and GATT, and Western governments (especially the US), demonstrated that 
restructuring the international economic system to the advantage of the Third World was 
not an option.  Rather, these actors pushed for ‘stabilization programs’ and ‘rational 
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 The academic Bergstein’s writings in the 1970s encapsulate the wariness of the developed countries over 
the actions of the Third World and the recognition of the potential economic repercussions from such 
actions.  Bergstein argued that producers associations (primary commodity cartels like OPEC were a form 
of ‘oligopolic market power,’ especially given the fact that a number of key strategic materials were 
concentrated in a small number of states, some of which had already begun to organize.  (Bergstein, 1974). 
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planning’ enhanced by policy reforms, which ultimately presented no threat to interests 
of the developed countries (Onwuka and Aluko,1986). 
Aside from the NIEO, for Africa other plans for development that emphasized 
some form of self-reliance were also rejected, one after another. For example, in the 
attempt to address African underdevelopment, African leaders through the OAU drafted 
the economic blueprints known as the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) for the Economic 
Development of Africa (1980-2000) and the Final Act of Lagos of 1980. The LPA sought 
to encourage an inward-oriented development strategy rather than the externally-oriented 
pattern inherited from colonialism. It emphasized the development of the domestic 
market in Africa rather than reliance on external markets and the role and importance of 
domestic factor inputs in development, the imperative of self-sufficiency in food 
production, the development of human capital and provision of social infrastructure for 
the African people (Adejumobi, 2003). Even while the Lagos plan of Action represented 
a step backwards from the NIEO- it did not, importantly, emphasize control over natural 
resources and took a more benign stance towards MNCs
48
- like the NIEO the LPA was 
essentially rejected (Amin, 1990).  
Adejumobi (2003) argues that, similar to the NIEO, the LPA fell victim to 
international economic politics and the hostility of western nations and its agencies, 
especially the World Bank. Barely a year after the LPA was adopted, the World Bank 
launched its counter to the LPA, known as the Berg Report.  The Berg Report presented a 
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 Amin (1990) argues that the Lagos plan, despite its declared principle of self-reliance, remained a classic 
plan for development by way of greater integration into the world economy.  For one, the Lagos plan still 
relied upon the exploitation of natural resources, and the traditional colonial and neo-colonial view of 
Africa as a source of supply for the development of others. Further, the concept of control over natural 
resources was overlooked, and in this manner the Lagos plan was a step backwards in comparison with the 
concepts of the NIEO.  Additionally, Amin criticizes that the Lagos document naively declares its 




scathing criticism of the LPA, emphasizing instead the central role of the market and 
external trade in economic development, with an attack on the role of the state in Africa.  
Essentially, the Berg Report, which would become the foundational blueprint for the 
neoliberal policies enacted throughout the 1980s and beyond, argued that for Africa to 
develop economically, it must liberalize its economy, cut back on role of state, and 
privatize public enterprises. Again, with rejection of the LPA, other development 
strategies were proposed, all of which were met with either opposition or a cold reception 
(Adejumobi, 2003).  
 
The neoliberal ‘counter-counter’ movement and the collapse of economic 
nationalism 
By the 1980s, economic nationalism in Africa and in much of the Third World 
had essentially collapsed, and their societies were to undergo an extended series of 
radical structural adjustments realigning their economies according to the principles of 
laissez faire capitalism, comparative advantage, and increased external integration.  
Under economic nationalism sovereignty over natural resources and the capacity to 
regulate TNCs were perceived as central to economic independence and the end of 
neocolonialism. Under the neoliberal reforms, Third World ecological resources were 
once again made accessible to the demands of capital accumulation, as lingering 
obstructions enacted during the developmentalist era were removed, one after the other. 
The Third World countermovement, born from the contradictions engendered by the 
expansion of the world capitalist system, was replaced by the neoliberal counter-
countermovement, in a context of economic and political crisis.    
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The Berg Report was criticized for thrusting African economies into 
fundamentally the same traditional colonial role as supplier of cheap raw materials and 
importer of expensive manufactured goods and food from West
49
 (Cheru,1989; 
Adejumobi 2003).   African governments rejected the Berg Report, arguing that such a 
development plan would leave their countries in a permanent state of dependency and 
poverty, making them dependent upon the developed world for their food supplies as well 
as capital goods, and many manufactured consumer goods (DeLancey, 1992). Further, 
the Organization of African Unity rejected the Bank’s analysis of the economic situation, 
arguing that the Bank failed to recognize external causes to the continent’s economic 
problems (Cheru, 1989).  But by the late 1970s, African countries were caught in various 
stages of economic crises, plagued by debt burdens, serious trade deficits, rising 
unemployment, industrial collapse, and social upheavals. Fatefully, these economic crises 
occurred just as the ideology underpinning the concept of development in the North was 
changing, as manifest in the Berg Report. The western Keynesian consensus, and the 
foreign aid undergirding it that had sanctioned the pursuit of industrialization, agricultural 
levies, provision of social services and interventionism by an developmental state was 
replaced by neoliberalism  (Satgar, 2009).   
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 More specifically, the report focused on four major factors as causes of African economic and 
agricultural crisis:  overvalued national currencies; neglect of peasant agriculture; heavily protected 
manufacturing sectors; and excessive state intervention in economy. The Bank criticized ISI policies, which 
were dependent on protection established through application of tariffs and quotas, and maintaining 
unrealistic exchange rates. Likewise, the Bank criticized African industries as inefficient and draining of 
scarce foreign exchange. Critics maintain that the Berg Report ignored the need for African governments to 
support small scale industry and use local resources to meet domestic demand.  Further, critics maintain 
that the pro-peasant rhetoric hid the more essential commitment to intensive application of export-led 
agriculture. African countries were encouraged to expand cash crop production in which they had a 
comparative advantage, and to increase privatization of agriculture. The foreign exchange from cash crops 
could then be used to purchase development inputs. Increased food production was not considered essential 
where cash crop earnings could be used to purchase imported foods.  Consequently, the Bank had used 
financial muscle to pressure governments to give up food self-sufficiency and promote export oriented 
agriculture (Cheru, 1989). 
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The proximate causes of the economic crises have been attributed to a 
convergence of external factors beyond the control of African states, as well as internal 
mistakes.  Much literature has already been written on the reasons underlying the African 
debt crisis and will not be repeated here.  In short, the economic nationalism of the post-
independence years had included the adoption of varying policies of import substitution. 
Yet despite the objective of increased self-reliance, this form of developmentalism 
required capital that was ultimately borrowed from the developed world that, in the end, 
African countries were unable to repay for various reasons, both in internal and 
external.
50
 The debt crisis was to have devastating effects on African economies.  In 
particular, the capacity to pay for crucial imports for important capital stock had been 
severely compromised, and as a result the development project itself was interrupted 
(Cheru, 1989). Overall, the debt overhang undermined domestic capital formation, 
frustrating public investment in physical and social infrastructure and deterring private 
investment. A vicious downward spiral followed in many countries, and by the 1990s 
Africa was crippled by its debts, with debilitating effect on its economies (Thompson, 
2000).  
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 External reasons included declining international price paid for these commodities in the late 70s, 
(Thompson, 2000; Helleiner, 1983; Cheru, 1989); the 1973 OPEC oil price hikes (Cheru, 1989; Thompson, 
2000; DeLancey 1992); declining official sources of development aid (Thomson, 2000); increased cost of 
borrowed capital (Helleiner, 1983); the rising interest rates in the US in early 1980s (Satgar, 2009).  
Scholars across a wide spectrum of political ideology have also criticized a number of internal factors. 
Orthodox scholars often blame governmental inefficiency, pervasive mismanagement, and corruption.  
However, other issues included the failure to diversify sufficiently in the period of faster growth in the 
1960s and 1970s (UNCTAD, 2005).  DeLancey (1992) argues, the use of the loans failed to generate the 
foreign exchange required to service the debts, whether through waste in nonproductive purposes such as 
import of nonessential consumer goods or because investment in projects, especially in the public sector, 
resulted low rates of return. Other scholars criticize the actions of the corrupt African elite. Onwuka and 
Aluko for example, argued that African countries are plagued by a scramble for national resources by 
privileged elites, who dominate and exploit the resources in favor of personal and class interest. The 
collaboration of such elites with MNCs, the looting of the national treasuries, and the general national 
economic disorder due to such corruption, had a direct psychological and moral effect on South’s 




Consequently, since the1980s African governments began turning to the IMF for 
balance of payment support, and the World Bank for structural adjustment loans 
(Campbell and Loxley, 1989). In some cases, governments such as in Uganda, Tanzania, 
Ghana, Mozambique, turned to the IFIs in hopes of promoting short-term recovery with 
an eventual return to the ideals of economic nationalism or some form of socialism. In 
other countries, sections of the dominant ruling groups favored the longer-term strategies 
of Fund/ Bank. Nonetheless the principal reason why African governments accepted the 
policies of the IMF or the Bank was the opportunity to borrow loans necessary for 
reducing the import constraint (Campbell and Loxley, 1989).  
At this point IFIs introduced structural adjustment loans, requiring African 
countries to liberalize their economies and open them to international and domestic 
private capital while reducing the role of the state in economic governance. Kenya, 
Malawi, and Mauritius were the first states to introduce SAP reforms at start of 1980s, 
but by mid-1990s almost all other African countries had followed suit. Campbell and 
Loxley criticize that Western financial institutions were, as Western powers had under 
colonialism, dictating the continent’s economic policy- and integral to SAPs was the 
dismantling of the development states and the various protections developed during the 
era of economic nationalism to gain greater sovereignty and economic autonomy
51
 
(Campbell and Loxley, 1989). Despite the variation of African economies and 
governments, the policies of structural adjustment were broadly the same regardless of 
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 Sometimes, banks, bilateral donors and other sources of funding insist that African governments borrow 
from international institutions in order to attain their assistance. This is largely because Fund/Bank 
assistance carries with it the requirement that borrowers pursue economic policies acceptable to the 
international institutions. It was through such policy conditionality that most structural adjustment 




the country.  Essentially, structural adjustment sought to restore growth and stability by 
recasting relative prices, domestic expenditures, the type and degree of state intervention 
in the economy, and to introduce the discipline of the free market to African economies 
(Campbell and Loxley, 1989).  
The IFIs argued that the continent’s development policies prior to 1980s had 
resulted in urban bias, largely benefiting the urban districts and stifling productivity in the 
country-side (World Bank, 1981). The IFIs argued that African countries should 
concentrate their efforts on exporting agricultural goods in accordance with their 
comparative advantage, and abandon their development strategies based on inefficient 
state enterprises, which were portrayed as parasitic.  State restrictions on imports and 
exports, considered a hindrance to the economic growth that would follow free market 
policies, were to be lifted. Ultimately, like proposals from the Berg Report, the overall 
ideological approach promoted export-oriented growth strategies, with reliance upon 
market mechanisms and the promotion of the private sector (Campbell and Loxley, 
1989).  For Africa this meant the rejection of any vestiges of the developmental state.  
The state was required to withdraw from economic intervention, which included the 
removal of all barriers, including exchange controls, protection tariffs, and public 
ownership. Massive cutbacks in social services were also advocated. Instead, export-
based agriculture became central to the neoliberal agenda (Campbell and Loxley, 1989).  
SAPs also required major institutional reforms, including changes in fiscal policy such as 
budgetary and debt management, export incentives and subsidies to importers, and public 
investment priorities.  Importantly, as well be discussed in detail in the following 
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sections, SAPs promoted the creation of more ‘favorable investment climates’ for foreign 
investment through a number of reforms (Cheru, 1989).  
 
Continuing primitive accumulation:  neoliberal policies and reasserting the power of 
foreign capital over peripheral resources 
The dismal failure of the structural adjustments to promote economic growth and 
alleviate poverty has been well-documented, and a number of critics argue such 
neoliberal policies have in fact only worsened these issues (Mkandawire, 2005; Cheru, 
1989). From the perspective of political ecology, however, what is significant is that 
neoliberal policies have reinforced Africa’s traditional colonial role as exporter of raw 
materials within the international division of labor through the emphasis on export-led 
growth in accordance with the principle of comparative advantage- a structural position 
EUE theorists have criticized reinforces peripheral countries’ position as source and sink 
for the ecological needs of the core countries in regards to international trade (Giljum and 
Eisenmenger, 2004).  Further, neoliberal policies have deliberately increased foreign 
access to, ownership of, and control over African ecological resources, achieved largely 
through the repealing of the developmentalist state and the defeat of economic 
nationalism. This section looks more closely at the policies enacted, in particular the 
policies regarding foreign investment.     
  Cheru argues that while appearing progressive and pro-peasant in style in its 
promotion of agriculture, the basic assumptions and prescriptions of the IFIs promote an 
overall export-led development strategy (Cheru, 1989). The essential argument is that 
expanded opportunities for trade and gains from trade would increase traditional exports 
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of individual countries, and also enable them to diversify their exports to include the 
limited manufactured goods assigned to them by the law of comparative advantage. For 
economies with limited domestic markets, trade would offer outlets for their exports and 
increase the foreign exchange needed for the importation of important goods such as 
investment goods like plants and equipment (Mkandawire, 2005).  
However, Campbell and Loxley (1989) argue, the emphasis on export-led 
development through comparative advantage merely reproduced the disadvantages of 
unequal exchange experienced during colonialism. The IFIs had encouraged a large 
number of developing countries worldwide to expand primary production, devalue their 
currencies, and increase production. Yet the net outcome was that international markets 
reacted to the increased availability of primary goods by lowering commodity prices. 
Critics argue that Africa therefore gained little relative advantage. For example, 
commodities such as cocoa, coffee and cotton- of which make up the bulk of export 
earnings for several countries- led to an expansion of world supply and a corresponding 
decline in world prices. By end of 1990s, and after reaching reforms in trade policy, little 
had changed. No major expansion occurred in the diversity of products exported by most 
of the Sub-Saharan African countries, although there are one or two exceptions like 
Madagascar and Kenya (Campbell and Loxley, 1989). Indeed, the product composition of 
some of the African countries’ exports may have become more concentrated.   
Further, no general increase has occurred in a number of industries in which most 
African countries have a ‘revealed’ comparative advantage.  After decades of reform, the 
most striking trend is the decline in the African share of global non-oil exports which are 
now less than one half of what they were in the early 1990s (Mkandawire, 2005). 
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According to a 2005 report by UNCTAD, following the neoliberal policies, the share of 
manufacturing output in GDP dropped sharply in SSA between 1980 and 1990 before 
stalling at a level in 1990s below what it reached in 1960 (UNCTAD, 2005). Various 
cross-country studies have traced this trend to the sharp slowdown of output growth 
under adjustment programs, signifying a growth of the informal economy and a general 
‘deindustrialization trend’ across much of region. Further, the report states, for many 
countries, this is coupled with a dependence on commodity exports that has remained 
very high, and in some cases risen higher, although paradoxically Africa’s share of world 
commodity exports has actually declined. Reproducing the problems that African 
countries sought to overcome with the policies of the post-independence era, at least until 
the mid-2000s, countries remained exposed to high price volatility, mainly from supply 
shocks, even as real prices continued their secular decline, exacting heavy costs in terms 
of incomes, indebtedness, investment, development and diversification. The report 
concludes that overall adjustment programs have done little to alter region’s pattern of 
integration into global economy, and worse, in case of manufacturing, have had a 
regressive effect (UNCTAD, 2005). 
The other pillar of the neoliberal SAPs, and directly salient to the issues of this 
dissertation, was to create favorable conditions to open up the country for foreign capital 
through privatization and various incentives to attract multinational corporations. To 
attract a larger share of global FDI, many African countries introduced changes in policy. 
Even now, attracting FDI continues to be promoted as integral to development and 
economic growth. The IMF, World Bank, and OECD argue that FDI is central to 
increasing the foreign exchange of low income countries and avoiding further build-up of 
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debt.  Underlying these arguments are the assumptions that FDI will bring stable capital 
inflows, greater technological know-how, higher paying jobs, entrepreneurial and 
workplace skills, and new export opportunities (OECD, 2002). 
However, despite the compliance of African countries to implement structural 
adjustments, opening their economies to FDI has done little to alleviate poverty or 
encourage development.  As the UNCTAD 2005 report criticizes, the orthodox response 
of IFIs, policy makers, and scholars has generally been a.) African governments had not 
carried out reforms far enough, but instead persisted in state interventionism, b.) not 
enough time had elapsed to reap the gains of adjustment and therefore of globalization, 
c.) government corruption and lack of rule of law (such as appropriate enforcement of 
property rights) has been impeding potential gains (IMF, 1999; OECD, 2002; World 
Bank, 2001; Collier and Patillo, 2000).     
The problem with such assessments, in particular the contention that African 
governments had not carried reforms far enough, is that by second half of the 1990s, 
African countries had undergone more far reaching adjustments than any other region. In 
actuality, Africa is very heavily involved in globalization as more devaluations, lowering 
of tariffs and privatizations, and so on, were imposed in Africa than anywhere else 
(UNCTAD, 2005). It is in this area of the world where the greatest number of programs 
were introduced. During 1980s and 1990s, 35 countries of Sub-Saharan Africa 
implemented 162 SAPs with the World Bank or the IMF in comparison to the126 SAPs 
introduced throughout rest of the world. Further, critics charge that the extensive, 
ongoing adjustment process does not even seem to have a terminal point (Campbell and 
Loxley, 1989).  To fully grasp the contrast between the orthodox policies regarding the 
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opening of African economies to foreign investment and the demands made during the 
era of economic nationalism it is necessary to look more closely at the policies 
themselves. 
 
Multilateral and Bilateral Investment Treaties 
 
This sections looks at multilateral/bilateral treaties, which have been at least 
partially responsible for shifting the balance of power to foreign capital, particularly 
through tying the hands of African states and preventing them from regulating FDI for 
development purposes. By the early 2000s most African countries had concluded bilateral 
treaties and signed multilateral agreements with international organizations in the effort 
to create more ‘favorable investment climates.’  In a 2001 report, the World Bank hailed 
the participation of African countries in international, regional and bilateral agreements 
dealing with FDI as important steps in signaling to investors that a favorable policy 
environment is being created (World Bank, 2001).  
Several scholars have argued that the proliferation of regulations formulated in 
such treaties place serious constraints on the national development strategies of 
developing countries (Wade, 2003; Adejumobi, 2003; Kragelund, 2003; Gallagher, 2010; 
Shadlen, 1999). Ultimately, these regulations limit the capacity of developing country 
governments to constrain TNCs, as they are designed to allow developed country firms to 
enter and exit markets more easily, and once within national boundaries, to operate with 
fewer restrictions and obligations (Wade, 2003). Such a level of intrusion, through the 
mechanism of international agreements, represents what Wade characterizes as a 
‘shrinking of autonomous development space,’ whereby the development space for 
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diversification and upgrading policies in developing countries is being shrunk behind a 
rhetoric of universal liberalization, privatization and economic growth
52
 (Wade, 2003). 
Concerning multilateral organizations, the major institutions in the post-WWII era 
that have governed international trade- GATT and later the World Trade Organization-  
also promulgated important provisions concerning the governance of foreign investment.  
The Uruguay rounds from1986-1993, in which the US was the major actor in the 
negotiation process, contained several controversial propositions in the area of foreign 
investment in the form of trade-related investment measures (TRIMs) (Adejumobi, 
2003). 
TRIMs covers a broad variety of developing country economic activity, and 
countries that are members of the WTO must satisfy the performance requirements of 
TRIMs (Wade, 2003).  The central aim of TRIMs is to provide a safe haven for Western 
investments with favorable domestic conditions.  TRIMs moves trade rules beyond the 
principle of ‘avoid discrimination between countries,’ that is, the ‘most favored nation 
principles of old GATT,’ to ‘avoid trade and investment distortions.’ It allows for an 
interpretation of most performance requirements on foreign firms as distortions, and bans 
or aspires to ban them. The TRIMs agreement bans performance requirements related to 
local content (which require that locally produced goods be purchased or used), trade 
balancing, export requirements (which require the export of a specified percentage of 
production volume), and it also bans requirements on public agencies to procure goods 
from local suppliers. A country that tries to impose such requirements can be taken to 
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 Wade argues that the rules being written into multilateral and bilateral agreements actively prevent 
developing countries from pursuing kinds of industrial and technology policies adopted by newly 
industrializing economies and by older developing countries when they were developing.  Further, 
developed country tariffs limit developing export growth and their rise up the value chain (Wade, 2003). 
 
 102 
Dispute Settlement Mechanism, and will usually lose (Wade, 2003).  Moreover, the US 
and EU want to modify current TRIMS agreement so as to ban all performance 
requirements, including for joint venturing, technology transfer, and R&D. Moreover, 
Wade argues that the language in the relevant parts of TRIMS is not legally clear, and 
many developing countries fear that if they do use such non-banned performance 
requirements they will face punitive punishment. States currently negotiating to join the  
WTO are finding the rules they are being asked to sign on to are even more restrictive 
than those for existing members (Wade, 2003; Adejumobi, 2003). In terms of developing 
country capacity to regulate the behavior of foreign firms for the purpose of development 
objectives, Wade argues that TRIMS restricts the right of a government to carry through 
policies that favor growth and technological upgrading of domestic industries and firms.  
A country that implemented such policies can now be legally handicapped in its access to 
developed country markets.  As such, scholars have argued that the WTO outlaws key 
investment regulations that were once crucial to many countries’ development strategies 
(Shadlen, 1999; Change and Green 2003; Correa and Kuman, 2003). Shadlen contends, 
“The bottom line is that the TRIMs agreement takes away developing countries’ ability to 
use important policy instruments to increase local value-added, employment, and 
industrial upgrading” (Shadlen, 1999, p. 759).  
Even more stringent are bilateral investment treaties (BITs) that have been 
proliferating throughout the developing world since the early 1990s. Compared to BITs, 
the obligations from TRIMs are rudimentary, and not nearly as comprehensive as the 
provisions contained in BITs. Bilateral investment treaties require host government to lift 
even more restrictions on foreign firms, to give even more concessions, in return for 
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better access to US or other powerful party markets. They establish firm-state arbitration 
boards, which allow private firms to take governments to arbitration by a body dominated 
by private-sector adjudicators. Such boards, Wade argues, are naturally sympathetic to 
needs of firms and use private contract law rather than public law (Wade, 2003). Further, 
concerning dispute, under the WTO, only countries can bring cases against other 
countries. However, regional-bilateral treaties with the US allow firms to bring cases to 
arbitration (Shadlen, 1999).  
BITs clearly focus on foreign investment protection, and developing countries 
sign bilateral investment treaties BITs in order to ‘signal’ to investors and attract more 
FDI.  In recent decades, BITs have become the most important international legal 
mechanism for the encouragement and governance of FDI. Prior to advent of BITs, the 
protection afforded to foreign investors was minimal, under the customary international 
legal rule of minimum standard of treatment and the so-called Hull Rule. The Hull Rule 
dealt exclusively with cases of expropriation and offered no general protection against 
discriminatory treatment (Neumayer and Spess, 2005). During the era of economic 
nationalism, developing countries had challenged the Hull Rule’s validity as part of their 
demands for the NIEO: the Resolution 1803 of UN General Assembly merely requires 
‘appropriate compensation’ for expropriation.  Furthermore, it is likely that the Hull Rule 
never had much sway anyways, considering the large number of expropriations in the 
1960s and 1970s that took place without what most investors would have regarded as 
adequate compensation (Neumayer and Spess, 2005). 
The basic provisions of most bilateral investment treaties guarantee certain 
standards of treatment for foreign investors that contrast strongly with the demands of the 
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NIEO. By entering into a BIT, signatories agree to grant certain relative standards of 
treatment such as national treatment (foreign investors may not be treated worse than 
domestic investors) and most favored nation treatment (privileges granted to one foreign 
investor must be granted to all foreign investors). They also agree to guarantee certain 
absolute standards of treatment such as fair and equitable treatment for foreign investors 
in accordance with international standards after the investment has taken place. BITs 
typically ban discriminatory treatment against foreign investors and include guarantees of 
appropriate compensation for expropriated property or funds, and free transfer and 
repatriation of capital and profits, all areas which the varying policies under economic 
nationalism sought to regulate. Further, the BIT parties agree to submit to binding dispute 
settlement should a dispute concerning these provisions arise (Neumayer and Spess, 
2005). The extent of interference with domestic regulatory sovereignty when developing 
countries sign BITs is therefore enormous. Virtually any public policy regulation can be 
challenged through the dispute settlement mechanism as long as it affects foreign 
investors. Often, foreign investors request for international arbitration straight away, 
which contrasts with the use of domestic courts, where investors have no say on 
composition of judges and where domestic rule might trump BIT provisions. Hence, the 
signing of BITs is specifically meant to signal to potential investors that the developing 
country is serious about the protection of foreign investment (Neumayer and Spess, 
2005). 
Overall, scholars such as Shadlen (1999) argue that regional-bilateral agreements 
move far beyond the WTO in a way that “…may have serious implications for 
developing countries’ capacities for achieving upward mobility in the international 
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economy,” and particularly bilateral agreements with the US.  Regional-bilateral accords, 
he contends, “….encourage specialization and pursuit of competitiveness via exploitation 
of existing comparative advantages” (Shadlen, 1999, p. 752).   
 
Domestic reforms:  An example of the mining sector  
A large proportion of FDI in Africa goes into the mining sector, and mineral 
export economies are among the highest recipients of inflows.  For much of 1980s and 
1990s, the investment climate in mining remained poor, at least partially due to 
uncertainty generated by the backlash against foreign-owned operations in the 1970s  
(UNCTAD, 2005).  In recent years, however, with major changes in mining codes that 
have helped orchestrate a state withdrawal from the sector, expand opportunities for the 
private sector and increase incentives to attract FDI, African economies have witnessed 
an influx of FDI into the mining sector (UNCTAD, 2005). The IFIs argued that the 
incapacity of inefficient SOEs to generate sufficient revenues hindered the wider 
development process, and it was proposed that such measures would alleviate the 
underperformance of the mining sector in Africa (UNCTAD, 2005).
53
  
Since the 1980s the World Bank has promoted a process of liberalization, 
deregulation, and privatization under the auspices of economic growth, which has 
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 UNCTAD (2005) states the need for a more nuanced analysis of SOEs in mining sector. Such an 
analysis would take into account that most of Sub-Saharan Africa was experiencing a prolonged economic 
downturn that started in late 1970s.  This resulted in a major source of rent depletion, and any revenues 
generated by sector were appropriated for BOP support, including debt service payments, thus depriving 





resulted in the creation of new regulatory frameworks for mining in Africa. The reforms 
have certainly created a more favorable environment for foreign investors, but critical 
scholars and activists charge these reforms have potentially undermined norms and 
standards in areas of crucial importance for social and economic development, as well as 
the protection of the environment in the countries concerned (Campbell, 2003; Lissu and 
Curtis, 2008; Akabzaa, 2001).  Overall, reforms emphasized creating a stable legal and 
fiscal framework, including mining codes, contractual stability, a guaranteed stable fiscal 
regime, and channels for profit repatriation. In return governments are expected to 
receive increased rents generated in the mining sector (UNCTAD, 2005). 
From the perspective of political ecology, however, African mining codes 
illustrate, similar to the multilateral and bilateral treaties, a significant shift to foreign 
capital control over African resources.  Further, critics argue that this has occurred at the 
expense of development objectives, with attendant social and environmental costs 
(Campbell, 2003). An example of this shift is the mining sector in Ghana, which received 
priority attention under the country’s Economic Recovery Program (ERP).  The ERP 
initiated a generous provision of tax incentives to foreign investors. Corporate income 
tax, which stood at 50-55% in 1975, was reduced to 45% in 1986 and further scaled down 
to 35% in 1994.  The initial capital allowance to enable investors to recoup their capital 
expenditure was increased from 20% in the first year of production and 15% for 
subsequent annual allowances in 1975, to 75% in the first year of operation and 50% for 
subsequent annual allowances in 1986.  Royalty rates, which stood at 6% of total value of 
mineral won in 1975, were reduced to 3.7% in 1987. Other duties such as the Mineral 
duty (5%), import duty (5-35%) and Foreign Exchange Tax (33-75%) that had 
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contributed significantly to government revenue were abolished. In addition, the 
following incentives were introduced; exemption from the payment of customs import 
duties in respect of plants and equipment and accessories imported for use in mining. The 
personal remittance quota for expatriate personnel was freed from any tax imposed for 
the transfer of external currency out of the country (Campbell, 2003). 
Campbell (2003) argues that ultimately the role of the African state was redefined 
to create a favorable environment for investment and the free play of market forces.   
Developmental objectives that hampered these goals, such as re-distributive measures 
that sought to retain greater earnings within the host country, or regulatory measures to 
monitor the use of non-renewables and protect the environment, were at best placed in 
secondary position compared to policies to attract foreign investment and promote 
exports. For example, Campbell noted that the World Bank’s 1992 Strategy for African 
Mining- the first systematic presentation of reforms considered necessary by the Bank- 
was based upon a survey that was sent to 80 mining companies.  Based upon the needs of 
the investors, rather than the goals of sustainable, integrated development, the report 
recommended a stable legal and fiscal framework, which included the need for mining 
codes, contractual stability, a guaranteed fiscal regime, profit repatriation, rule of law, 
etc.  The report, however, did not articulate how the mining sector would contribute to 
broader developmental objectives of great import, such as the building of backward and 
forward linkages or the possibility of value-added processing of minerals. Rather, the 
primary focus was how to attract investment and reduce investment risk for private 
mining companies.   
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Overall, Campbell (2003) argues that African states face a decreased ability to 
ensure a sustainable flow of net returns from mining activities and political sovereignty in 
terms of achieving developmental objectives.  For example, economic reform that 
liberalized the general investment regime in areas of taxation, currency exchange, 
banking, trade and labor, and opened all sectors to foreign investors previously reserved 
to the state, obviously involves major changes in the concept of sovereignty for many 
developing countries for all the reasons stated in the NIEO.  Reductions in levels of ad 
valorem royalties required by state and reduction in corporate income tax rates as well as 
customs duties on imported capital goods reduce the capacity for African states to retain 
earnings. For example, the Tanzanian mineral code introduced in 1998 as a result of a 
five-year World Bank financed sector reform project allows 100 per cent foreign 
ownership, provides guarantees against nationalization and expropriation, offers 
unrestricted repatriation of profits and capital, pegs the royalty rate at maximum of 3 per 
cent, provides waivers in respect of import duties, tax exemptions on imported 
machinery, equipment and other inputs, and waives requirement for local procurement of 
goods and services.  This is indeed a significant policy reversal from a country that once 
sought to build development based on African socialism and institute indigenous control 
over their means of production.  Chapter 4 discusses these issues in terms of Tanzania’s 
gold mining sector in more detail.  
Now, with the current scramble for African resources and a concurrent 
commodity boom that has resulted in robust world market prices for African metals, 
scholars and policy makers are especially criticizing the tax regimes of resource-rich 
countries.  A number have also begun to make rough empirical calculations for the 
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associated losses in revenue.  For example, the Africa Progress Report 2013, written by 
the Africa Progress Panel and chaired by Kofi Annan, states quite plainly that ‘aggressive 
tax planning drains the public purse.’  The report acknowledges that in the 1990s many 
governments may have mistakenly provided excessive tax concessions to attract foreign 
investors. What the report finds especially problematic is that many such policies have 
continued, even despite the commodity boom of the 2000s and the increased profit 
margins of mining and petroleum companies.  For example, the report finds that in Sierra 
Leone, generous concessions were made to foreign investors that included royalty rates 
as low as 0.5 percent on mining exports. Also, in Sierra Leone, in 2011 only one of five 
major mining companies operating in the country paid corporation tax. Zambia as well 
entered the copper boom with one of lowest royalty rates in the mining sector in Africa. It 
was not until 2013 that tax concessions for the copper industry increased somewhat in 
light of the increase in world market prices.  The report writes that until 2010, the average 
royalty payment on gold exports in Sub-Saharan Africa was only 3 per cent, one of 
lowest in world. However, world prices of gold increased from $300 to $1,600 per ounce 
between 2000 and 2011, while investor profits increased at four times rate of government 
revenues (Africa Progress Panel, 2013). 
Further, the report states that revenues secured by many resource rich countries 
appear to be very low in relation to the value of exports and especially when compared 
with international standards.  For example, cited in the report, the IMF estimates that, 
globally, the effective tax rate in mining is typically 45-65 per cent (and it is higher in 
petroleum). But in 2011, while Zambia’s copper exports generated $US 10 billion, 
government revenues from copper were only $240 million, or 2.4 per cent of export 
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value.  In the same year, exports of mining products from Guinea reached $1.4 billion, 
representing 12 per cent of GDP, but government mining revenues were just $US 48 
million, or 0.4  per cent GDP. Further, the report asserts, tax reform has proven difficult 
in many resource rich countries due to opposition from major companies. In some cases 
mining companies have completely opposed reform, in response threatening to invoke 
stabilization clauses written into agreements negotiated in 1990s. For example, the report 
points out, when Zambia sought to renegotiate its royalty rate on copper exports, major 
investors opposed the measure despite a fourfold increase in the price of copper between 
2000 and 2011. Likewise in Nigeria, royalty rates were negotiated during the 1990s when 
oil prices were one-fifth of post-2000 prices, but major companies still strongly opposed 
reforms.  Only now in 2013 has the government raised taxes from nominal level of 63% 
to 71% (still at lower end of tax range identified by IMF) (Africa Progress Panel, 2013).  
Chapter 4 provides more detailed empirical estimations for Tanzania concerning losses 
associated with low revenue collection. 
Another report, written by the German Development Institute, similarly finds that 
Sub-Saharan Africa generally failed to benefit from the high prices of mineral and energy 
commodities from 2003 to 2008.  While the extractive sector experienced strong sales 
revenues and high inflows of direct investments, the three case study countries of 
Zambia, Namibia, and Ghana indicate that they only profited ‘more than moderately’ 
from tax revenues during the commodity boom.  For example, in Zambia, the report finds 
that the copper and cobalt industry sold minerals to the value of over US$ 13 billion and 
benefited from nearly US $4 billion of FDI in the period from 2003 to 2008.  However, 
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the average implicit tax rate
54
 for the extractive sector in Zambia from 2003-2008 was 
below 2 percent, and consequently the government only raised tax revenues of about US$ 
393 million in that same period.  In Namibia, sales of minerals were worth US$ 9.4 
billion, and FDI totaled US$ 2.6 billion in the period 2003-2008.  In contrast, tax 
revenues only totaled about US $ 893 million. Likewise, Ghana exported minerals and 
fuels worth US $7.7 billion and attracted over US $ 4 billion of FDI inflows from 2003- 
2008.  In contrast, tax revenues totaled only US $ 426 million from 2003 to 2008 when 
the average implicit tax rate in that period was 5 per cent.   
Further, the report engages in a hypothetical experiment through applying 
Australia’s implicit tax rate to the case studies.  It finds that Ghana, if it had the same 
implicit tax rate of Australia, could have collected tax revenues of US $ 735 million in 
period 2003-2008 rather than US $ 426 million. Namibia could have raised government 
revenues an additional US$ 870 million, and Zambia nearly US$ 1.4 billion from 2003 to 
2008 (Sturmer, 2010). 
It is important to note that while the reforms adopted in the 1980s and 1990s may 
have initiated foreign investment regimes that were highly in favor of investors, much 
literature suggests that this trend has been, and continues to be, abetted by the corruption 
and collusion of local elites.  This is an issue of much importance, one that suggests a 
class structure typically criticized by dependency theory; a comprador elite whose 
interests coincide with foreign interests, and often conflict with the interests of their own 
citizens.  This is a complex issue, and most likely varies country to country in the 
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 The author defines implicit tax rates as ratios that measure aggregate revenue from one or more taxes 
(meaning corporate income taxes paid by the extractive sector and royalties) as a percentage of some 
aggregate tax base (meaning in the report sales revenues from minerals and fuels.)  Implicit tax rates are 
sometimes referred to as an average or effective tax rate. 
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particular relations between elites and investors.  Chapter 4 goes into greater detail 
elucidating this relation in terms of Tanzania.  But for example, the report from the 
German Development Institute argues that corruption and patronage in the granting of 
concessions and in tax administration were central to the low implicit tax rates.     
The Africa Progress Report 2013 engages in a case-study analysis of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, and argues that privatization of the DRC’s minerals 
sector has been plagued by a culture of secrecy, informal deals and allegations of 
corruption, despite calls (and promises of) change towards transparency. Further, with 
some of the world’s richest mineral resources, DRC state companies are granting 
concessions to foreign investors, most registered offshore, that systematically undervalue 
natural resources.  An analysis restricted to the years 2010-2012, and focusing on only 
five deals, finds that between 2010 and 2012, the DRC lost at least US$ 1.36 billion in 
revenues from underpricing mining assets that were sold to offshore companies.  These 
total losses from just the five deals reviewed were equivalent to almost double the 
combined annual budget for health and education in 2012. Across the five deals, assets 
were sold on average at only one-sixth of their estimated commercial market value. 
Hence, assets valued in total at US$ 1.63 billion were sold to offshore companies for a 
mere US$275 million.  The report also cites a pervasive problem of tax evasion by 
offshore companies, and provides an estimate that firms that shift profits to lower tax 
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 Likewise, reflecting the non-inclusive nature of economic growth under the current commodity boom, 
the report finds disparities in resource rich countries are rising with economic growth, and dampening the 
potential for poverty reduction.  The report analyzed the relationship between growth, inequality and 
poverty reduction in four countries: Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zambia.  In each of the four countries, 
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Control over peripheral minerals by core and semi-peripheral capital, abetted by 
local elites and on terms favorable to individual capitals as well as the broader 
biophysical needs for the continued accumulation of capital- is at the heart of issues of 
ecologically unequal exchange and ecological imperialism.  Under economic nationalism, 
reasserting national control over the mining sector was central to the efforts for resource 
sovereignty and goals of development, as such resources are non-renewable national 
assets.  Without the capacity for African economies to derive maximum benefits, such as 
aiming to maximize the value of locally retained earnings, create linkages, transfer 
technology, or mitigate environment and social impacts, economies based on mineral 
extraction remain plagued by export enclaves.  For example, in terms of value added, the 
Africa Progress Report 2013 found that even with the growth of natural resource exports 
in the 2000s, Africa remains crippled with underlying structural weaknesses.  Africa 
remains an exporter of unprocessed or lightly processed commodities and consequently 
African exporters continue to capture only a small share of the final value of mineral 
exports. The DRC, for example, is the world’s largest exporter of cobalt, but it remains 
mostly in form of unprocessed ore. Meanwhile value is added outside the country, such 
as by the smelting industry in China and other importing countries. Likewise, Guinea 
exports bauxite, but it too is processed into aluminum overseas. Angola and Nigeria 
                                                                                                                                                 
there was a significant gap between the anticipated poverty reduction effects of growth and the actual 
outcomes.  Further, in each of the four countries the wealthiest 10 per cent captured a disproportionately 
large part of the increase in overall consumption generated by growth.  In each case the poorest 40 per cent 
saw their share of income decline.  This increasingly unequal pattern of wealth distribution was already 
superimposed on highly unequal patterns of wealth distribution.  The report also discusses the ‘hidden 
wealth of the elites.’ For example, in 2009, under a lawsuit brought by Transparency International, it was 
found that Presidents Omar Bongo Ondimba of Gabon, Denis Sassou Nguesso of the Republic of Congo 
and Teodoro Obiang Nguemaof Equatorial Guinea bought luxury homes with state funds.  Sassou Nguesso 
allegedly owned 24 estates and operated 112 bank accounts in France, while Bong and his relatives 
allegedly owned about 30 luxury estates on the French Riviera and in Paris and its suburbs.  (Africa 
Progress Report, 2013)     
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continue to export low value-added crude oil, and in a classical dependency syndrome, 
import high value-added petroleum and petroleum-based plastics and fertilizers. Further, 
the report states, studies conducted of the value chain for a range of minerals in Africa 
have found that the value of processed products was typically 400 times greater than the 
equivalent unit value by weight of the raw material.  The report concludes that without 
processing industries that add value, mining creates fewer jobs, produces less revenue 
and contributes less to GDP, and create an economy vulnerable to extreme price 
fluctuations on world markets.  Such disarticulated economies, as Bunker had realized in 
his study of the Amazon, are inhibited from development along the lines of a diversified 
and integrated economy.  Biophysical resources are simply transferred to core articulated 
economies, whose multiple internal linkages enable them utilize such resources for their 
technological and economic growth.    
There are therefore a number of significant contradictions that undermine the 
ideological legitimacy of the neoliberal reforms as a sustainable development strategy. 
For one, as discussed in Chapter 2, scholars have criticized that such strategies are 
environmentally unsustainable. Further, IFIs and orthodox scholars and policy makers 
insist that increased FDI inflow brings foreign exchange, transference of technology and 
managerial knowledge, and provide access to international markets and build export 
capacity. While a case can be made that such FDI reforms did bring increased access to 
international market and have increased export capacity, such gains as technology 
transfer and managerial knowledge are hindered by their very prescriptions for attracting 
FDI such as the binding constraints discussed above under bilateral investment treaties. 
Domestic reforms, such as tax reforms, repealed the developmentalist policies aimed at 
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retaining higher profits.  Examination of international treaties suggests that the policy 
arena for international economic integration for developing countries necessitates the 
repealing of the very developmentalist policies aimed at attaching stipulations to the 
operations of TNCs to ensure the transfer of technology and the construction of forward 
and backward linkages to build an integrated economy (Gallagher, 2010; Shalden, 1999; 
Neumayer and Spess, 2005).  As Shalden writes of this paradox,  
Thus, the price to be paid for increased market access under regionalism-
bilateralism is that countries must relinquish many of the very tools that 
historically have been used to capture the developmental benefits of 
integration in the international economy (Shadlen, 1999, p. 750). 
 
Further, a historical analysis as given above of the period of economic 
nationalism demonstrates that the Third World felt that sufficient funds from FDI flows 
and export of resources, transfer of technology and managerial knowledge, etc., would be 
much better achieved through some form of economic nationalism, including commodity 
cartels, the collective demands of the NIEO and in general higher levels of resource 
sovereignty. However, the cold reception, even resounding rejection, of such demands 
like the NIEO, has been well-documented by scholars, mainstream and radical alike 
(Bhagwati,1977; Samir Amin, 1990; Onwuka and Aluko, 1986; Adejumobi, 2003). 
 
The ‘new scramble for Africa:’ the 21
st
 century global demand for Africa’s 
resources 
In the first decade of the 21
st
 century FDI inflows began to increase rapidly in 
African primary sectors, with heavy emphasis on traditional sectors such as mining, but 
also across a full spectrum of African ecological goods and services. In a world capitalist 
 
 116 
system characterized by the tension between a growing global economy and dwindling 
sources and sinks, Africa has emerged as a last bastion for resources for both core and 
emerging economies alike. Several scholars have termed this the ‘new scramble for 
Africa’ in comparison with the colonial scramble for Africa by the European powers 
(Carmody, 2011; Southall and Melber, 2009). As some scholars have noted, it was the 
structural adjustments beginning in the 1980s that set the stage for the new scramble for 
Africa by opening up what had been relatively closed economies and making their 
primary sectors attractive to foreign investment (with unintended consequences such as 
increasing competition from emerging economies such as China, India and Brazil) 
(Carmody, 2011; Kragelund, 2010). While population growth and urbanization are 
important factors in African environmental degradation, nonetheless, the continuing 
emphasis on export-led development strategies has also had severe ecological 
repercussions, both in terms of localized pollution associated with such activities as 
mining (Akabzaa, 2001) but also more generally in terms of depletion of natural capital 
stocks.  On the one hand, the liberalizations have opened African ecologies as a source of 
secure access to cheap resources for developed and emerging countries alike. On the 
other hand, with increasing demand and dwindling supplies, prices of important natural 
resources have boomed, offering substantial profit to foreign investors.   
 
Overview:  African trade flows in physical terms and FDI inflows 
 
Since the 2000s, African countries have been growing at a relatively fast rate.  
This has partially been beneficial, leading to improvements in trade, and moderate 
increases in government revenue, infrastructure development and provision of social 
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services (UNCTAD, 2012). However, according to UNCTAD’s latest Economic 
Development in Africa 2012 Report, which focuses on issues of environment and 
sustainability, the current pattern of growth is neither inclusive nor sustainable.  Largely, 
this is due to the fact that this economic growth has been based on the extraction of 
natural resources.  The most important resources driving this growth dynamic are fossil 
fuels, and metallic and non-metallic minerals, which are non-renewable, being depleted at 
a very rapid rate, and subject to highly volatile commodity prices and global demand.  As 
had been alluded to earlier, this growth pattern has been accompanied by a 
deindustrialization trend.  The share of manufacturing in Africa’s gross domestic product 
fell from 15 percent in 1990 to 10 percent in 2009, with some variation among countries, 
but substantial decline in most regions nonetheless.  As such, the structural changes 
African countries have witnessed over the last 30 years have not been productivity-
enhancing structural changes, but rather the results of an increasing importance of the 
commodity economy and the rising importance of low-productivity informal economic 
activities in the service sector (UNCTAD, 2012).  The report emphasizes that despite 
major reserves, the region’s stocks of non-renewables are being depleted, particularly 
through international trade, though domestic use of resources such as population and 
urbanization also contribute.  In addition, Africa is suffering from land degradation, 
deforestation, and loss of biodiversity.  Sixty five per cent of Africa’s agricultural land, 
31 per cent of its pasture lands, and 19 per cent of its forests and woodlands are degraded.  
Such trends have been caused mainly through deforestation, desertification, and erosion 
(UNCTAD, 2012).  
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One way the increased interest in African resources can be captured empirically is 
through quantifying Africa’s trade in physical terms (metric tons).  According to the 
UNCTAD 2012 report, the volume of Africa’s material trade in physical terms (metric 
tons) rose substantially, reflecting the global interest in African resources in the 21
st
 
century.  Overall, the volume of Africa’s material trade in physical terms rose from 
almost 260 million tons in 1980 to 506 million tons in 2008. Fossil fuels, dominated by 
petroleum, hard coal and for a short time natural gas, are African countries’ main exports 
in physical terms.  After a decrease during the mid-1980s, exports of fossil fuels reached 
a peak in 2008 amounting to 534 million tons.  Metals, dominated by iron ores and 
concentrates, and followed by manganese and chromium ores and concentrates, are 
Africa’s second largest export flows, with around 78 million tons exported in 2008.  
Mineral exports comprise the third largest export group, with a volume of 52.3 million 
tons in 2008.  The last material category, biomass, has lowest share of African exports, 
with fruits, timber, products made of biomass like paper, and crops such as coffee, cocoa 
and tobacco main as the primary biomass exports, exporting about 14.5 million tons in 
2008. Graph 1 displays the growth in physical terms of African exports from 1980-2008.  
Since the mid-1980s, all material categories have grown.  (The relationship of this trend 











Graph 1: Exports in physical terms (millions of tons) of African Countries by 




Source:  UNCTAD 2012 
 
In addition to an increase in exports in physical terms, the new scramble for 
Africa is reflected in part in increased FDI inflows, largely due to high prices for 
important commodities as well as the opening of African economies to foreign 
investment. From an ecological perspective looking at total FDI alone can be deceiving, 
as the monetary amount of FDI flows divulges neither the draining of natural capital nor 
potentially associated environmental impact. What may register as an insignificant inflow 
into the timber sector, for example, may be associated with devastating effects on an old 
growth African forest.  Nonetheless, the rapid growth in inflows, and their concentration 
in minerals and fossil fuels, reveals the predominant interest of the core and emerging 
economies in securing such strategic resources for industrial purposes.    
According to the UNCTAD World Investment Report 2007, in the extractive 
industries, the high prices of metals, oil, and natural gas in recent years have led to the 
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increased activity of TNCs in Africa, with inflows from emerging economies like China 
becoming increasingly important.  In 2006, FDI inflows to Africa rose by 20% to 36$ 
billion, twice their 2004 level, in large part related to investments in extractive industries. 
An estimated 442 green field investments were undertaken in Africa in 2006, 258 by 
developed country transnationals, particularly from Europe, 175 by developing 
economies (134 from Asia and the remaining from within Africa), and a few from South 
East Europe and the CIS. The value of cross-border acquisitions of African enterprises 
reached a record level 18$ billion in 2006, almost half of this in the form of M&As by 
Asian TNCs, representing a huge expansion of activity since the start of the decade 
(UNCTAD, 2007).  
The extractive industries accounted for most of the increase in inflows to Africa 
in 2006, as the surge of FDI inflows were concentrated mainly in oil and gas as Table 1 
shows (UNCTAD, 2007)  Though in addition, the growing services sector, particularly 
transport, storage and communications, continued to attract FDI, as reflected by the data 


















Table 1:  Distribution of cross-border M&As, by Sector and Main Industry in 
Africa, 2005-2006 
 
Source UNCTAD 2007 
Further, investors seeking mining locations drove an increase in FDI inflows in 
African least-developed countries (LDCs), increasing from $6 billion in 2005 to $ 8 
billion in 2006, as shown in Graph 2.  The 10 major recipients of FDI among African 
LDCs in 2006 were, in declining order:  Sudan, Equatorial Guinea, Chad, Tanzania, 
Ethiopia, Zambia, Uganda, Burundi, Madagascar, and Mali.  FDI grew especially quickly 
(by 50% or more) in Burundi, Djibouti, Guinea-Bissau, Somalia, Madagascar, Ethiopia, 













Source UNCTAD 2007  
 
The UNCTAD 2007 report found that policy developments also indicate a further 
opening up to foreign investment, although some countries have also made changes in 
their regulatory frameworks with a view to securing greater benefits from inward FDI. 
While African economies have been encouraged to open to foreign investment since the 
1980s, UNCTAD’s annual survey on changes to national laws and regulations shows that 
even as late as 2006, 40 Africa countries introduced 57 new measures affecting FDI, of 
which 49 encouraged inward FDI.  A number of African countries introduced measures 
aimed at improving the admission and establishment processes applied to foreign 
investors.  For example, Burkina Faso created one-stop shops for new businesses; Kenya 
strengthened its investment promotion agency (IPA); several countries eased or improved 
registration and fiscal procedures for business start-ups; and Nigeria cut registration time 
from 274 to 80 days.  Other countries introduced other measures to promote foreign 
investment, such as various forms of tax reductions.  At the international level, the 
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region’s development partners under the umbrella of the Fourth Africa-Asia Business 
Forum and Tokyo International Conference for Africa’s Development implemented 
measures to boost region’s FDI inflows (UNCTAD, 2007). 
According to the newest UNCTAD World Investment Report 2013, investment in 
extractive industries remains the most important driver of FDI to Africa, though 
investment in manufacturing and services also witnessed investment increases.  In East 
Africa, recently discovered gas reserves in Tanzania and oil fields in Uganda resulted in 
increased FDI, as inflows to the region rose from $4.5 billion in 2011 to $ 6.3 billion in 
2012.  Central Africa also saw its inflows rise to $10 billion, a record high, maintaining a 
trend of increasing FDI since 2010.  In this region, natural resources continue to attract 
investment from mining transnational corporations.  For example, significant FDI was 
targeted at the expansion of the copper cobalt Tenke Fungurume mine in the DRC.  For 
West Africa FDI flows declined by 5 per cent to $ 16.8 billion, largely due to a drop in 
investment in Nigeria by 21 per cent.  However, investment in oil-producing Ghana 
remained stable at $3.3 billion and mining interests in Mauritania helped that country’s 
inflows double to $1.2 billion.  In the Southern African region, some countries saw 
substantial increases. Inflows to Mozambique doubled to $ 5.2 billion, attracted by the 
country’s huge offshore gas deposits.  However, FDI flows to Southern Africa fell.  
Reflecting a trend some commenters criticize as a form of sub-imperialism (Shivji), 
South Africa registered FDI outflows at$4.4 billion, making the country the largest 
source of FDI in Africa.  South African companies were active in acquiring operations in 




 As established under colonialism, African resources remain the primary draw for 
FDI flows, with sectoral concentration in mining. Resources, prospects of better world 
prices, changes in attitudes towards national ownership and sector specific incentives 
tend to be primary determining factors in attracting FDI (UNCTAD, 2007). Some 
scholars argue this creates a form of enclavism and uneven development.  Ferguson 
argues that the standard interpretation that Africa remains underdeveloped because the 
continent is bypassed by capital is misleading.  Rather, 
….capital hops over unusable Africa, alighting only in mineral rich 
enclaves that are starkly disconnected from their national societies. The 
result is not the formation of standardized national grids, but the 
emergence of huge areas of the continent that are effectively off the grid.  
These areas are in many ways excluded from the global economy, but 
Africa is not a ‘black hole’ in the information society; rather, specific 
forms of global integration on the continent co-exist with specific and 
equally global forms of exclusion and marginalization” (Ferguson, 2005, 
p. 380).    
 
This is a difficult trend to quantify, and critics could point out the FDI in manufacturing 
and services have been on the rise according to the World Investment Report 2013.  
However, Ferguson’s  comments carry weight, because FDI is still primarily driven by 
natural resources; economic growth is generally still driven by extractive based activities; 
such economic growth is neither sustainable nor inclusive, and has resulted in increased 
inequality and not led to the expected levels of poverty reduction; Africa has failed to 
make significant gains in moving up the value added chain and is instead witnessing a 
trend of de-industrialization; and that extractive industries in general tend to produce 





African ecologies in the global ecological context 
This section briefly overviews, in general terms, the global drivers behind the 
increased demand for African resources since the 2000s.  Despite the heavy concentration 
in minerals and fossil fuels, what is significant about the ‘new scramble for Africa’ is the 
extent to which the totality of African ecological goods and services are being exploited.  
While traditional resources such as fossil fuels and strategic minerals are attracting global 
attention with high FDI flows, African commons such as the land and African fisheries 
are increasingly being sought out as well.    
 
African fossil fuels and the global demand for energy security 
As discussed above, with the projected massive increase in global demand 
coupled with dwindling supplies, fossil fuels are central to the new scramble for Africa.  
Both core and emerging economies alike are competing to secure their access to oil, and 
Africa has attracted investments from virtually all the major oil companies in Europe and 
the US.  While Middle Eastern oil reserves are substantially greater than African reserves 
(Africa contains about 7 percent of known global oil reserves), interest in African oil has 
been catalyzed by the desire to reduce energy dependency on the volatile region.  
Consequently, the US and other Western powers are seeking to decrease their 
dependence upon Middle East as region of supply and turning to Africa, especially North 
Africa, West Africa, and the Gulf of Guinea. The demand for oil is also rising 
dramatically in emerging economies such as China and India, as both have become net 
importers of oil. In the past decade and a half China has been increasingly engaged with 
African states in its quest for oil and other commodities. India’s growth rate, like China’s, 
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has led to growing oil imports, and Indian state-owned enterprises have also intensified 
their quest for access to African oil (Obi, 2010). 
The developmental repercussions of such a massive inflow of foreign interest and 
investment in Africa’s petro states have been far from laudable.  Africa’s petro states 
have suffered from corruption and lack of democracy, the dispossession of local 
communities in oil-producing areas, and environmental despoliation.  Further, the 
determination of the US to secure its access to African oil, gas, minerals, and other 
energy sources is leading to its extension of a formidable apparatus of political military 
alliances with strategically placed countries in Africa, often justified by reference to the 
war on terror.  (Southall and Melber, 2009).   
 
Other strategic minerals 
Africa accounts for 41 percent of world reserves of cobalt, 56 percent of 
diamonds, 34 percent of gold, 10 percent of oil, 12 per cent of chromites, 53 percent of 
phosphate rock, and a number of other important resources (UNCTAD, 2012). Africa’s 
minerals are of enormous economic and strategic importance.  To begin with, Africa 
holds about 18% of the world’s recoverable uranium resources, and the demand for 
uranium has increased dramatically in recent years as it is the key raw material in nuclear 
energy production. While Western companies remain predominant, China is becoming an 
increasingly significant actor and is competing, especially with Russia, for deals in 
Namibia and Niger.  These include the actual or potential takeover of Western operations 
(Southall and Melber, 2009). Coltan, from which the metals columbium and tantalum are 
extracted, is another key strategic resource, vital for electronic equipment such as mobile 
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phones. Of known global tantalite resources 80 percent are found in Democratic Republic 
of Congo.  
As with oil, both uranium and coltan have been associated with conflict and 
environmental degradation. A regional scramble for coltan had helped fuel civil war in 
the  DRC from 1998-2003, and involved eight African militaries at its height. Uranium 
mining, also, has been associated with pollution and violent conflict in Niger over the 
distribution of rents (Southall and Melber, 2009). 
 
The dispossession of the African commons:  land grabbing and the depletion of African 
fisheries 
Aside from strategic metals and fossil fuels, Africa is also at the heart of the 
global land grabbing trend. Land and water for agriculture are increasingly becoming 
commodified and accessible to the global market. Despite the orthodox contention that 
land is plentiful and underutilized in Africa, land grabbing, as dubbed by its critics, has 
become an area of especial concern, as it is often associated with the dispossession of 
land from local communities and the deprivation of their current and future livelihoods. 
There are a number of factors driving the land grabbing in Africa and elsewhere in the 
periphery, but primarily, in a global context of shrinking resources, developed and 
emerging economies are trying to achieve food, water and energy security outside of their 
national boundaries (Smaller and Mann, 2009).  
Concerning energy security, with high oil prices and depleting supplies, 
developed country and emerging country governments and their private sectors are 
acquiring land for energy crops. Hence the production of biofuels has become a major 
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driver of land grabbing in Africa, and has also been criticized for pushing the price of 
important grains up with adverse effects on the poor. Critics argue that the legalities 
surrounding foreign investment in land and water often shift rights from domestic to 
foreign actors due to the current frameworks of domestic and international law for 
foreign investment. In many of the host states, for example, domestic laws concerning 
land rights, water rights, or pollution controls for intensive agriculture are either 
insufficient or lacking. On the other hand, the international law framework often provides 
numerous hard rights for foreign investors (Smaller and Mann, 2009).  Chapter 4 goes 
into further detail concerning the issue of land grabbing and Tanzania. 
 
African water supplies 
GRAIN, an international non-profit organization working to support small 
farmers and social movements in their struggles for community-controlled and 
biodiversity-based food systems, argues that behind the scramble for land in Africa is a 
global struggle for water. In general, land deals in Africa involve large-scale, industrial 
agricultural operations that consume, or plan to consume, large amounts of water. Hence, 
land grabbing in Africa concentrates around the continent’s largest river and lake 
systems.  The dispossession of African water supplies reflects the larger global ecological 
crisis involving water shortages; in the near future, it is predicted that water will become 
the single most important physical commodity based asset class.  In this context, many 
corporations are rushing to sign land deals that give them wide-ranging control over 




However, a third of Africans already live in water-scarce environments and 
climate change is likely to increase these numbers significantly. According to GRAIN, 
the massive land deals could rob millions of people of their access to water and deplete 
much of the continent’s most precious fresh water sources.  Ecologically, nearly all land 
deals are located in major river basins with access to irrigation and often occupy fertile 
and fragile wetland, or in more arid areas that can draw water from major rivers.  In some 
cases, farms directly access ground water by pumping it up. These water resources are 
lifelines for local farmers, pastoralists and other rural communities.  Countries which the 
Nile River passes through, including Egypt, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda have 
received especial attention. Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Sudan have leased out millions of 
hectares, and will lease out more. To bring such land into production, it will need to be 
irrigated, and GRAIN argues that such irrigation will severely deplete the water 
resources.  Another part of Africa targeted by agribusiness are lands along the Niger 
River, which millions rely on for agriculture, fishing, trade, and a primary water source. 
Mali, Niger and Nigeria are most dependent on the river, but seven other countries share 
its water (GRAIN, 2012). 
The legalities surrounding the scramble for African water also tend to work in the 
favor of investors.  Contracts are rarely made public, and from contracts that have been 
leaked, it has become apparent that these contracts tend not to contain any specific 
mention of water rights.  This generally leaves companies free to build dams and 
irrigation canals at their discretion.  Further, even in instances where governments may 
have the political will to protect local communities and environment, existing 
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international trade and investment treaties generally give foreign investors strong rights 
in this respect (GRAIN, 2012). 
 
African forests 
African forests have long been targeted for foreign harvesting, and deforestation 
remains a serious problem today.  It is estimated that 4 million hectares of forest are lost 
each year, twice the world average rate of deforestation. The Worldwide Fund for Nature 
estimates, for example, that at current rates of deforestation Congo-Brazzaville’s forests 
will be two-thirds gone by 2050 (Carmody, 2011). European companies, under generous 
concessions granted by African governments, dominate the logging sector, though much 
logging is done illegally.  Exports primarily flow to Southern Europe, though China is 
rapidly becoming a major destination for timber (Southall and Melber, 2009).  Overall, it 
is largely Euro-American consumption that is driving the demand for tropical timber, and 
often European and American companies involved in the deforestation. This recurring 
dynamic, central to ecologically unequal exchange, means that while European and 
American consumers benefit from deforestation in Africa, local forest dwelling 
communities suffer the losses.   
 
African Fisheries 
Over the past twenty five years, the global trade in fish and fish products has 
sharply increased, and around 50 per cent of world’s fish exports come from developing 
countries (Carmody, 2011). For Africa, the growth of industrial fishing by foreign fleets 
has contributed greatly to the depletion of local fish stocks along the continent’s 
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coastlines. With external demand for fish, the continent exports around 2.7 billion 
dollars’ worth of fish annually. Western Africa in particular is increasingly supplying fish 
for Western Europe, Russia and China (Carmody, 2011). However, as with most of 
Africa’s resources, while foreign interests and consumers benefit from the exploitation of 
Africa’s fisheries, the local people suffer. Historically, local fishing populations have 
depended upon Africa’s rivers, lakes and coastlines as important supplies of food.  While 
population expansion and urbanization have taxed fish stocks, the industrial fishing by 
foreign fleets in particular have contributed to the over-exploitation of Africa’s fisheries. 
As a result, many fishermen become poorer, with some fishing sectors in decline, while 
the bulk of profits flow to foreign interests. Further, while some fleet owners have 
negotiated agreements with coastal states that provide for the payment of a license fee or 
a share of income to the host nation, many have not. Illegal, unregulated and unreported 
(IUU) fleets, mainly from Europe and the Far East, fish within African territorial limits, 
operating with de facto impunity since few coastal states have capacity to impound such 
intruders (Southall and Melber, 2009).  In addition, foreign fleets have often manipulated 
access agreements in order to overfish (Carmody, 2011).   
   
Conclusion 
This chapter sought to trace, historically, the policies of the era of economic 
nationalism to the era of neoliberalism and the ‘new scramble for Africa.’ From a 
political ecological perspective, the orthodox interpretation of African economic 
nationalism as little more than an inefficient failure is too reductionist to capture the 
totality of conflicting interests that this era contained.  In historical hindsight the 
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economic nationalist strategies have been criticized from across the political spectrum.  
The point in this chapter was not so much to uncover the causes, external or internal, 
behind the failures of economic nationalism as to consider what this has meant in the 
broader picture of the continued accumulation of capital and the subsumption of 
peripheral resources. The argument is that the decline of economic nationalism in Africa 
and its replacement by neoliberal policies has meant the removal of obstructions to the 
subsumption of Africa’s resources in terms amenable to the accumulation of capital and 
the metabolic needs of core and, increasingly, emerging economies. Such ‘obstructions’ 
to capital had included the very mechanisms that African countries had sought to use to 
gain resource sovereignty and improve their terms of trade, with the ultimate aim of 
increased economic independence after an era of colonial subjugation.  
If we conceptualize ecological imperialism as the subjection of peripheral 
political, social, and economic systems for the metabolic needs and needs of capital 
accumulation, a case can be made that historically ecological imperialism has been the 
norm in Africa since the colonial period, with a brief contestation during the era of 










Chapter 4 Tanzania: Foreign Investment in Mining and Land 
Introduction:  Tanzania in the global ecology 
            Tanzania is a resource rich country, endowed with valuable minerals, vast 
tracks of arable land and abundant water resources, and an extensive coastal region.  
Like other African countries, in a global ecological context of limited supplies and 
increasing demand, its resources have attracted global attention, evident through 
increased FDI inflows into its extractive and land sector in the past decade. And like 
other African countries, in the 1980s Tanzania embarked on IMF and World Bank-led 
structural adjustment reforms.  After years of heavy state intervention and control, 
these reforms opened Tanzanian resources to foreign investment as a key strategy for 
economic growth and development.  As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, these reforms 
have been criticized as a ‘neoliberalization of nature,’ which I argued involves the 
subsumption of natural resources as necessary inputs in the process of capital 
accumulation, on terms favorable to capital, and can be conceived of as an unfolding 
counter-countermovement against the economic nationalism of the post-independence 
eras.   
 
This chapter looks more closely at the political economy of the foreign investment 
regime governing Tanzania’s resources, that is, the policies that regulate the price and 
accessibility of Tanzanian resources to foreign capital, as well as the socio-political 
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conditions and conflicts surrounding foreign investment. While Chapter 3 had broadly 
discussed the changes in FDI regimes for much of the Third World since the era of 
economic nationalism, this chapter further elaborates this issue with Tanzania as a case 
study. The chapter focuses on foreign investment in land and Tanzania’s mining sector; 
the mining sector because it attracts the largest inflows of foreign investment and is 
characterized by equally large (and controversial) outflows of profit, and land because 
foreign investment has had significant, and often negative, impact on the lives of 
Tanzanian communities.    
Tanzania is one of the top 11 countries globally to have been targeted for foreign 
investment in large-scale land acquisitions, a dubious position that has sparked 
substantial civil conflict and accusations of land grabbing and dispossession. In 
2007/2008, the spike in agricultural commodity prices catalyzed huge transnational 
farmland acquisitions, dubbed by some as a global land rush.  This land rush is driven by 
deep-seated socio-ecological challenges unlikely to abate in the long-run.  Population 
growth, growing consumption rates, demand for food, biofuels, and other raw materials, 
have coupled with increasing water scarcity and natural resource constraints, and 
countries are seeking to invest in land for food, energy, and environmental security. 
Increasing demand and limited supplies has also resulted in rising prices, prompting 
financial speculation and investment for profit purposes. As discussed in Chapter 2, a 
defining characteristic of capitalism’s relation to nature is the capacity for ecological 
crises to be turned into sources of profit. Also as discussed in Chapter 2, this dynamic 
underlies much of the expansionary tendency of capital accumulation.    
 The Land Matrix, a specialized community of land experts from civil society 
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organizations, governmental and intergovernmental institutions and academia, has 
documented reports of 1217 agricultural land deals worldwide, amounting to about 83.2 
million ha of land in developing countries, or 1.7 percent of the world’s agricultural area. 
Africa is the most targeted region, with reported land deals covering an area equivalent to 
4.8 percent of Africa’s total agricultural area. Though globally a large number of 
countries (eighty-four) are reported to be targeted by foreign investors, 70 percent of total 
land area is concentrated in eleven countries, seven of which are in Africa.  Tanzania is 
one of the seven African countries, making it a top destination for large scale land 
investment globally (Land Matrix Tanzania webpage).       
Investors are both public and private actors, and originate from three groups of 
countries: emerging countries (Brazil, South Africa, China, India, Malaysia, and Korea); 
Gulf states; and countries in the ‘Global North.’ Overall, investment is coming from 
wealthier, food importing countries with an average GDP per capita four times higher 
than target countries.  In contrast, targeted countries are among the poorest nations in the 
world and tend to have high incidences of hunger.  Investors also tend to seek out 
countries with weak land institutions that also offer relatively high levels of investor 
protection. As food and energy security are primary drivers, most investment projects are 
export-oriented and target high-yield, easily accessible arable land with access to water 
resources (Land Matrix Tanzania webpage).  For Africa, this trend has become 
problematic, resulting in the acquisition of rural land at a scale unknown since colonial 
times. Further, African governments appear to be giving fertile land to foreign investors, 
including governments, at ‘giveaway prices.’ In contrast to promises of social and 
economic development and poverty alleviation, land acquisitions have been associated 
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with lack of democratic oversight and management, loss of livelihoods and access to 
resources, and conflict between villagers, governments, and investors (Land Matrix 
Tanzania webpage).    
As noted in chapter 3, global demand for minerals and energy commodities has, 
like the demand for land, resulted in high inflows of FDI into Africa in the past decade.  
Tanzania has various valuable and highly-demanded minerals, and its mining sector is the 
second fastest growing sector after tourism, with economically proven deposits of gold, 
diamonds, tanzanite, ruby, tin, copper, nickel, iron, soda phosphate, gypsum, kaolite, 
coal, natural gas and uranium.  But also like the issue of land, foreign investment in such 
resources has not translated into substantial benefits for the Tanzanian people.  While 
classical producers of minerals and fossil fuels like Australia, Canada and Saudi Arabia 
benefited from the 2003-2008 rise in commodity prices (Sturmer, 2010), Tanzania, like 
other Sub-Saharan countries, was burdened by foreign investment regimes that 
guaranteed that largely profits flowed out of the continent.   Further, despite an overall 
high economic growth of 7 percent per annum over the last ten years, Tanzania has failed 
to translate this economic growth into significant reductions in income poverty or 
structural industrial development.  The poverty headcount ratio at the rural poverty line 
remains at 37.4 percent as of 2007, and the poverty headcount ratio at the national 
poverty line is 33.4 percent. Twenty-three percent of all households in rural mainland 
Tanzania are food insecure, and while life expectancy gains have been made in the past 
decade, the average life expectancy is still only 58 years old (REPOA, 2012).   
Inequality is high in Tanzania, with a Gini coefficient of 0.35. Reflecting the non-
inclusive nature of economic growth under the current commodity boom, Tanzania’s 
 
 137 
wealthiest 10 percent captured a disproportionately large part of the increase in overall 
consumption generated by growth.  In contrast, the poorest 40 percent saw their share of 
income decline (Africa Progress Panel, 2013). 
 
Tanzanian’s integration into the world-system: the political ecology of land and 
mining in the colonial era 
Tanzania’s colonial economy and integration into the world-system began under 
German conquest and subjugation in the 1880s.  Under German colonial control, 
Tanzania’s economy was organized and geared to export raw materials, mainly 
agricultural goods, as a response to human and industrial consumption needs in the core 
economies, particularly Germany. Through violent conquest, forced labor, and laws 
imposing taxes on the African population, the colonial mode of production was 
introduced.  Roads, bridges, seaports and railways were built as the infrastructure to 
extract and transport the surplus from periphery to metropole, and the plantation became 
a central way of organizing African labor to produce new commodities.  By the late 
1890s, Africans, either as peasants or paid laborers, were forced to cultivate and produce 
such primary commodities as sisal, new varieties of cotton, rubber, groundnuts and coffee 
(Kanika, 1980).  
Land acquisition was central to the colonial agenda of political control and the 
economic goal of producing surplus for the needs of the metropole.   Conflict over land 
dispossession underpinned major anti-colonial struggles, beginning with multiple, 
sporadic resistances in the late 1800s to the Maji Maji War in the early 1900s, up until the 
Meru Land Case and the Kiembe Samaki Uprisings in the mid-1900s (Chachage, 2011). 
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The contentious features of the currently existing land regime were inherited from the 
land regime created in the colonial political economy.  The colonial land regime was 
established by the Germans from 1885 to 1916. Under the German colonial government 
the Imperial Decree of the 26 of November, 1895, converted all territorial lands into 
‘crown lands.’ All lands for which private ownership could not be established by 
documentary ownership were considered ownerless, and while communities could prove 
ownership through occupation and use, land not continuously used was considered 
ownerless. Due to this decree, some 1.3 million hectares were alienated from indigenous 
control, and thereafter German authorities issued freehold grants to settlers along the 
coast and northern highlands (Land and Natural Resource Tenure in Africa Program, 
2010).   
With the defeat of Germany after WWI, land control and ownership fell under the 
British, and colonial control over land became even more centralized.  The British 
colonial land regime (1918-61) essentially assumed indigenous occupants had no 
ownership rights over land.  The property regime established by the British colonial state 
was intended to facilitate the production of cheap agricultural goods through peasant 
labor on plantation lands, but Tanganyika was considered a trust territory. Hence, the 
colonial state had to legitimize its laws and actions in regards to native interests, while 
allowing the British administration to maintain the legal capacity to control and alienate 
indigenous land. In pursuit of these goals, the British ended up placing all lands in the 
hands of the state and effectively centralized land administration (Shivji, 2009).  
In 1923, the British passed the Land Ordinance, the principal piece of legislation 
whose original architecture still underpins the existing land tenure system. The Land 
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Ordinance installed authority over all land to the colonial Governor, declaring that ‘no 
title to the occupation and use of any such lands shall be valid without the consent of the 
Governor.’ The Governor was given the  power to grant ‘right of occupancy,’ that is, the 
right to occupy and use land for a period of up to 99 years, to natives and non-natives, 
and to demand rent for use of any public lands granted to any native or non- native. 
Further, the ultimate disposal of land was subject to the will of the Governor. Section 2 of 
the Ordinance declared that all lands were public lands, while section 3 stipulated that all 
public lands were under the control of the Governor and subject to the disposition of the 
Governor (Shivji, 2009).        
In 1928, in response to criticisms from the Permanent Mandates Commission of 
the League of Nations, the Ordinance was amended to formally recognize ‘customary 
law’ (that is, law arising from traditional practices and ownership of land). Right of 
occupancy was re-defined to include ‘the title of a native or a native community lawfully 
using or occupying land in accordance with native law and custom.’ Nonetheless, 
customary right (also known as ‘deemed right of occupancy’) was not equated the same 
status as ‘granted right of occupancy’ by the state. Hence, despite some recognition of the 
customary right of occupancy, a dualistic system of land governance evolved, whereby 
rights granted by the state were in practice considered superior to customary rights to 
land. The rights of customary holders were not entrenched in law, and there were no 
stipulations as to the rights of customary holders against the rights of the state. 
Ultimately, land remained public land, subject to control of the state, disposition of the 
Governor, and not protected by law, though natives were legally allowed to occupy land 





 role as a trust territory was nominally justified through 
allowing peasant and pastoralist customary landholders to have permissive rights 
regulated by native law and custom. However, when the colonial political economic 
interests required alienation, customary occupants could legally be evicted, having no 
land tenure security. With independence, the post-colonial state was to inherit this 
hierarchically organized dual land tenure system (Shivji, 2009). 
Exploitation of Tanzania’s minerals also began under colonial control when the 
Germans explored for gold in the area surrounding Lake Victoria in the 1890s.  While 
Arab and local traders mined and sold Tanzania’s natural resources including gold, 
copper, iron, and salt, German colonialism established the first commercial mines.  
During the pre-independence era small and large-scale mining companies were 
established and grew in number, seeking to exploit both precious metals and industrial 
minerals.  In the 1920s and 1930s British and South African mining operations also 
opened.  Mines in Sekenke, Geita and Mpanda were established for gold and in Mwadui 
for diamonds, and mineral production increased consistently in this period throughout the 
pre-independence period, save for a decline during the WWII (Nyankweli, 2012). After 
the war mineral exports kept increasing, and by 1959 mineral exports exceeded pre-war 
production levels.  However, just before independence, outputs fell dramatically with 
investment fears of economic and political changes, as well as the persistently low price 
of gold at the time (Nyankweli, 2012).   
Hence it was under colonial control that Tanzanian resources in the form of 
agricultural goods, land and minerals were subsumed by foreign capital and integrated 
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 From 1962-1964 Tanzania was known as the Republic of Tanganyika.  In 1964, Tanganyika joined the 




into the world-capitalist system, to be exported from Tanzanian soil to the associated 
metropoles. Needless to say, with the means of production under foreign control, the flow 
of profits followed the direction of the resources as well.   
 
Economic nationalist policies and Tanzanian resources 
Like other post-colonial African countries, upon gaining political independence 
from the British in 1961, Tanzania was left in a state of economic dependency, or neo-
colonialism.  The structure of its trade profile remained essentially the same as 
established under colonialism- exporting primary commodities (mainly coffee, cotton, 
diamonds, and sisal) at low prices to capitalist markets, and importing finished products 
and industrial goods at high prices. Trade remained heavily biased towards a few 
traditional Western partners, with Britain still the largest export and import market. 
Tanzania’s means of production remained heavily under the influence of Britain, and the 
West in general.  The government continued to depend upon British financial resources, 
with banking and insurance predominantly British-owned, while in contrast the majority 
of Tanzanians remained as rural subsistence farmers (Crouch, 1987). 
In regards to foreign investment in the early post-independence years (1960s), the 
government sought to create an attractive environment for investors, a stance to be 
repeated under the neoliberal reforms a quarter of a century later.  Foreign capital was 
seen as a necessary component for development, and policies such as the Foreign 
Investments Protection Act of 1962 and the Preventive Detention Act of 1962 were 
enacted to attract foreign investors, with tax holidays, easy repatriation of profits, and 
strict labor laws to discipline workers (Shivji, 2009). As such, despite formal political 
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independence, the command of the economy remained under foreign control. However 
this situation, coupled with increasing social and economic inequality, led to mounting 
political tension and dissatisfaction and the desire for economic self-reliance.    Nyerere, 
the first president of the newly independent Tanzania and ideological father of ‘African 
socialism,’ became increasingly convinced of the need for a more equal and self-reliant 
society.  He decided that this necessitated the democratization of institutions at every 
level, with the state playing the role as representative of the people (Crouch, 1987). 
In 1967 Nyerere issued the Arusha Declaration, a series of policy documents 
expounding new economic and social priorities. The central tenets of The Declaration 
were socialism, self-reliance, rural development, mass participation and responsive 
leadership. The declaration sought to translate socialist theory, in terms of greater social 
justice and economic independence, into practice. Socialism, according to the Arusha 
Declaration, was to be built upon the absence of exploitation, the control of the major 
means of production and exchange by the peasants and workers, and socialism as a belief. 
In terms of policy, a more egalitarian society was to be achieved by increased 
expenditure on social services in rural areas, a more equitable distribution of income, and 
the facilitation of worker participation in decision-making (Crouch, 1987).   
To these ends, a command economy was seen as central, especially in achieving 
greater self-reliance and economic independence.  Public ownership was crucial to the 
socialist project, and all major means of production and exchange in the nation were to be 
controlled and owned by the peasants through the control of the Government.  
Nationalization began one day after the Arusha Declaration and foreign commercial 
banks were the first to be nationalized. In the first week after the Declaration the state 
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took over the six largest foreign-owned import-export houses, all insurance businesses, 
eight flour milling firms, the sisal industry, and the controlling interests in seven MNC 
subsidiaries
57
 (Crouch, 1987).  Other economic controls included centralized control over 
investment planning for both domestic private and foreign investment, administrative 
allocation of foreign exchange and import licensing along with price controls 
administered by the National Price Commission; regulated/controlled interest rates and 
credit rationing according to the annual financial plan as well as state control on 
wholesale trade for some import and domestic commodities to specific parastatal 
organizations (Nyankweli, 2012). Orthodox critics point out that with the Arusha 
Declaration, a number of policies enacted were responsible for directly or indirectly 
discouraging private (both foreign and domestic) investment including nationalization of 
all means of production, distribution and exchange, prohibiting private ownership of 
small industrial enterprises in villages and cracking down on entrepreneurs who had 
started small scale enterprises despite these prohibitions  (Nyankweli, 2012).  Leftists 
critics, however, argue that while ideologically the Arusha Declaration sought to 
redistribute wealth and place the means of production within the hands of the producers, 
in reality, economic policies such as the nationalizations expanded the power of the 
bureaucratic elite.
58
     
                                                 
57 However, for practical reasons Nyerere still sought to reassure potential investors that private investment would be 
welcome in any new or existing industry not listed as reserved for public ownership, and that minority private 
participation might be permitted in several of the listed industries.   Consequently, some sectors of the economy were 
100% government owned, in others sectors private and government partnership existed, while others sectors some 
enterprises were privately-owned (Crouch, 1987). 
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 A note on the issue of class:  Radical scholars such as Shivji and Rodney, commenting on the class 
structure of Tanzania, noted the emergence of a bureaucratic bourgeoisie post-independence.  Unlike the 
productive national bourgeoisie of the developed countries that played an important role in revolutionizing 
the means of production, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie’s power is linked mainly to political power and 
control over property as leading officials in government.  During the colonial period, according to Shivji 
and Rodney, Asians from British India were brought in as a ‘layer’ between the colonial powers and the 
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Typical of the post-independence era of economic nationalism and the New 
International Economic Order, as discussed in Chapter 3, natural resources were brought 
under national control as well.  The mining sector was brought under state control and 
nationalized. Private mining, by private persons or companies, was prohibited and only 
the state mining company STAMICO, a parastatal established in 1972, could conduct 
exploration and mining for all minerals (Nyankweli, 2012). In terms of land, the post-
colonial laws largely replicated the essential structure put in place by colonial authorities 
and in some cases expanded the scope of centralized control over land.  This was to have 
negative consequences for the alienation and dispossession of land from customary 
owners in both the eras of economic nationalism and neoliberal reform, as will be 
                                                                                                                                                 
African population, and were encourage to become supply traders, clerks, and artisans, thus in effect 
forming a ‘commercial’ or ‘merchant’ class.  As traders they exploited the peasants and as employers, their 
workers. Their presence also limited the development of an African petty bourgeoisie.  With independence, 
however, came the rise of what both Shivji and Rodney describe as the  ‘bureaucratic bourgeoisie.’   This 
class came from a typical underdeveloped African country weak petty bourgeoisie class, and its ruling 
section came to possess the instruments of state on the morrow of independence.  Relative to the rest of its 
power, Shivji argues that it came to command enormous power.  With the Arusha Declaration, the state 
took over the function of the big capitalists and ran the economy in the interest of this petty bourgeoisie, 
particularly with the nationalization of a wide range of activities and the greatly increased the scope of the 
bureaucracy.  This also led to conflict between the Asian commercial bourgeoisie and the bureaucratic elite, 
who sought to take over many of the functions of the Asians.  Asians began to leave the country, and take 
their money with them, and the class basis of the commercial bourgeoisie began to disintegrate, while the 
power of bureaucratic elite grew. Both authors argued that with independence, class distinctions sharpened, 
and the contradictions between the interests of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie that held state power and the 
peasantry and working class grew.  However, Rodney seems to disagree with Shivji concerning the Arusha 
Declaration.  Shivji argues that the Arusha Declaration reflected a program of destroying the commercial or 
merchant bourgeoisie, and the beginning of bureaucratic capitalism.  However, Rodney, though essentially 
argued that the Arusha Declaration reflected the relative weakness  of the bureaucratic class post-
independence, as this class was unable to oppose a document that had overwhelming support from the 
peasantry and workers. The intent of ujamaa, or African socialism, was to halt the incipient penetration of 
the money economy and class formation of the country side.   However, Rodney claims that despite the 
progressive intent of the Arusha document, and villagization, the bureaucratic elite treated and found other 
ways to establish their power, particularly with the nationalizations and during villagization. In the end, it 
seems both Shivji and Rodney felt that class distinctions- intended or not- were sharpened, not weakened, 








discussed.  For example, the independent government simply replaced the word 
‘Governor’ with ‘President’ in the 1923 Land Ordinance that had centralized control 
under the British.  Nyerere then issued a further series of laws that expanded the domain 
of public land and abolished freehold tenure
59
  (Chachage, 2011). The ultimate effect of 
post-colonial laws regarding land was to further centralize control and place it under the 
executive power. Under nationalism, the state could dispossess a customary owner 
because land was considered mali ya umma- public property and all public property fell 
under the jurisdiction of the President (Shivji, 2009).      
 From1967-1973 the Nyerere’s government enacted the controversial Villagization 
Program (Ujamaa) which involved a forced relocation of approximately eighty-percent of 
the rural population to 5,528 villages (Shivji, 2009 cite)The program aimed to establish 
large collective farms and modernize agriculture, with large-scale agriculture and 
pastoralism under parastatals and small-scale agriculture under villagization.
60
  Under 
villagization, the local government was not legally vested with powers to govern land, 
and villages were often allocated land in public meetings without following any formal 
procedures. Customary tenure systems were generally ignored, large portions of 
customary land were alienated and disputes over existing land rights were largely 
disregarded (Chachage, 2011).   
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 For example, the Freehold Titles (Conversion) and Government Leases Act of 1963 converted freehold titles (<1% 
of land) to 99-year leaseholds with development conditions.  The Rights of Occupancy Development Conditions Act of 
1963 obligated lessees to pay rent. The Rural Farmland (Acquisition and Regrant) Act of 1965 empowered the 
government to acquire undeveloped private land and transfer it to people who would occupy and develop it (in practice, 
land transferred to state corporations parastatls, and cooperatives) (Chachage, 2011). 
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 The post- independence village settlements actually had their genesis in modernization theory and development plans 
from the World Bank and USAID. As Shivji notes, the first five year plan adopted immediately after independence was 
based on the World Bank report ‘The economic development of Tanganyika.’ Modernizing traditional peasants or 
pastoralists meant removing them from traditional surroundings so as to integrate them in the world capitalist market 
through production of cash crops for export. The transformation approach recommended by the World Bank involved 
settling selected farmers in villages supervised by a government agency, the Rural Settlement Commission. A similar 
philosophy informed the Fallon Report, published by USAID, and the report was the basis of the Range Development 
Act, in 1964 (Shivji, 2009). 
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Though villagization was acknowledged to have failed by 1966, in hindsight the 
process appears to have further eroded land tenure from the domain of customary law and 
the placement of individual tenure, placing the land under the supervision of the 
government through detailed regulations, rules and laws. Parastatals took over 
nationalized assets including land, holding such lands under ‘rights of occupancy.’ Such 
lands had often belonged to customary holders in villages, and villagization destroyed 
what little was left of the security of ‘deemed rights.’ Importantly, the overall direction of 
the political economy of production of cash crops for export and integration within the 
world capitalist market was not transformed (Shivji, 2009). 
 
The era of structural adjustments:  neoliberalism and foreign investment in land 
and mining  
Though nationalism and African socialism defined Tanzania’s ideological front in 
the 1960s and 1970s, in practice the Tanzania’s economy moved 
….erratically between import substitution and export-oriented 
industrialization with state capital, a bit of local private capital, and a 
substantial element of foreign public loans and private management 
contracts” (Shivji, 2009, p. 169). 
 
 But by the time Nyerere retired from presidency in 1985, the political and economic 
foundation of nationalist ideology was crumbling.   While some mass goods industries 
like textile, oil and leather were established with some success, other industries stagnated.  
Further, like other African countries, Tanzania fell into debt after its period of economic 
nationalism.  Within the government ideological differences had formed; ‘reformists’ 
wished to open up Tanzania to market forces while ‘statists’ wished to see state 
dominance continue. In the end, however, Tanzania had to adopt a series of market 
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reforms as IMF and World Bank-imposed preconditions for debt relief.  After Nyerere 
stepped down peacefully from power in 1985, Tanzania underwent a dramatic change in 
economic direction in the reformist direction, symbolized by the signing of an agreement 
with the IMF in 1986 for $77.5 million over 18 months to support an economic recovery 
program (Crouch, 1987).       
The overall emphasis of the structural adjustments was to re-orient Tanzania’s 
economy towards a market-based, export-led economy (in particular the boosting of 
agricultural export crop production), with private capital conceived as the main engine of 
growth, as opposed to import substitution and government intervention in the economy.   
Major structural adjustment measures included privatization of state-owned enterprises, 
removal of subsidies, lowering or abolition of tariffs, dismantling of state-marketing 
boards, liberalization of foreign exchange regimes, reductions in public expenditure, and 
an emphasis on creating a business-friendly environment in terms of FDI, among others 
(Nyankweli, 2011). With large external debts, Tanzania was highly dependent on 
multilateral aid and had little bargaining power with regard to debt-relief conditions. 
With the process of liberalization, marketization and privation (LIMP), labor, land, and 
natural resources were liberalized, marketized and privatized and a number of legal and 
institutional reforms were introduced (Shivji, 2006). 
 
Tanzania, Structural Reforms, and the Global Rush for Land 
Tanzania is a heavily agriculture-based country, with approximately eighty 
percent of the population’s livelihoods depending on subsistence farming.  Food 
production dominates agriculture, with maize, sorghum, millet, rice, wheat, beans, 
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bananas and potatoes among the major staple crops.  Coffee is the main cash crop, along 
with sisal, cashew, cotton, tobacco, tea, cloves, and oil seeds.  Agriculture is dominated 
by small-scale farmers cultivating farm sizes between 0.9 and 3 hectares.  Women make 
up the majority of the labor force, and farming techniques are characterized by low 
productivity, leaving Tanzania households often vulnerable to climatic and economic 
shocks. In recent years, such shocks have apparently increased, as Tanzanian harvests 
have suffered substantially from droughts and floods, with resultant increased prices for 
basic food stables
61
  (Oakland Institute, 2011).  As of 2009, Tanzania has a population of 
approximately 43.7 million, and about 94.5 million total hectares of land. Total arable 
land area is estimated, however, to be only around 44 million hectares with about 10 
million hectares currently cultivated (Tanzania Natural Resource Forum, 2009). 
The Land Matrix identifies Tanzania as one of the top 11 recipient countries 
worldwide for large-scale land investment deals.  As of August, 2012, there have been 
reported cases of over 41 deals in Tanzania, equal to approximately 1,115,179 ha.
62
  Of 
these deals, thirty-seven are agriculture related, 6 livestock related, and 1 related to 
forestry for wood or fibre
63
  (Land Matrix Tanzania website). As a politically stable 
country with vast tracts of fertile agricultural land and bountiful water supplies, Tanzania 
has attracted much foreign investment in recent years; total foreign investment in 
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 Climatic changes can have large effects on individual households and communities. During field 
research, many Tanzanians complained to me that their farmlands had suffered from drought in the past 
decade, with subsequent rising prices of food and food shortages.  The consequence of such climatic 
changes has been for many households to suffer from hunger and drops in standards of living.   
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 It must be kept in mind, according to the Land Matrix, that official records are often unclear and 
information is not always available on the exact amounts of land which have been allocated and leased to 
different investors, making it difficult to quantify the total amount of land acquired. Hence this is an 
estimate at best.  
 
63




agriculture in Tanzania has grown from 0.1 percent of Tanzania’s GDP in 1990 to 32.9 
percent in 2005 (Oakland institute, 2011).    
Table 1 covers the top ten investors in Tanzania according to investor, investor country, 
investor region, investor sector, crop and hectares (Land Matrix Website Tanzania). The 
full list of investors is given in Appendix II.   
Table 1:  Top Ten Investors in Land in Tanzania 
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Agriculture Sorghum 45,000 
 Malaysia Southeast 
Asia 
Agriculture Oil palm 45,000 
Source:  Land Matrix Tanzania website 
As table 1 shows investors from the USA, UK, United Arab Emirates, and Malaysia are 
top investors presently important in agriculture in Tanzania. As with other large-scale 
land investments in other developing countries, the investment trends are driven by three 
main issues:  energy security, food security, and environmental security.   
 Concerning energy, according to a study by the Oakland Institute, land deals are 
dominated by investments in agro-fuels, and both Tanzanian and foreign governments 
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have been promoting this surge in investments (Oakland Institute, 2011). Biofuel 
investment is typically driven by the growing global demand created by high oil prices, 
energy security concerns, global climate change concerns, and now some of the world’s 
largest oil firms are investing in biofuels in order to profit from it.  Tanzania’s 
government has promoted it for its potential to provide a partial energy substitute for 
costly oil imports, which take up to 25 percent of total foreign exchange earnings.  It is 
also promoted as a new source of agricultural income and economic growth in rural 
areas.  Many biofuel investments involve large plantations, though some are carried out 
by smallholder farmers and locally contracted farmer arrangements  (Tanzania Natural 
Resource Forum, 2009). Investments in Tanzania have also included carbon sequestration 
initiatives, whereby large tracts of land have been bought in order for foreign countries to 
secure carbon credits.  Countries have also invested in Tanzania to meet food security 
concerns.  Food production investments include investors from the UK, USA, Singapore, 
India, United Arab Emirates, China, Jordan, Saudi, Arabia, Turkey, Bangladesh (Oakland 
Institute, 2011).         
A key argument made by proponents of large-scale land investments is that Africa 
has the most under-utilized, fertile land in the world, and would gain in economic growth 
and development through the influx of foreign capital and technology.  This argument has 
been criticized on a number of grounds. Concerning the alleged bounty of under-utilized 
and available land, critics have argued that in reality, systematic empirical data on land 
availability in Africa remains limited.  Further, the meaning of land ‘availability’ is open 
to interpretation. Although a common argument  is that ‘marginal lands’ can be used for 
large-scale production of agrofuel feedstocks, in reality it is higher value lands, with 
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higher rainfall, access to irrigation, and proximity to markets that investors commonly 
target. In many cases across Africa, such land is already being used, but as will be 
discussed, such use often goes unacknowledged, as local people using the land often have 
no formal land rights or access to the relevant law and institutions (Oakland Institute, 
2011).           
These issues plague land scale acquisitions in Tanzania, as evident from the from 
the numerous land conflicts which have arisen over the issue of land in recent years. The 
Tanzanian government is actively seeking investors in agriculture and other sectors as 
part of its development and economic strategies, based on official rhetoric that there is an 
abundance of land available for investment. But most of the land sought after and being 
acquired by foreign investors in Tanzania is already classified as village land. Even if 
such land is not permanently settled, often it is used for a wide range of rural people’s 
livelihood activities. This includes land used by Tanzania’s many pastoralists, which is 
often labeled as barren, idle, degraded or marginal and therefore potentially available to 
investors (Oakland Institute, 2011). Moreover, while the Tanzanian government 
considers available land as meaning that there are no rural communities fully utilizing the 
land, there are currently no proper guidelines in place for potential future agricultural 
production and no standard mechanisms for calculating future population growth. A 
district officer of agricultural development in the rural town of Lushoto explained that 
Tanzania has limited land resources already under strain from population growth, and 
large-scale land investments from foreign investors are further exacerbating this problem. 
Further, the amount of land actually available is not at all clear according to NGOs 
writing on the subject, nor is it known how much land is acquired by local or foreign 
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investors each year. It is impossible, therefore, to keep investors accountable without 
publicly accessible information regarding investments, such as readily accessible data 
showing how much land is available or has been acquired and granted to local or foreign 
investors (Oakland Institute, 2011).    
Hence, while one of the central arguments for land investment in Tanzania, and 
Africa in general, is the perceived abundance of underutilized land, a growing body of 
literature has criticized that in reality large-scale, land-based investments are typically 
associated with dispossession, loss of resource access rights and ensuing conflicts, as the 
following section discusses in more detail.  These problems associated with large-scale 
land investments have prompted critics to dub such transactions as ‘land grabs.’ More 
specifically, the term land grab has been defined by the Tirana Declaration
64
 as land 
acquisitions which do one or more of the following:   
o Violate human rights, particularly the equal rights of women.  
o Flout the principles of free, prior, and informed consent of affected land users, 
particularly indigenous peoples.  
o Ignore impacts on social, economic, and gender relations, and on the 
environment.  
o Avoid transparent contracts with clear and binding commitments on employment 
and benefit sharing.  
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 In November 1995, over one thousand representatives of civil society, governments, and multilateral 
institutions came together in Brussels, Belgium for a conference on hunger and poverty.  In 2003 this 




o Eschew democratic planning, independent oversight, and meaningful 
participation.  
In these respects, a host of literature from academics, NGOs, and civil society groups 
suggests that the large-scale land investments occurring in Tanzania warrant the label of 
land grabbing.  The Tanzania media has reported that there are well over 1000 land-based 
conflicts reported in Tanzania on an annual basis, for  reasons including denied or limited 
ownership of and access to land and resources attached to it such as water;  forceful 
evictions, involuntary resettlement, unfair compensations or lack of compensations, 
environmental destruction, among others (Ngowi, 2012).  Such conflicts appear to have 
intensified in the period of economic liberalization (Mwalongo, 2012). 
 
The neoliberalization of land: background and legalities 
While the term land grab seems to imply an illegal transaction, in the case of 
Tanzania, large-scale land investments usually occur through legally sanctioned land 
acquisition. Within the context of broader neoliberal reforms, a number of legal and 
institutional reforms paved the way for land privatization and marketization, in order to 
create an atmosphere for the promotion of foreign investment.
65
   The result of such 
measures was the increase in both foreign and indigenous investment in land. However, 
the combination of a centralized land administration inherited from colonialism and 
economic nationalism, legal confusions over land tenure, and increased investment has 
made land an issue of much conflict between villagers, the government and investors.   
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 One major reform was the Tanzania Investment Act no. 26 of 1997 that established the Tanzania 




Popular discontent over the issue of land had erupted as early as the beginning of 
the 1990s, as Tanzania’s land regime had been problematic for customary holders since 
colonialism and into the pre-independence era.  In response to this popular discontent, the 
government had established the Presidential Commission of Enquiry into Land Matters to 
hear complaints, which led to new land legislation seeking to redress some of the issues.  
A new Land Legislation was enacted in 2001, specifically the Land Act of 1999 and 
Village Land Act of 1999. Both acts currently provide the framework for the exercise and 
administration of land rights. In some areas, there has been substantial reform towards the 
benefit of customary holders from the prior tenure framework.  For example, all 
Tanzanians above 18 years of age have rights to acquire and own land and all existing 
property rights are recognized and protected, including customary titles (HAKIARDHI, 
2011).         
However, land laws continue to retain problematic features of the old system.  To 
begin with, and perhaps most significantly, under the ‘radical title’ of the Land Act, the 
ultimate ownership of land remains in hands of the President, as a trustee for all 
Tanzanians. Ultimately, all aspects of land use and ownership, including rights of 
occupancy and imposition of development conditions, and land rent, remain under 
bureaucratic control. Under the Land Act, only the Ministry of Lands, through the 
Commission of Lands, has the authority to issue grants of occupancy (HAKIARDHI, 
2011). 
Problems arising from centralized executive control over all land in Tanzania are 
exacerbated by a number of confusions originating from the Village Act and Land Act 
themselves. Land in Tanzania is divided into three categories:  general, reserved, and 
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village land. Reserved land includes all land set aside for special purposes like forest 
reserves, game parks, game reserves, etc.  This includes about twenty-eight percent of all 
land. Under the Village Land Act, which provides the legal framework for the 
administration of village land, village land is all land within the boundaries of the more 
than 11,000 registered villages including.
66
  Confusion has arisen from the different 
definitions of general land, and is the source of much conflict regarding the issue of 
customary tenure arrangements.  Under the Village Act, general land is a residual 
category, that is, any land that is not reserved land or village land. However, under the 
Land Act, general land includes all public land that is not reserved land or village land, 
and includes unoccupied or unused village land. The Land Act does not define 
unoccupied or unused village land but nonetheless places all general land under the 
authority of the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human Settlements Development, 
thereby leaving a legal loophole that continues to undermine customary tenure of land 
(HAKIARDHI, 2011). 
Further, though the Village Land Act provides that the customary right of 
occupancy is in every respect equal in status to granted right of occupancy, in practice 
this is not the case.  A dualistic statutory customary character of land rights that prevailed 
since colonialism still remains. Government officials do not recognize customary land 
rights as equal to statutory, and do not respect the legal authorities of village government. 
(HAKIARDHI, 2011)  
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 Village land constitutes nearly 70% of all lands in Tanzania and provides customary rights of occupancy 
automatically to village lands in perpetuity. By the Village Act, village land is under the managerial authority of the 
Village Council elected by the Village Assembly, which includes all residents aged 18 years and above. The Village 
Council is accountable to the Village Assembly for land management decisions, with responsibility and authority to 
manage land, including issuing certificates of customary right of occupancy within their area and establishing and 
administering local registers of communal land rights, must apply customary law. As Tanzania is still largely rural, 




In regards to the issue of land grabbing and foreign investment, the problem lies 
in the presidential power to transfer ‘in the public interest’ any area of village land to any 
other category of land (such as general land), whereby public interest also includes 
investments of national interests. It is the legal process of transferring land from one 
category to another (uhawilishaji) that is at the heart of dispossessing village land into 
investment land.  In essence, the state has the legal right to dispossess village land for 
foreign investment. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, contrary to the argument that 
neoliberal policies mean removing inefficient state obstacles in order to promote a free 
market, in reality such policies mean a re-definition of the role of the state, one that 
guarantees resources are available for the process of capital accumulation.    
Hence, although the Village Council and Assembly have the authority regarding 
the arrangement and allocation of village land they have no ultimate influence in the 
President’s decision to acquire and transfer any part of their land, especially in the case of 
large-scale foreign private investment. While affected persons can register their 
unwillingness to support a transfer, they cannot in actuality refuse the proposal. In the 
end, the president can resort to lawful expropriation (subject to payment of 
compensation), even if the result is involuntary settlement.  Also, while the Village Land 
Act stipulates that village land may not be transferred until the type, amount, method and 
timing of payment of compensation has been agreed upon between the Village Council 
and the Commissioner, in reality villagers often lack the financial and human resources to 
mount any legal challenge against the government.
67
 There are also no clear mechanisms 
                                                 
67
 Land acquisition is legally restricted to Tanzanian citizens unless investment is involved. Under the Tanzania 
Investment Act, 1997, which replaced 1990 National Investment Act, the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) is 
mandated with identifying and providing land to investors.  Land is vested with the TIC and transferred to investor on 
basis of a derivate title, and at end of investment project it is supposed to revert back to TIC.  
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in the Village Act by which communities can appeal or block such reclassifications of 
their lands. While the law gives village assemblies the power to approve or reject the 
removal of village land by the state for areas of less than 250 ha, it does not provide for 
any check on land removal for areas larger than 250 ha.  (Chachage, 2011). 
The standard agricultural land lease lasts 99 years at mere price of 200 shillings 
(0.14 $) per hectare per year, and this price does not vary according to the location of the 
land or the crops grown (the price used to be 600 Tanzanian shilling, $0.4 per hectares, 
but was reduced following investor complaints!) Rent due on land is collected by the 
Ministry of Lands district staff, and money is incorporated into the government budget. 
Ten percent of total rent due on the lease every year goes to the Tanzanian Investment 
Center as a facilitation fee. Leases, however, are supposed to become invalid if investors 
do not start production within two years and do not ask for extension or give explanation 
for lack of production (Oakland Institute, 2011).    
In sum, criticism of land legislation tends to revolve around two distinct 
problems.  First, the legislation has provided a massive loophole which has been the 
source dispossession and ensuing conflict: the Village Land Act essentially reserves the 
right of the Present of Tanzania to transfer land from the village sector, transforming it 
legally into general or reserved land. The second loophole is the inconsistent definition of 
general land, whereby the Village Land Act defines general land as all public land not 
reserved or village land, while the Land Act defines general land as all public land not 
reserved land or village land, but including unoccupied or unused village land.  
 Finally, as an important note, current development policies do not appear to bode 





well for the issue of land grabbing in Tanzania.  In 2009 current President Kikwete 
launched the agricultural development program Kilimo Kwanza (Agriculture First). 
Kilimo Kwanza emphasizes modernization of both small-scale and large-scale 
agriculture, through technological and political reforms, public- private partnerships, 
value chain approaches, and foreign investments. However, critics have pointed out that 
it fails to provide the necessary safeguards for risks already associated with large-scale 
land acquisition, and moreover, may even exacerbate land grabbing. For instance, 
statements within the development plan imply that small-holder farmers will be taken 
over by larger-scale mechanized commercial enterprises and that their labor will be 
released into the labor market. Also, the National Framework Land Use Plan, 2009-2029, 
proposes to increase commercial farming and ranching from 2% to 18% primarily for 
Kilimo Kwanza.  This land is to be made available from the existing land use category 
which the National Land Use Framework Plan (NLUFP) defines as ‘scattered village 
settlements, agriculture, grazing and mining’- a strategy that could potentially involve 
involuntary resettlement (REPOA, 2012).       
With respect to pastoralist activities the NLUFP 2002-2029 indicates that the 
areas currently categorized as being used for grazing, hunting, game control areas, 
scattered settlements and agriculture are to become ‘community ranching areas’ covering 
an area of 12 million hectares, with various conditions attached on how these areas are to 
be used. Finally, Pillar 5 of Kilimo Kwanza concerns making land available for these 
initiatives. The first activity listed is to amend the Village Land Act No. 5 of 1999 to 
facilitate equitable access to village land for Kilimo Kwanza.  Critics worry that these 
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initiatives will increase insecurity around access to and use of land and natural resources 
for the rural population (REPOA, 2012). 
 
Socioeconomic-ecological impacts and conflicts over the land issue 
Conflict has been endemic to the large-scale land acquisition in Tanzania, 
sparking accusations of land grabbing and anger against the government from NGOs, 
academics, Tanzanian and international media, and civil society groups specifically 
sprung up around the issue of land. Among the most pressing issues are accusations of 
land dispossession by villagers with attendant loss of resource access, facilitated by the 
above discussed problems surrounding customary ownership.  Further, according to 
critics, investment processes lack transparency and accountability, and fair and equal 
practices, and there have even been accusations of corruption within the bureaucratic 
institutions responsible for land management (REPOA,2012).  The literature also 
suggests that promised benefits of economic development often fall short of reality.    
 Studies carried out by international NGOs and Tanzanian civil society groups 
have found that a number of large-scale land investments have resulted in land 
dispossession for villagers, with negative consequences for rural livelihoods dependent 
on land and its resources.  The Tanzanian branch of the civil society group, Participatory 
Ecological Land Use Management (PELUM), issued an extensive report on agribusiness, 
forestry, and biofuel companies in the Morogoro, Iringa, and Pwani regions.  The study 
found that such ventures posed threats to land access, ownership and use among villagers, 
with deleterious effects on villagers’ food sovereignty.  Once dispossessed of land and 
made into plantation workers, the report also accused that their labor value was 
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undervalued, thereby undermining the commonly made argument that large-scale land 
investment result in economic opportunities and development. Another extensive report 
by the Oakland Institute, an independent policy think tank based in California, found that 
the controversial Sun Biofuels project in Kisarawe negatively affected over 11,000 
people living in 11 villages who lost land to the investors in terms of loss of access to 
resources.  Though Sun Biofuels claimed that such land was only bushland and hence 
unutilized, villagers complain that they were economically dependent on such land for 
firewood collection.  One village lost 40% of its total land area to Sun Biofuels.  Overall, 
the report found that the project had negative impacts on local livelihoods through the 
loss of land used for collection of natural resources (Chachage, 2011).   
 The Oakland report also raised the issue of land dispossession for pastoralists, 
commenting on the historical evidence of land dispossession of the Maasai land in the 
Arusha area.  Apparently, pastorals in particular have been affected by land 
dispossession. Many projects acquire supposedly ‘idle’ or marginal land, assuming it is 
unoccupied as it is not settled or farmed.  For pastoralists such as the Maasai, their claim 
to land tenure is even more tenuous than settled villagers, as land laws leave loopholes 
for the government to claim ownership of lands neither settled nor farmed. Historically, 
the Maasai have suffered from land dispossession, when in Arusha 40 years ago, they 
were pushed off fertile grazing land by investors from Holland and South Africa to grow 
wheat and white beans.  As a result, the Maasai are left with only very marginal land.  
The problem of pastoralists being dispossessed of land remains an ongoing source of 
conflict, as of March 2013 the Tanzanian government, through the Minister for Natural 
Resources and Tourism, is moving forward with a plan of taking 1,500 square kilometres 
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which are essential dry season grazing land from the Maasai of Loliondo in Ngorongoro 
District (Just Conservation webpage, 2013).  
Hence, concerning the issue of loss of access to resources, at the heart of the 
conflict is a false categorization of land as ‘unused’ or ‘unutilized.’  In reality, such land 
often provides important resource services to villagers who use it to collect firewood, 
charcoal, honey or fruits, or to pastoralists who use such land for seasonal grazing or 
access to water sources.  Finally, like the PELUM report, the Oakland Institute found that 
labor forced off land was undervalued when re-hired as plantation workers; when 
BioShape took land from village of Muvuji, Kilwa, which was fully dependent on maize 
cultivation, they then employed 70-80 percent of the villagers to work on its plantation as 
casual laborers. Workers were paid only 2 dollars a day, worked 6 days a week, and were 
left no time for their own cultivation, but did not earn enough to sufficiently sustain their 
families.  If people become reliant upon the market in such cases, they become vulnerable 
to fluctuations in food prices and food security (Oakland Institute, 2011). 
According to the literature, the process of large-scale land investments itself is 
problematic, often violating the principle of free, prior and informed consent.   Aside 
from the fact that ultimate control resides in the executive power as discussed above, a 
joint report by the Tanzanian Policy Research for Development (REPOA), the Tanzania 
Natural Resource Forum (TNRF), and International Institute for Environment and 
Development (IIED) argued that weak governance in land administration poses a 
significant threat to land rights.  Complex procedures, lack of legal regulations for 
oversight, transparency and accountability, corruption at various level including the local 
level, general lack of financial and human resources, and the impossibility for the public 
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to access necessary info about investments, continuously undermine good quality land 
administration. The report further argues that even with local participation, local 
governance bodies tend to mirror social hierarchies in communities and often lack 
representation from groups that are marginalized (REPOA, 2012).  
For example, the Tanzanian Land Rights Research and Resources Institute Haki 
Ardhi, a civil society group which sprung up to address the land issue in Tanzania, found 
that that villagers in the Kilolo District in Iringa and the Kilwa District in Lindi had faced 
a series of such issues since 2006 associated with the land acquisitions of New Forest 
Company and BioShape in Tanzania Ltd.  The study found that in both cases villagers 
were inadequately informed as to the amount of village land to be transferred.  In the 
Oakland study, local people thought they had only ‘let’ their land, and investors had only 
sensitized people about potential benefits, but not about potential disadvantages. Cases 
studied by Theting and Brekke, found that consultation processes involved no real 
community participation, and the Oakland field work supports this view-  the majority of 
rural people who had given land away did not fully realize its value at time, being mainly 
bushland used for collection of various natural resources but not used to grow food crops. 
Such processes violate the principle of free, prior, and informed.   HAKIARDHI has also 
criticized that land laws contain provisions which are allow for corruption and self-
enrichment among land administrators, allowing them to acquire profitable or well- 
resourced village land and pass it on to private companies and rich individuals 
(HAKIARDHI, 2011). 
Also of issue is the lack of manifestation of proposed benefits.  In the study by 
PELUM, of the villages in Kilolo District in Iringa and Kilwa District in Lindi, benefits 
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such as new employment opportunities and investments in the communities had been 
limited and short-lived, in all cases falling far short of what communities expected when 
agreeing to the initial investments (Chachage, 2011).Though investors have implemented 
some activities associated with corporate social responsibility, HAKIARDHI argues that 
such benefits mask losses villagers would incur in the long-run, and strongly suggests 
that villages could generate more of these benefits by other means. (HAKIARDHI, 2011) 
The Oakland Institute likewise found that often promises of employment, social services 
and infrastructure between local people and investors are primarily verbal, and therefore 
difficult for anyone to hold the investors accountable (Oakland Institute, 2011).   
Associated with loss of resource access and land dispossession is the lack of 
sufficient compensation for such losses.  Before land can be transferred from village to 
general land so as to be leased to foreign investors, the level of compensation to the 
affected people is supposed to be decided upon.  However, in the Oakland study of Sun 
Biofuels in Kirasawe, the report found that Sun Biofuels only compensated 152 
households for land taken from 11 villages, partially because official compensation 
values fully cover all land uses and activities that take place on land.  Many market 
values of land are hidden, or difficult to capture in a formal economic valuation sense.
68
 
Compensation methods being used in Tanzanian do not allow for or take into 
consideration potential future land use and production activities of local people.  
Furthermore, following government guidelines, the compensation for land loss is not 
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 The Oakland study provides an example whereby the value of natural resources found on land is greater than the 
amount compensated for the land.  The study found that for the Sun Biofuels’ land, valuers found land sought by 
company in Kisarawe had basic value of 170$ per hectares, with added-value for trees or buildings found on land. 
However, much land was natural forest and woodland, for which no compensation was paid, yet conservative estimates 
of commercial value of sustainably harvested timber are around 28$ per hectares. For the 8,211 ha granted to Biofuels, 
the level of harvesting which would be possible from this land could therefore amount to a figure in just one year which 
is higher than entire compensation package paid by Sun Biofuels to 152 households (Oakland Institute, 2011). 
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meant to make a household either better or worse off (Oakland Institute, 2011). Another 
report, issued by the Tanzanian Forestry Working Group and the Tanzanian Natural 
Resource Forum, argued that most land obtained or in the process of being obtained by 
biofuel companies has been village land not permanently settled but still used by village 
members.  For example, most of land obtained in areas such as the Kilwa and Kisarawe 
Districts is miombo woodland, with patches of coastal forest and thicket, often used for 
forest-based economic activities, including commercial charcoal production, harvesting 
of forest production for medicines, fuelwood, building materials, and mushrooms 
(Tanzania Natural Resource Forum, 2009). 
Finally, concerns have been raised about adverse environmental impacts of large 
scale biofuel investments on water supplies and forests in coastal areas, which occur 
when large plantations are established in formerly naturally forested areas.  Other indirect 
impacts have also been noted to occur, such as adversely affecting food prices through 
transferring land to biofuel production rather than to meet food needs (Tanzania Natural 
Resource Forum, 2009).  
 
Mining sector reforms and the global rush for African minerals 
During the years of structural adjustment throughout Africa, mining was 
identified as a primary sector to galvanize economic growth, and targeted for extensive 
reforms. It was argued that the mining sector in Africa, suffering from a declining share 
in the value of world mining output and trade, was underperforming and failing to 
generate sufficient revenues for development. Poor policies, political interference, lack of 
investment in geological mapping, poor technical data on mineral endowment, weak 
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infrastructure and the lack of cheap and reliable energy supplies were seen as hindering 
the efficient functioning of the mining sector.
69
 (UNCTAD, 2005). As such, deregulation 
of Africa’s mining sector started in the 1980s in the context of structural adjustment 
reforms.  Broadly, the reforms called for increased liberalization, deregulation and 
privatization as means of correcting macroeconomic imbalances, stimulating economic 
recovery, and establishing a more a sustainable growth path. Importantly, during this 
time, the World Bank began to shift from its traditional role of the 1960s as supporter for 
exploration and production activities, to the commercialization and privatization of SOEs 
in the 1980s and capacity building.  In the 1990s, its role evolved to emphasize private 
sector development and attraction of FDI. In recent years, the Bank emphasized issues of 
governance and transparency, pro-poor growth, mitigating environmental and social 
risks, and protecting rights of people adversely affected by investments in extractive 
industry.  
However, overall reforms have shifted governments’ primary objective towards 
generating tax revenue, rather than utilizing the sector to pursue political objectives such 
as sovereign control of resources, as had been the case during the era of state-controlled 
mining enterprises.  Reforms ensured that privatization was considered central to the 
efficient functioning of mining enterprises.  Given the lack of financial and technological 
resources, as well as the lack of local entrepreneurs, reforms have thus concentrated on 
attracting capital from foreign mining companies.  To this end, African countries were 
encouraged to create stable legal and fiscal frameworks, including mining codes, 
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 UNCTAD’s report on foreign investment argues for a more nuanced analysis.   UNCTAD argues that in most of 
Sub-Saharan Africa a prolonged economic downturn which started in late 1970s along with a collapse in commodity 
prices following the boom of mid-1970s, was a major source of rent depletion. In many cases, any revenues generated 
by the sector were appropriated for BOP support, including debt service payments, thus depriving the mining sector of 




contractual stability, guaranteed fiscal regimes, profit repatriation, and access to foreign 
exchange (UNCTAD, 2005). 
By end of 1995, under the auspices of the World Bank which played a key role in 
conceptualizing and introducing the institutional reforms, 35 countries were reported to 
have published new mining codes, which reduced tax levels, eased immigration laws for 
expatriate workers, and granted tax exemptions for imported equipment. Guinea’s 
reforms were introduced in the mid-1990s, and followed later by those of Madagascar, 
Mali and Tanzania at end of 1990s.  All phases of reforms followed each other with 
continuity, and each succeeding phase built upon the set of policies enacted under 
previous mining regimes (UNCTAD, 2005). 
Tanzania’s mineral code was introduced in 1998 as a result of a five-year World 
Bank-financed sectoral reform project.  It includes the typical elements introduced in 
reforms, to be discussed in more detail below. It was argued that Tanzania’s mining 
sector, despite being endowed with various kinds of metallic minerals, gemstones, 
industrial minerals, energy-based minerals, as well as gravel and sand, did not make 
substantial contributions to country’s economy.  This was largely due to its absence of a 
business-friendly environment and choice to pursue a state-led socialist economy. 
According to the World Bank, Tanzania’s 1979 Mining Act was problematic-  it did not 
offer private investors a risk-free investment climate;  security of tenure over minerals 
rights was not adequately protected within a legal framework; it created a climate of 
uncertainty, arbitrariness, and potential for bureaucratic delays (Nyankweli, 2012). 
Overall, Tanzania’s mining regime was hostile towards private investment, and reforms 
were intended to create an investor-friendly environment to encourage FDI.  As such, 
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reforms have sought to accommodate corporate objectives, such as maximizing profits, 
minimizing risk and recovering investments as early as possible. In addition, reforms 
emphasized policy continuity and predictability, especially towards securing property 
rights and open markets, with tax regimes responsive to the preceding objectives 
(UNCTAD, 2005). 
As a consequence, the new 1998 Mining Act allowed 100 per cent foreign 
ownership, provided guarantees against nationalization and expropriation, and offered 
unrestricted repatriation of profits and capital. It pegged the royalty rate at a maximum of 
3% (the same rate as in Mali and Guinea), and provided waivers in respect of import 
duties and tax exemptions on imported machinery, equipment and other inputs.  It also 
waived the requirement (in the 1979 Mining Act) for local procurement of goods and 
services (UNCTAD, 2005). 
As a result of such reforms, Africa has become much more attractive to FDI in its 
mining sector, especially with high global demand for minerals in the 2000s.  Proponents 
cite the fact that new investment has expanded the capacity of existing producers and new 
mines have been developed where before the African mining sector stagnated. For places 
like Mali and Tanzania, which did not have large mining sectors before 1990, they now 
host substantial flows of FDI in large-scale operations.  These trends, it is argued, can 
allow Tanzania’s mining sector to become an important engine of development and 
economic growth, and indeed the mining sector is allocated an especial role in Tanzania’s 
current development policies.  Nonetheless, like the issue of land, Tanzania’s mining 
sector has sparked much criticism and conflict.   NGOs, civil society groups, and 
academics have accused Tanzania’s mining regime as unjustly giving away Tanzania’s 
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precious resources, especially gold, at fire-sale prices to foreign investors with practically 
no benefit actually ‘trickling down’ to the Tanzanian people.  In contrast, Tanzanians, 
especially those living within the vicinity of mining, bear the burden of environmental 
degradation, and loss of access to land and/or former livelihoods as small artisanal 
miners.  Further, critics argue, on a larger, structural scale, the large inflows of FDI and 
the nature of the current mining regime has fostered a political culture of secrecy, 
corruption, and un-democratic practices in the governing of Tanzanian resources.   
 
Statistics for FDI in mining and economic impacts 
The mineral sector is the second fastest growing sector after tourism in Tanzania, 
with economically proven deposits including gold, diamonds, tanzanite, ruby, tin, copper, 
nickel, iron, soda phosphate, gypsum, kaolite, coal, natural gas and uranium (REPOA, 
2012). In terms of its share of exports, mining is the fastest growing sector. The value of 
mineral exports in terms of precious stone and metals (Graph 1) alone increased from 
US$ 21,501,804 in 1997 to US$ 1,764,315,785, and the Tanzanian Investment Center’s 
website states that this 
…underscores the sector’s current position as one of the fastest growing 
sectors that guarantees investors security of tenure, repatriation of capital 
and profits and ensures a transparent regulatory and administrative system 
in the acquisition of mineral rights. 
 
The growth of gold exports has meant that precious stones and metals now dominate 40 
percent of total exports in monetary value, an issue that, as will be discussed further in 











Graph I: Export values of pearls, precious and semi-precious stones, precious 
metals  
 
Source: UNCOMTRADE export data for ‘precious stones and metals’ 
In particular, since the first large-scale gold mines began production in late 1998, 
gold mining has been the fastest growing sector of the economy and the largest source of 
foreign investment.  By January 2008, gold had hit a record high world price of US 876$ 
per ounce (Curtis and Lissu, 2008). Six major gold mines operate in Tanzania, with two 
foreign mining companies dominating the sector:  the Canadian company, Barrick Gold 
Corporation, which operates three mines (Bulyanhulu, North Mara, and Tulawak) and is 











































































(AGA), which operates the Geita mine, the country’s largest gold deposit. Tanzania has 
current proven gold reserves of around 45 m ounces.  At current gold prices, the 
country’s potential gold fortune gold reaches up to US $39 billion- over three times 
country’s annual GDP of $11 billion, without taking into account extraction costs (Curtis 
and Lissu, 2008). 
However, even though the mining sector accounts for a large share of total export 
earnings, the share of mining in GDP is still small.  In 2001, the share of mining as a 
percentage contribution to GDP was only 1.8%, and grew to only 3.3% by 2010 
(REPOA, 2012). The contribution to the Gross National Product is likely to be even 
smaller compared to the GDP because of the outflows of the mining companies’ 
dividends and interest on debts, which represent part of the difference between GDP and 
GNP (Nyankweli, 2012). The small contribution is attributed to the underdevelopment of 
the sector, which is characterized by low domestic technological capacity, heavy 
dependency on imported inputs, and weak linkages with other domestic sectors (REPOA, 
2012).  However, as will be discussed in-depth further, critics argue that investment 
incentives and tax breaks given to investors, compounded by the fact that mining 
companies retain a large share of their export earnings in offshore accounts, are the major 
reasons behind the sector’s minimal contribution to net national foreign exchange 
receipts.  The sector’s contribution to government revenue has been minimal, despite the 
fact that it has attracted significant FDI stocks.  Such low contribution to government 
revenues is worrisome given that the country’s current proven reserves of 45 m ounces 
are presently being extracted at a rate of over 1.6m ounces a year for five of the six major 




Structural reforms, legalities of mining, and the neoliberalization of the means of 
production   
Tanzania’s Mining Act of 1998, the major architectural framework governing 
Tanzania’s mining regime, has been the subject of much criticism and controversy. In 
2008, in response to growing public discontent, an extensive and comprehensive report 
written by Tundu Lissu and Mark Curtis, and commissioned by various Tanzanian civil 
society groups and international NGOs, Tanzanian religious organizations, and the 
University of Dar es Salaam, criticized the Tanzanian mining regime, as well as the 
broader political economy in which it is embedded, as essentially allowing foreign 
plunder of Tanzania resources.  The report, “A Golden Opportunity? How Tanzania is 
Failing to Benefit from Gold Mining,” argued that the mining sector (with focus on the 
gold sector) in Tanzania was plagued with three main severe problems: the government is 
receiving very low tax revenues from gold mining; gold mining is subject to minimal 
governmental or popular democratic scrutiny and is widely perceived to suffer from 
associated corruption; and people in gold mining areas fail to benefit significantly and 
many are actually being made poorer. 
Government revenues are the primary way in which a country is monetarily 
compensated from FDI in the extractive sector.  As noted, Tanzania’s tax regime has its 
genesis in the neoliberal reforms of the 1980s, with the New Mining Act of 1998 a direct 
outcome of the five-year World Bank Financed sectoral reform project.
 70
  As Tanzania 
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 World Bank papers on the mining sector from 1989 and 1992 called for Tanzania to develop private investment in 
mining and attract foreign capital. In 1994, the World Bank funded the Mineral Sector Development technical 
assistance project and promoted fiscal reforms to develop private sector minerals. This project led to the Tanzanian 
governments’ Mineral Sector Policy of 1997, which emphasized the primary role of private companies in mining and 
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had reformed its investment laws to attract FDI, the government had offered a range of 
incentives to all foreign investors, which critics argue are responsible for the low levels 
the government actually receives in revenues.  The following policies in particular from 
the 1998 Mining Act are criticized by the ‘Golden Opportunity’ report: 
 Investor ability to repatriate 100 per cent of profits 
 Ability to carry forward company losses to set these off against future tax 
liability 
 Tanzania’s mining law stipulates a royalty rate71 of just 3 per cent on gold, 
criticized as too low to ensure a fair return to Tanzanians 
 In addition, royalty is calculated as a proportion not of total production value of 
minerals but their ‘net back value’, defined as market value of minerals minus 
cost of transport and cost of smelting or refining in-country. Further, payment of 
this royalty can be deferred if the ‘cash operating margin’ i.e. the company’s 
revenue minus its operating costs such as capital expenditure, interest payments 
on loans and depreciation costs, falls below zero.  According to the authors of the 
report, an official at Tanzanian Revenue Authority stated that such “…royalty 
deferment is as good as a tax exemption.” 
                                                                                                                                                 
conceived of the role of the government as ‘regulator.’ Two new Acts passed in 1997 covering investment, ‘financial 
laws,’ and customs duties, which reduced tax rates, customs duties on certain imports, and provided for the ability to 
repatriate profits. The New Mining Act which followed in 1998 was direct outcome of five year World Bank financed 
sectoral reform project (Curtis and Lissu, 2009.) 
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 Royalties are the most common instrument for taxing the extractive sector.  Royalties tax the fiscal dues on the basis 
of either the volume (unit royalty) or the value (ad valorem royalty) of production or exports. For governments, 
royalties ensure a relatively stable stream of revenue, but for producers, royalties constitute additional costs that have to 




 Mining companies pay 0 per cent duty on imports of mining related equipment 
during prospecting, and up to the end of the first year of production; after this, 
they pay 5 per cent.  Mining companies enjoy zero import duty on fuel.  
 Mining companies enjoy the right to employ an unlimited number of foreign 
nationals, which compares to a limit of five for non-mining companies.  The 
Immigration Act of 1995 was changed in order to allow this.  
 The mining laws allow mining companies, unlike other companies in Tanzania, 
to be exempt from paying capital gains tax.  
 Mining companies enjoy special VAT relief, which includes exemption from 
VAT on imports and local supplies of goods and services to mining companies 
and their subcontractors.  
 The cost of all capital equipment incurred in a mining operation can be offset 
against income from the mine in the year in which it is spent, meaning that 
mining companies have been able to avoid declaring any taxable income and thus 
payment of corporation tax. In contrast, non-mining companies are entitled to a 
100 per cent depreciation allowance only for the first five years of operations. 
This incentive creates, according to the report, avenues for ‘tax planning’ to 
minimize tax liability and has deprived government of corporate revenues from 
the sector. The 100% capital expensing coupled with absence of ring-fencing lead 
to perpetual declaration of huge tax losses by mining companies even where they 
make commercial profit.  
 
 175 
 Rate of stamp duty (tax paid when buying property or shares) is set by law at 4 
%, while recent contracts signed have set the rate of stamp duty at maximum of 
0.3 %.  
 The law allows the government to enter into contracts with companies that may 
contain provisions binding on the United Republic, such as guaranteeing the 
fiscal stability of a long-term mining project.  In 2004, Minister of energy and 
minerals Daniel Yona revealed mining agreements signed by government and 
companies included tax stability clauses that precluded the raising of tax and 
royalty rates upward.  
 Foreign mining companies have exclusive ownership of their operations and 
minerals recovered and complete power to dispose of them as they wish, 
including to transfer those rights to other companies without incurring capital 
gains tax.  Yet the practice of buying and selling mining operations can be very 
lucrative.  For example, in 2003 the Australian company East African Gold 
Mines made US $252 m selling on Tanzanian gold mine to Canadian Placer 
dome, later bought by Barrick, from an original investment deal of US$ 90m. 
Neither the government nor the people received anything from these deals. 
 Mining companies are allowed to maintain their accounts in US dollars and their 
tax liability will then be assessed in dollars, enabling them to avoid costs 
associated with currency exchange; they can also open and operate foreign bank 
accounts and are allowed to keep money inside country that will only be 




 As noted, the code allows 100 per cent foreign ownership, and provide 
guarantees against nationalization and expropriation  
 For ‘strategic investors’- companies investing more than 20$ million, which is 
typical of mining- obtain ‘strategic investor status’; can have individual fiscal 
agreements with the government, some of which offer special concession never 
made public. 
 Newly licensed companies on the Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange with at least 30 
percent of their shares issued to the public pay only 25% corporate income tax, 
compared to the standard 30 percent for first three years.  In addition, the share of 
companies listed on the DSE are exempted from paying capital gains tax (whose 
normal rate is 30%) 
 Other VAT exempted items include insurance, education, financial services and 
tourist services.  
 Another report points out also that the maximum payment of local government 
taxes from mining companies is up to $200,000 a year, which is lower than the 
0.3 % of turnover required by law (Policy Forum, n.d.). 
The above such policies, critics argue, have resulted in considerable loss of potential 
revenue for the Tanzanian government.  While an exact figure is near impossible to 
calculate, the report by Lissu and Curtis has made some estimations of the amount of 
revenue loss due to such policies for the gold sector. According to their report, between 
1997 and 2005, Tanzania exported gold worth more than US$2.54 billion.  The 
government received around $28 million a year in royalties and taxes on these exports, 
amounting to just 10 per cent over the nine year period.  (The 3 per cent royalty brought 
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the government only an average of US$17.4 m a year in recent years.  Raising the royalty 
rate to, say, 5 per cent would have increased government revenues by around US$58 
million over the past five years).  The authors calculate that Tanzania has lost at least 
$265.5 million in recent years as a result of an excessively low royalty rate, government 
tax concessions that allow companies’ to avoid paying corporation tax and possibly even 
tax evasion by some companies. Tundu and Lissu also claim that this estimate is quite 
conservative.   They also estimate that the prioritization of large-scale gold mining in the 
country has come at the expense of small-scale artisan miners, around 400,000 of whom 
have been put out of work (Curtis and Lissu, 2008). 
Further, Nyankweli (2012) argues that the government has suffered loss of 
sovereignty with the 1998 Mining Act.  Significantly, in contrast to the 1979 Mining Act, 
the 1998 Mining Act entitles private license holders to use their mineral rights as 
collateral and to transfer mineral rights to banks or financial institutions without requiring 
ministerial approval or consent. This, Nyankweli states, practically enables foreign 
financial institutions to acquire mineral rights in Tanzania, offering investment houses a 
new level of protection. That is, the Tanzanian government is no longer the sole grantee 
of mineral rights, and this can be regarded as a significant erosion of Tanzanian 
sovereignty over its mineral sector.  Further, in the 1979 Mining Act, the minister was the 
only authority in disputes and his decision was final, but in the 1998 Mining Act (Mine 
Development Agreements Section 10) settlement of any dispute must be done by 
international arbitration (i.e. the International Convention for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes, ICSID).         
 Also concerning the issue of erosion of sovereignty the 1979 Mining Act provided 
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the Tanzanian government with the right to acquire ‘on stipulated terms or on terms to be 
agreed, an interest in any mining venture which may be carried on in relation to land in, 
or which constitutes, the prospecting area’, with the stipulation to be included in the 
prospecting license. In 1998 act, this right disappears. At the same time as the Tanzanian 
government suffered the loss of the ability to hold an interest in any mining venture, 
Nyankweli states, new provisions in the 1998 Act allow individual Ministry of Mines 
officials to hold shares in mining companies: 
While the 1979 Mining Act expressly prohibited the Ministry of Mines 
officials from holding shares in mining companies or mining licenses, this 
prohibition is dropped from the 1998 Mining Act. This seems to open the 
door for ministry officials to act with private, rather than state or public 
interests in mind, and creates additional avenue for private mining 
companies to try to influence or even directly bribe public officials  
(Nyankweli, 2012, p. 71). 
 
Criticism has also been targeted at the lack of provisions guaranteeing that the mining 
sector will bring general developmental benefits.  In the 1979 Mining Act, general 
developmental benefits (employment and spill-over effects) were treated as part of the 
overall package of mining ventures and were included in the approval and licensing 
process. For example, the 1979 Mining Act required applicants for prospecting and 
mining licenses to demonstrate their plans for employment and training of Tanzanians. 
Also, mining license applicants were required to reveal their plans for goods and services 
to be procured in Tanzania. Such requirements were annulled with the 1998 Mining Act 
(Nyankweli, 2012). 
 
Socioeconomic-ecological impacts and conflicts of the mining sector 
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Aside from national level issues, such as loss of government revenue, loss of 
sovereignty over resources, and capacity to direct the sale of such resources in a 
designated way specifically for development purposes, there are features of the 
Tanzania’s mining regime that have sparked social conflict and discontent among the 
Tanzanian population. The first major issue that has sparked public anger is the absence 
of democratic control over natural resources by the Tanzanian people. Like land, rights to 
mineral and petroleum resources ultimately belong to the state. Any rights of occupancy 
of land do not extend to mineral and petroleum resources.  Instead, such resources are 
regulated by statutory instruments and their use administered by the government 
(REPOA, 2012). Though supposedly acting as a trustee for the Tanzanian people, in 
reality it appears state control over resources translates into elite privilege to benefit from 
resources.  This inequity together with an inequitable shouldering of burdens from 
mining activity, such as environmental degradation and loss of land, has sparked at times 
even violent conflict, as, for example, the case of the gold mine at Bulyanhulu, where 
conflict between artisanal miners, the gold mining company Barrick, and the government 
resulted in the deaths of up to 70 people.
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Bulyanhulu is located in northwest Tanzania, and the gold mine there is currently owned by Canada’s Barrick Gold 
Corporation. Following the discovery of gold by nomadic herders in Bulyanhulu in 1975, families from Northern had 
Tanzania began to migrate there and carry out artisanal mining. The 1994 Small Scale Miners’ Association submitted 
an official request to the government to gain community title to hundreds of mine shafts constructed by the artisanal 
miners themselves at Bulyanhulu. However, around same time, Canadian Embassy submitted a proposal for a mining 
license under the local subsidiary, Kahama Mining.  At same time, Tanzanian Government was under intense pressure 
by IMF and World Bank to promote private foreign investment in the mining industry, and to eventually do away with 
all public ownership of the mineral extractive industries. Kahama Mining was soon granted permission to begin their 
operations.  Small scale miners of the area were declared illegal intruders to be evicted from land.  At the end of July 
1996, Kahama forcefully evicted the residents, with reinforcement from Tanzanian Field Force Unit riot police. Homes 
were flattened, settlers’ properties confiscated, and entire population was forced to flee.  Further, as a number of people 
were continuing to work in the mine shafts, company officials ordered additional bulldozers to fill the mine shafts with 
gravel. The exact number of people who died remains unknown, but from accounts of families and eyewitnesses, over 
seventy people were allegedly buried alive. The police arrived a few days later, but in the end, little was done and the 
government essentially called the case closed. Despite calls for independent, comprehensive investigation of evictions, 
backed by Amnesty International, all efforts have been prevented by Tanzanian officials. By 1999, Barrick Gold 
bought Sutton Resources and became the operator at Bulyanhulu Gold Mine, under an arrangement made possible with 
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Public discontent has also festered in regards to the lack of democratic oversight 
over mining contracts. Mining contracts are shrouded in secrecy with no real democratic 
scrutiny, and even lack parliamentary oversight.  The Tanzanian parliament has never 
seen any contracts signed by government with the mines- except the Buzwagi contract, 
which was leaked to the media. As such, elected representatives have no influence over, 
or even knowledge, the specific terms given to foreign mining companies to extract the 
country’s resource wealth. Further, according to Curtis and Lissu, journalists and activists 
reporting on corruption and mining have been the subject of pressure and even 
anonymous death threats. Many critics suggest that the favorable treatment given to some 
mining companies is linked to this corruption.
73
  Curtis and Lissu also note the following: 
the country’s Auditor General estimates that annually over 20 percent of the government 
budget is lost due to corruption, theft and fraud; the World Bank’s investment climate 
assessment states that the Tanzania Revenue Authority, which collects taxes, is very 
prone to corruption; and the Business-Anti-Corruption website states that employees of 
the Mining Department demand bribes in order to issue mining or prospecting licenses.  
Further, Tanzania’s Economic and Social Research Foundation, in their State of 
Corruption in Tanzania report, acknowledged that the Ministry of Energy and Minerals is 
prone to corruption, possibly linked to the fact that some officers of the minerals division 
also own minerals rights (Curtis and Lissu, 2008). 
                                                                                                                                                 
financial backing from World Bank and the Canadian Government’s Export Development Corporation (Women and 
mining network, 2010). 
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 Though difficult to verify exact numbers, belief that favorable terms for foreign investors is linked to 
corruption, seems fairly widespread, as evidenced by Tanzanian media, and numerous conversations I have 
held with ordinary Tanzanians.  The website Tanzanian Corruption Tracker, a Tanzanian NGO has written 
a number of articles on corruption and the Tanzanian mining sector.  
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Land dispossession, degradation of land/environment and loss of access to shared 
resources such as forests, rivers and lakes are also associated with gold mining, and to 
some extent tanzanite and diamond mining, creating conflict between communities, 
mines, and the government.  As pointed out in a report commissioned by the Economic 
and Social Research Foundation, the Land Act does not define a mineral land among its 
three categories of general, village and reserve because mineral land is not known till 
discovered. According to the Land Act Section 22(2) minerals are by definition not a part 
of land in Tanzania; once resources such as gold are discovered, the land turns into a 
minerals land and falls under the Minerals Act and policies, which take precedent over 
land policy and laws that govern rights of occupancy. Hence, upon discovery of minerals, 
the land turns into minerals land, overriding all categories of land except conservation 
areas in the reserved category. This situation is the root cause of many conflicts between 
mining investors and communities, and it arises from a dis-harmony between land laws 
and mineral policies.  The discovery of new deposits and issuance of mining licenses 
almost automatically nullifies existing land rights claims, and can result in the relocation 
of hitherto existing communities against their will. 
Further, as the report by the Economic and Social Research Foundation notes, 
compensation for displacement, environmental degradation, or loss of resource access is 
often very low, also sparking dissatisfaction and conflict (Lugoe, 2012). For example, in 
the North Mara Gold Mine in Tarime District,  Barrick Gold Corporation has been 
accused of taking by force villagers’ land done by dumping millions of tons of waste rock 
and rubble onto village lands without seeking the community’s consent, or paying 
compensation as required by law.  This was supposedly done with the active participation 
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of the district administration.  Hence, as the report notes, in Tanzania communities have 
lost their lands not only through takeovers but also through degradation, as the hazardous 
land subcategory overrides all three public land categories, and once declared hazardous, 
communities lose all rights over such land (Lugoe, 2011).  
The argument for large-scale mining is that it brings economic benefits to local 
communities- creating employment, importing new technologies, stimulating economic 
activity by mines’ buying local goods and services, and community development 
projects. However, while large scale mines can create jobs, there is extensive evidence 
that they create only a very small number, generally due to few linkages with the broader 
economy, and the fact that transnational corporations also tend to use more capital 
intensive technologies and processes than domestic enterprises (UNCTAD, 2005). 
Further, as noted, stipulations such as buying local goods and services, have been 
removed from the mining regime since the neoliberal reforms. The Tanzanian mining law 
does not require mining companies to buy any percentage of goods and services locally, 
as the 1998 Mining Act had abolished that provision in the 1979 Act as part of the 
recommendations the World Bank had made to African governments in its 1992 Strategy 
for African Mining technical paper (Nyankweli, 2012). Figures suggest that around half 
of company expenditure goes to local suppliers, which has some positive benefit, but, 
critics argue, not enough (Curtis and Lissu, 2008). 
Tanzania’s six major gold mines employ total of 7,135 people, according to 
government figures. A study for the ICMM noted that the mining industry, although 
employing less than 8000 people, has created 45,000 additional jobs. However, as Lissu 
and Curtis point out, large scale mining has made many more unemployed.  Before the 
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arrival of MNCs, precious metal mining was dominated by small- scale artisan miners 
using simple tools and techniques, providing small incomes for a large number of people, 
generally uneducated and poor.  Citing a survey conducted by the World Bank in 1995, 
which estimated that 550,000 people were directly employed in small scale mining, 
Curtis and Lissu point out that large-scale mining may have made around 400,000 people 
unemployed (Curtis and Lissu, 2008). 
Further, the1998 Mining Code allows mining companies to employ an unlimited 
number of foreigners. Government figures show that of 7135 people employed in the six 
major gold mines, 565 or 8% are non- Tanzanians. However, expats usually occupy 
management and supervisory positions and earn very large salaries in comparison with 
Tanzanian nationals, and there have been accusations that mines pay Tanzanians less than 
foreigners, even when doing the same job. The average pay for mineworkers between 
128$ -240$ a month, while the pay pack of the chief executive of Barrick is $9.4 m 
including the basic salary, bonus and stock options.  Further, the organizing of unions is 
not easy, and a 2006 report commission by the World Bank notes that when unions at 
Geita mine tried to organize workers in 2002, mine management refused to meet them 
(Curtis and Lissu, 2008). 
Critics also complain that although community development spending is touted as 
another benefit for large-scale mining, the actual amount spent is small in comparison to 
local needs or company profits.  According to figures provided by the Curtis and Lissu 
report, AGA’s annual community development spending has averaged around US$0.7 
million a year, while Barrick’s appears to be somewhere between US$3-5 million across 
all of its mines in Tanzania.  Not only are these figures very low compared to the amount 
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of gold exported, and unlikely to generate significant local economic impacts, they are 
deductible from taxable income (Curtis and Lissu, 2008). 
The environmental degradation associated with mining activities and the impact 
on local communities is a classic example cited by political ecologists and theorists of 
EUE as the shifting of environmental burdens onto the global South for the benefit of 
consumers in the global North.  Typically, extraction activities are associated with very 
high levels of environmental degradation. Large scale gold mines in particular generate 
more waste per ounce than any other mineral. Extracting one ounce of gold requires the 
removal of more than 250 tons of rock and ore. Piles of infertile soil, effluent from 
chemical processing plants containing lead and mercury in large quantities, etc., are often 
disposed. The UN Industrial Development Organization estimated that for every gram of 
gold recovered, 2-5 grams of mercury is released into environment (Lugoe, 2011). 
Section 10c of the Mining Act 1998 does state that development agreements may 
contain binding provisions related to environmental matters, and the 1998 Mining Act is 
supposedly an improvement from the 1979 Mining Act in terms of environmental 
regulations.  However, a report by Policy Forum that examined the Tulawaka, Buzwagi, 
and Geita gold mines development agreements found that despite environmental legal 
provisions provided for in the 1998 Mining Act, the government did not actually 
incorporate any environmental terms that address the needs of the local communities and 
would be enforced by the governing legislate.  For example, Policy Forum found that 
there is a distinct absence in the three agreements of any provision for mine closure 
procedures to mitigate negative impacts on local communities.  Further, the government 
has no voice concerning the terms of identification, selection, monitoring of contracts and 
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sub-contractors on behalf of the mining companies, and no provision that mining 
companies will be liable should any of the contractors commit faults (Policy Forum, 
n.d.). 
The laxity of the government in environmental regulation, and the taking 
advantage of such laxity by the mining companies, is another root cause of conflict 
between communities, government and mines.  There are a number of such examples that 
have garnered high media attention, and for the sake of space only a few high profile 
cases are listed here.  For example, between 2005 and 2008 chemical disposals from 
processing plants at the North Mara mine in Tarime District created environmental and 
land hazards, adversely affecting the surrounding communities. A study conducted by 
three independent groups found that compared to WHO, USA and Tanzanian standards, 
levels of heavy metals were above normal in the area surrounding the mine. Poisonous 
chemicals, in the form of acid mine drainage, came from the mine’s tailing dam and 
waste rock piles.  In addition, the nearby River Thigithe was also affected (Lugoe, 2011). 
The toxic waste from the Mara mining operations is believed to be responsible for killing 
over 1350 livestock and negatively affecting the health of over 40 people. Kitula, in a 
case study of the Geita District, found pressing problems such as pollution of water 
sources from mercury and cyanide, dust, mine pits, cracking and the collapse of 
buildings. Such pollution had caused land degradation, damage to water quality, and 
harm to livestock and wildlife biodiversity. Kitula also points out that although there is 
growing awareness of the importance of environmental management amongst mining 
stakeholders and government officials, that mitigation strategies are offset by conflicts of 
interest, economic and political, and at the central and local levels.  (Kitula) At the 
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mining site in Bulyanhulu, where Barrick Gold has been accused as responsible for the 
death of up to 70 people, millions of liters of water are pumped to the mine every hour 
without consideration for the provision of clean water to the local communities. This 
mine has been accused of devastating the local ecology with waste rock piles, mine 
tailings that emit heavy metals into the surroundings, and also depleting precious water 
resources (Women and mining network, 2010).  Other studies, such as Nyankweli’s 
dissertation on various gold mines in Tanzanian, have likewise found serious issues of 
land degradation, water degradation, and air degradation due to mining due to the 
excavation of large tracts of land, the pollution of water both surface and underground, 
and the release of particulate matter into the ambient air along with noise pollution.  Such 
environmental degradation causes major adverse effects on the health of the population as 
a whole, not to mention associated effects such as the spreading of malaria through 
creation of stagnant water, and the spread of HIV and STDs through migrant workers 
(Nyankweli, 2012). 
 
The New Mining Act of 2010 
In late April 2010, in response to years of public discontent, conflict, and pressure 
from civil society groups, Tanzania’s parliament passed a new mining legislation.  The 
Mining Act 2010 replaces the 1998 version. Since the 2010 Act is fairly new, not much 
has been written extensively on its impact, though there are a few policies which have 
been touted as addressing public grievances concerning the former 1998 Act.   In 
particular, the new legislation raises royalty rates across the board by basing calculations 
on gross profits rather than net back values, as before. In addition, royalty rates on gold 
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rise from 3 to 4%, while diamonds stay at 5% and uranium is set at 5%. Further, under 
the 2010 Act, the government has the right to take a stake in any strategic mining 
operation, to be determined by type of minerals and level of investment.  All companies 
are forced to list on the local stock exchange, and to set aside a certain percentage of their 
production for processing, smelting or refining within the country. No foreign firms are 
to be granted licenses for gemstone mining without entering a 50-50 partnership with a 
Tanzanian company, and mining contracts, while granted for the life of the mine, are to 
be subject to performance review every five years (Ng’wanakilala, 2010). The act also 
made it mandatory for the government to set aside specific areas for small- scale miners, 
in the effort to avert conflicts between artisanal miners and big mining companies.  
Unsurprisingly the new Mining Act 2010 has attracted criticism from the mining 
industry:  on the one hand, the mining industry argues that Tanzania’s hostile business 
environment grants the country less space to charge higher royalties, and that the 
nationalistic provisions found in the new act will scare off investment and hinder the 
growth of the mining sector.  Further, the issue is not the mining regime per se, but rather 
a highly corrupt state incapable of managing public funds. On the other side of the 
spectrum, other critics say the bill has not gone far enough. They point out that legislation 
would not affect existing mining contracts
74
 (Ng'wanakilala, 2010).  The large gemstone 
producer Tanzanite One will not be affected by new ownership rules, for example, and 
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 However, though the Mining Act 2010 does not legally bind mining contracts established before its enactment, 
recently giant gold mining companies, including Barrick Gold Limited, Geita Gold Mines and Resolute Gold Mines 
Ltd have started abiding to the new mining law after concluding a series of negotiations with the government. The 
government had undergone negotiations with the miners in a bid to persuade them to adhere to some of the terms 
instituted under the new law, including pushing up the royalties. Negotiations also included other issues not part of the 
new law, including convincing miners to accept the ring-fencing practice income tax, which entails limiting cost 
recovery for an extractive project to the revenues generated by that same project. The big three gold miners ABG,Geita, 




government officials said agreements with AIM-listed miner Petra Diamonds, which 
owns a 75 percent stake in Tanzania’s Williamson diamond mine, will not be affected by 
the new rules (Ng’wanakilala, 2010).  Further, the Executive Director of HAKIARDHI 
said the new law gives too much power to the Minister and Commissioner of Mines. 
According to Mr. Mhind, too much power is not in line with the recommendations of the 
Mining Commission, saying that ‘giving so much power to these executives may provide 
them with the leeway to make agreements that are unfavorable to Tanzania, like what 
happened to many previous mining agreements’ (TanzaniaInvest webpage, 2010). 
Further, the new royalty is insubstantial. Critics argue that the gold mining contracts 
signed in 1990s were established when prices of gold were low, and now it is justifiable 
to increase the royalty rate to at least 5 percent because prices are now between five and 
six times higher. Further, other African countries such as Ghana and South Africa are 
charging royalties of more than five percent.
75
   
 
Discussion and Conclusion: The Politics of Ecological Imperialism 
Tanzania’s history and current situation in regards to foreign investment and 
natural resources is not exceptional.  The country largely mirrors the broader trend of 
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 Tanzania’s former royalty rate of 3% is at the lower end of the 3 to 12 per cent sliding scale royalties levied on gold 
production in Ghana, and 3 to 8% royalties that gold mining companies negotiate in Mozambique. Botswana levies 5% 
royalty. Tanzania’s VAT laws are similar to other African countries which also exempt mining companies from paying 
VAT on imports and local supplies, such as Ghana. Other aspects of Tanzania’s fiscal regime for mining broadly 
similar to other countries; most countries corporation tax rates similar at between 25-30 %;  most allow losses to be 
carried forward against tax;  many allow 100% deductions, and others allow zero customs duty on mining equipment. 
In Tanzania foreign firms have been guaranteed 100% ownership of mines, while Botswana government Mining Act 
gives government mandate to acquire 15-50% stake in major mining projects (Curtis and Lissu, 2008). An interesting 
paper examining the three case studies of Ghana, Namibia, Zambia, compared to classical mining and quarrying 
countries, such as Australia, notes that if sub-Saharan countries had achieved the same implicit tax rates and sales 
revenues per km2 as such classical mining countries as Australia, their tax revenues from the extractive sector could 
have been significantly higher. Hence, unlike classical extractive economies like Australia, Canada, and Saudi Arabia, 
which benefited greatly from the commodity boom in recent years, Sub-Saharan countries were unable to take obtain 
much advantage, despite skyrocketing prices and demand, and high inflows of FDI, tax revenues from the extractive 




other African nations as discussed in Chapter 3; the initial countermovement against 
economic dependency during the era of post-independence economic nationalism, 
whereby national control of resources was seen as crucial, and the subsequent counter-
counter movement involving the neoliberalization of Tanzanian resources, evident in the 
structural reforms favoring foreign investors in the land and mining sectors.  Chapter 2 
had argued that this counter-counter movement was a result of an expansionary tendency 
of capitalism to subsume resources (biophysical resources and labor) on terms favorable 
to capital accumulation. These arguments were made in depth in Chapters 2 and 3, and 
will not be repeated here.  Instead, the value of a more in-depth case study, such as the 
study of foreign investment in the mining and land sectors in Tanzania lies in the fact that 
certain important internal socio-political characteristics become more apparent.  Tanzania 
exhibits many socio-political features of a classical extractive economy, and such features 
can be conceptualized, as noted in Chapter 1, as ‘internal supportive features’ of 
ecological imperialism.  Such features are likely to be present in many peripheral 
economies outside of Tanzania, but to varying degrees and with local variation.   
 The first socio-political feature is centralized, non-democratic governmental 
control over resources, as evidenced in lack of ownership or control over land and 
minerals by the Tanzanian people. Though ostensibly the state is meant to act as a trustee 
of national resources for the Tanzanian people, in reality control is placed in the relevant 
ministries, whose actions are not subject to democratic oversight by the Tanzanian people 
or elected officials in parliament. Placing national resources under state control with no 
democratic oversight or accountability is elite control, not social control.  The secretive 
nature of land and mining deals, and the public discontent and conflict surrounding them, 
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are visible manifestations of the non-democratic control of resources. In Tanzania’s case, 
the state is the intermediary actor in the process of ecological imperialism, a situation 
likely to be similar in many other peripheral countries as well.  
This does not mean the Tanzanian government has always been univocal in 
regards to the issue of foreign investment- some members of the Tanzanian government 
have in fact been vocal dissenters against what they considered a neocolonial situation.  
But it means that until very recently, much of the politics surrounding foreign investment 
has been heavily top-down.  For all the reasons discussed above, power has been heavily 
tilted towards certain ministries with decisions completely out of the hands of ordinary 
citizens, or even elected officials of parliament.  The Mining Act of 1998 gives the 
Minister of Energy and Minerals in particular the discretionary powers to award and 
revoke mining licenses, enter into Mining Development Agreements, and defer royalties.  
Further, under the 1998 Act it is illegal to disclose any information obtained from reports 
between mining companies and the Minister or any other authority.  
However, this does not mean all government officials have been agreeable or 
complicit to such a power structure.  Some members of parliament have actively 
protested against various aspects of how foreign investment in the extractive sector is 
governed. But again, demonstrating an unequal balance of power, outspoken critics on 
the mining issue have been penalized.  For example, in 2002 the Tanzanian government 
charged two environmental activists and an opposition political leader with sedition for 
speaking out about allegations of widespread human rights abuses at the gold mine 
Bulyanhulu.  Rugemeleza Nshala and Tundu Lissu of the Lawyers' Environmental Action 
Team (LEAT) and Augustine Mrema, Chairman of the Tanzanian Labor Party, raised 
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concerns over allegations of killings, illegal evictions and destruction of livelihoods at the 
Bulyanhulu Gold Mine in August 1996.   Tundu Lissu has since become a vocal member 
of parliament, and has a history of activism as a campaigner of rights of rural 
communities.  Another example includes Mr. Zitto Kabwe, the MP for Kigoma, who in 
2006 was suspended for disclosing the details of a mining contract.   
This issue of lack of democratic control is closely tied with the second internal 
feature, the lack of practical legal channels for addressing the grievances of citizens and 
communities. To the extent that such legal channels exist, for practical purposes they are 
too difficult for ordinary citizens to access, whether for financial, technical or other 
reasons.  
The third significant socio-political feature concerns the broader class structure.  
Tanzania, despite experiencing substantial growth for the past decade, has failed to 
translate such growth into poverty and inequality reduction, rather as stated in the 
introduction, inequality has grown.  Neoliberal policies appear to have fostered a class 
structure classically criticized by dependency theorists such as Girvan, Baran, Frank, and 
Galtung; the growth of a sort of comprador class whose interests overlap with the 
interests of foreign investors, especially in regards to the specific ministries that control 
the resources and are responsible for the contracts between government and investors.   
Also on the issue of class, the lack of democratic control over resources and the secretive 
nature of land and mining contracts seem to foster corruption among the elites.  In that 
sense, the current focus of the World Bank and Western donors on good governance and 
accountability are on mark.  However, what seems to elude the mainstream critique of 
corruption is the relationship between corruption and foreign investment.  As noted, it 
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was not until the reforms and the 1998 Mining Act that ministers were allowed to hold 
shares in mining companies.  Further, even if corruption could be eliminated, policies that 
largely benefit foreign capital over the Tanzanian people could be made perfectly legal. 
The issue is not one solely of corruption, but also lack of effective democratic control, 
and a broader politico-economic structure that ensures the flow of both profits and 
resources from periphery to core. Class conflict has also manifested in the conflict 
between the government and communities adversely affected by land and resources 
issues. 
The fourth socio-political feature of significant import is the simmering of 
discontent, conflict and resistance in Tanzania, arising for all the reasons discussed in this 
chapter.  On the one hand, in Tanzania’s case resistance appears to be inchoate and not of 
a national scale.  Importantly, it does not seem to be organized by any political party or 
particular ideology on a substantial scale.  Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), the dominant 
party in Tanzania, has been in power since 1977 and it was under this party that the 
neoliberal policies of the 1980s were ushered in.  The only other major contender for 
political power is CHADEMA, a center-right political party that openly endorses free 
market policies.  One could argue, therefore, that there does not appear to be any 
‘Polanyian’ countermovement at the national level against continuing primitive 
accumulation as had been the case during the era of economic nationalism.
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76
 Particularly in comparison to places in Latin America like Bolivia, where a leftist party gained power, 
and the government itself has engaged in a form of nationalization of the natural gas sectors.  In Bolivia, 
the leading party MAS is an openly declared socialist party that has at least rhetorically challenged 
imperialism, capitalism, and environmental degradation and implemented policies to protect against the 
vicissitudes of the international market.  The indigenous population in Bolivia put MAS in power, and from 
my three months of research in Bolivia, I met with individuals and NGOs more radical than MAS.  Bolivia 
hosted the largest ecological conference in recent years, one that openly condemned the environmental 
effects of capitalism and called for a new world order. In comparison with its past of African socialism and 
also in comparison to Bolivia, Tanzania’s resistance is limited and incipient.  
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 Nonetheless, particularly within recent years, various civil society groups have 
organized and resisted over issues related to mining, land, and more broadly, 
environmental issues.  Mittelman understands civil society to be  
….a contested political space, established and extended by collective 
action, and composed of voluntary associations distinct from the economy 
and, while not completely separate from, nonetheless, outside the direct 
control of the state (Mittelman, 2000, p. 30).  
In Tanzania, civil society organizations began to proliferate with the privatization and 
rapid downsizing of the public sector under structural adjustment. Recent estimates 
approximate the number of civil society organizations from between 4000 to 8000 
(Haapanen, 2007). The sector which could be considered ‘civil society’ in Tanzania 
includes a diverse set of groups, from small, local organizations of women to large-scale 
groups affiliated with international agencies.  
When conceptualizing environmental resistance to globalization, Mittelman wrote 
of five levels of civil society that actively participate; such categorizations are also useful 
for analyzing civil society and resistance in Tanzania.  At the first level, as in many 
developing countries, in Tanzania there are diverse international environmental 
organizations that either have local affiliates or are working closely with indigenous 
groups.  Such groups tend to be located in urban areas, and examples include the World 
Wildlife Fund, the Birdlife International, Wildlife Conservation Society, and the 
International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), all of whom have local 
chapters in Tanzania.  Some of these institutes, for example IIED, have published critical 
reports on government policy concerning resources and foreign investment, and have 
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actively worked with other NGOs in organizing workshops, meetings, and calls for 
change directed at the government. 
At the second level are the national coalitions or networks of NGOs that have also 
sprung up in recent years.  A good example is Policy Forum, a network of NGOs 
incorporated as a non-profit company whose membership currently includes over 100 
non-governmental organizations registered in Tanzania. Policy Forum acts as a network 
that draws together various NGOs to address issues of poverty reduction, equity and 
democratization through informed civil society participation. Likewise, Participatory 
Ecological Land Use Management (PELUM) is a legally registered national network of 
NGOs that have come together to facilitate learning, networking and advocacy in 
ecological land use management for sustainable agriculture. Both PELUM and Policy 
Forum have published critical reports on land grabbing advocating change in national-
level land tenure policies. 
At the third level, there are a number of individual NGOs at the national level that 
play multiple roles, including facilitating action, mobilizing resources, providing 
expertise, and undertaking research on specific issues.  One example is The Land Rights 
Research and Resources Institute (HAKIARDHI), a Tanzanian national level NGO 
centered on the issue of land tenure. HAKIARDHI seeks to spearhead the rights to land 
of rural and peri-urban based small producers through activist researches, lobbying and 
advocacy for policy changes, critical analysis of policies and laws and active 
participation in policy processes.  The Institute conducts land rights training through 
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district and grassroots level workshops, monthly seminars, training of trainers, media 
programs and dissemination of publications.
77
 
At the fourth level, a number of grassroots organizations engaged in actual 
implementation of projects also exist.  In the case of Tanzania, such grassroots 
organizations tend to be small and focused on specific development projects within 
specific localities with the aim of ameliorating environmental degradation. Finally, 
concerning the fifth level of civil society which consists of unorganized masses that can 
potentially be mobilized around issues of severe environmental degradation, recent years 
have witnessed a proliferation of conflicts, with local communities organizing around 
issues such as land grabbing and mining alone. An example would be the protests over 
the environmental destruction at the gold mine in the Tarime district or the human rights 
abuses at Bulyanhulu, as discussed above.        
In terms of resistance, therefore, the greatest organized resistance appears to come 
from such civil society groups, in particular the NGOs that organize around 
environmental issues combined with issues of social justice.
78
 In Tanzania, a country with 
relatively low-levels of formal education, NGOs have a privileged position as gatherers 
and disseminators of information, and can make broader connections, address root or 
structural causes, and can protest a national state of affairs due to national policies.   
Unlike small communities pushed into reacting after environmental degradation occurs 
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 Similar to HAKIARDHI, numerous ‘land rights’ national-level NGOs exist throughout the developing 
world, particularly in other African countries and Latin America concerning indigenous land rights.  This is 
unsurprising, given the conflict over large-scale land investments that has erupted in recent years.  
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 A purview of the 50 or so registered environmental organizations in Tanzania reveals that by far the 
majority are apolitical, working on localized, specific issues such as conserving this particular forest, or this 
particular species, or encouraging sustainable development through small scale environmentally projects 
like beekeeping or tree planting.   I would not classify the majority of NGOs as actively engaged in 
resistance against the neoliberalization of Tanzanian resources-  they seem to side step the issue, and focus 
on environmental degradation due to local populations, like the cutting down of trees by villagers. 
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within their own backyard, NGOs call for changes in economic policies at the national 
level.  It was the published reports of NGOs that most of this chapter’s information came 
from. In terms of other civil society groups, there is also evidence of resistance from 
religious leaders. A prime example of protest would be the report, “A Golden 
Opportunity?” discussed above, endorsed by Christian and Muslim leaders.   
However, NGOs and other civil society organizations operate in a restricted 
environment. During the research period, informal interviews were conducted with two 
of the major NGOs that published critical reports and actively called for changes in 
government policy- REPOA and Tanzanian Natural Resource Forum (TNRF). In private, 
both organizations complained of government corruption and foreign investment.  
Further, both expressed the danger involved in advocacy around such issues, having been 
subject to intimidation on different occasions.
79
  Literature on civil society in Tanzania 
indicates that the political space for civil society is restricted (Haapanen, 2007), and my 
interviews with NGOs have confirmed this.  Essentially, the state recognizes civil society 
organizations as partners in service delivery, but seeks to limit their political 
participation. As such, according to the literature, while civil society organizations have 
expressed criticism towards certain procedures and policy issues, they have avoided a 
strong watchdog role towards the state and radical critique (Haapanen, 2007). 
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 In an informal interview with TNRF, I was informed that much care has to be taken not to use overtly 
political or radical language.  Also, I was told about an event where TNRF held a workshop on the issue of 
land grabbing, together with REPOA. I was informed that a top ranking official of Barrick Gold Mining 
registered for the workshop under a false name.  The official then attended the workshop, sitting in the back 
of the room in a manner, TNRF described, that appeared as a subtle threat. A top economist from REPOA 
who had also worked with the government also described to me the years he had spent trying to push 
through policies that would help to redistribute wealth in the country and how such policies were 
continuously blocked.       
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Apart from civil society organizations, from a Gramsian concept of 
counterhegemonic ideology, Tanzania arguably exhibits signs of resistance in terms of 
counterhegemonic ideology. Rather surprisingly the major Tanzanian newspapers such as 
The Citizen and the Guardian publish highly critical pieces on foreign investment in 
mining and land grabbing, outright indicting the government and questioning the 
economic logic behind such investment.  This chapter drew from a number of such 
articles in the preceding sections.  Another important example of resistance, which could 
be classified under a Gramsian ‘counterhegemonic’ movement against the state, is the 
prolific number of conflicts and protests concerning issues of land grabbing as well as 
environmental degradation due to foreign investment in mining, as discussed in the 
preceding sections.  Largely, such movements are localized however.   
As the work of James Scott (1985, 1990) points out, the absence of openly 
declared contestations should not be mistaken with acquiescence.  Scott’s concept of 
infrapolitics, that is, everyday forms of resistance conducted singularly and collectively, 
but which fall short of openly declared contestations, effectively describes many of the 
outcomes of the informal interviews I had conducted. Every person I had held informal 
interviews with was highly critical of foreign investment, and felt that it reflected 
‘neocolonial situation.’  They also felt elites in power were corrupt and largely to blame, 
as it was the elites who gave the contracts to the foreign investors and agreed to the 
terms.  They also argued that a major problem was general societal levels of corruption 
that encouraged a culture of corruption from top to bottom in every major institution- 
education, medical, community development level, government, and so on.  Such 
corruption made it possible for investors, for example, to buy off local leaders in large 
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scale land investments.  Overall, at the micro-level and in terms of ‘counterdiscourses,’ 
there seems to be a high level of discontent in Tanzania. 
The extent to which all forms of resistance have overall successfully managed to 
challenge the top-down politics of ecological imperialism is perhaps best illustrated 
through the 2010 Mining Act. After years of discontent and public outcry, the drafting of 
the 2010 Mining Act included weeks of consultation with civil society organizations, 
members of Parliament, companies, and other stakeholders.
80
  During the preceding 
debate, the Minister for Energy and Minerals was subject to scrutiny, and forced to 
answer how the bill would address the mining sector’s lack of integration with other 
sectors, the slow development of small-scale mining, the weak government capacity to 
administer environmental issues and other parts of mining sector, the low levels of value-
added for minerals, and finally, the insignificant contribution of the mining sector to state 
revenue and GDP. (Revenue Watch) 
The bill that was eventually passed made modest improvements in some of the 
expressed areas of concern, as discussed in the preceding section, such as insufficient 
state revenue generation due to low royalty rates and lack of linkages to other sectors of 
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 In the months leading up to passage of the bill, Revenue Watch and its local partner Policy Forum, two 
major NGO networks organizing civil society organizations from across Tanzania, worked to build 
capacity for parliamentarians, civil society and the media through various workshops and meetings.  
Revenue Watch and Policy Forum, along with the media, other civil society organizations such as Faith 
Based Organizations, and members of parliament, such as Dr. Zainab Gama, brought up numerous issues of 
concern from civil society, such as the lack of public scrutiny over mining contracts and mining 
development agreements, and the government’s failure to enforce environmental law despite environmental 
hazards.  Revenue Watch and Policy Forum organized workshops on mining policy framework, and 
various civil society organizations and the media issued statements appealing to the government to ensure 
broad-based consultation and transparency.  In the weeks leading up to the bill, such organizations 
reviewed the proposed bill, and voiced their opinions as to what the new bill adequately or inadequately 




the economy.  Such attempts in the new act demonstrate some progress and response to 
public outcry, but a number of central issues of concern remained unaddressed.  Mainly, 
the Mining Act continues to place an excessive concentration of power in the hands of 
the Minister for Minerals, and also continues to keep mining contracts confidential.  The 
bill still grants the Minister and the Commissioner for Minerals to enter into Mineral 
Development Agreements.  Meanwhile, in the bill there are no provisions stating the 
legislative role in ratifying the Mineral Development Agreements, nor procedures for 
reviewing such development agreements.
81
  The bill designates nearly all information on 
mining operations confidential.   Overall, the outcome of the new mining bill both 
expresses both contestation and resistance from below, but also the limited and restricted 
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According to Revenue Watch, a general split in attitude could be deceived among government members.  
Legislators were often eager to protect public interest and maintain voter trust, and were open to citizen 
concerns and the concerns of small-scale miners.  In contrast, the executive branch generally sided with 




Chapter 5:  The Sociometabolic Profile of Tanzania and the Issue of Ecologically 
Unequal Exchange  
Introduction 
Returning to the issue of global environmental distributional inequalities as 
discussed in Chapter 1, ecologically unequal exchange theorists postulate that the world-
system is characterized by an asymmetrical transfer of biophysical resources and sink 
capacity from peripheral regions to core accumulating regions.  According to EUE, 
accumulation occurs not only through the extraction of surplus value, it occurs in 
biophysical terms.
82
  The implications of EUE theory are that the living standards in the 
Global North are at least in part a result of accumulation,
83
 based upon the extraction of 
surplus value and the asymmetrical transfer of ecosystem goods and services from the 
Global South.         
Also as discussed in Chapter 1, EUE theorists argue that this pattern can, and 
should, be investigated empirically.   One of the techniques that has garnered attention in
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 In this chapter I am dealing with the transfer of biophysical resources only.  The literature on the transfer 
of surplus value is controversial, even among Marxists scholars. Bettelheim, for example, in arguing 
against Emmanuel’s position, contends that the poverty of the Third World is due to the low level of 
development of the productive forces, and wage differentials with the West are the result, not the cause of 
underdevelopment. Such a discussion though important is unfortunately beyond the scope of this 
dissertation.   
83
 Living standards in the Global North are obviously a consequence of a large number of variables, as is 
poverty and underdevelopment in the Global South.  The point here is not, of course, to claim that high 
living standards in the North and poverty in the South are due exclusively to ecologically unequal 
exchange.  The technological level of the forces of production, the social organization, the improved 
distribution through class struggle, and so on, are all important factors.  However, the point EUE makes is 
that accumulation is also an ecological process; it is the physical transfer of resources from one place to 
another.  The amount of resources used in the Global North, for its production and consumption and hence 
related to the overall standard of living, is according to EUE theory, dependent on ecologically unequal 
exchange.    
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the study of ecologically unequal exchange is Material Flow Accounting and Analysis 
(MFA), based upon the theoretical concept of societal metabolism.  This chapter presents 
the results of a time-series, economy-wide MFA (EW-MFA) for Tanzania from the years 
1970-2010, in the attempt to answer the following questions: 
1.) The years 1970-2010 coincide with the implementation of economic nationalist 
policies under Nyerere and subsequent neoliberal economic reforms.  How have 
the structural reforms affected the socio-metabolic profile of Tanzania? Is there 
evidence of increased asymmetrical transfers of resources or ecologically unequal 
exchange, as measured by an EW-MFA, due to the structural reforms? 
2.) What are the strengths and weaknesses of an EW-MFA approach in evaluating 
ecologically unequal exchange?   
Societal metabolism 
The term metabolism was originally derived from the concept of metabolism in 
biology, whereby living organisms absorb nutrients from their environment, assimilate 
the nutrients for energy, and expel what is not required as waste. In an analogous manner, 
ecological economists conceive of economies as embedded in a larger natural 
environment, constantly drawing in resources, processing them and utilizing them for 
human needs, and subsequently expelling waste. The metabolic processes of economies 
are viewed as essentially entropic. The total input of resources from the greater 
environment and the total output of wastes are known as the ‘material throughput of the 
economy’ (UNCTAD, 2012). Socioeconomic metabolism refers to flows of materials and 
energy between society and nature (Fischer-Kowalski and Weisz, 1999).  
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Certain sustainability scholars have argued that the specific stage of development 
of a society, or its ‘mode of subsistence,’ determines the magnitude of this throughput.
84
  
Primitive hunter-gatherer societies largely performed what is known as ‘basic 
metabolism,’ that is, they mainly depended on the solar energy captured in the biomass 
found in their immediate environments.  Further, they extracted only what was required 
for subsistence. As such, in terms of both input and output, they largely remained within 
their environment’s carrying capacity, or the amount their greater environment could 
sustain indefinitely given the food, habitat, water, and other necessary ecosystem goods 
and services.  Over time, however, the emergence of agriculture as a new socio-
ecological regime evolved whereby humans started ‘colonizing’ nature at the expense of 
other species and utilizing land solely for crops useful to humans (Weisz et. al, 2001; 
Haberl et. al, 2011).  This enabled human access to surpluses, which in turn, resulted in 
the expansion of populations as well as the increased scale of throughput and 
consequently greater pressure on the surrounding ecosystems. Under the pre-industrial 
agricultural socio-ecological regime, the main source of energy is still solar-based, as 
humans continue to rely on the energy conversion provided by biomass sources.  Many 
economies are still largely agrarian in the world-system today, especially in Africa 
(UNCTAD, 2012). 
Industrialization has emerged as a qualitatively and quantitatively new socio-
ecological regime. Through technological and scientific development, humans have 
learned how to utilize non-renewable sources of energy, in particular fossil fuels. With 
the use of fossil fuels and new production techniques, industrial societies are 
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 The concept of ‘mode of subsistence,’ as well as the concept of reliance upon solar energy, was first 




characterized by ‘extended’ metabolism with unprecedented levels of productivity, 
surplus, and increased per capita material and energy consumption.  However, while 
industrialization has solved some of the problems of previous modes of subsistence, such 
as periodic scarcity, it has also severely strained the Earth’s ecosystems.  Resource 
extraction has surpassed the Earth’s natural regeneration rates and the production of 
wastes is greater than what can be absorbed by the planet’s sink mechanisms (Steffen et. 
al, 2011).  
Currently, the world-system contains all the socio-ecological regimes, with 
varying levels of transition between them (though very few hunter-gather regimes 
remain).  The metabolic profile of the least-developed countries is largely agrarian, with 
total energy and material use per capita and per unit of area quite low. For developing 
and emerging economies, total energy and material use per capita is higher, though on 
average they seem to be closer to an agrarian profile than to an industrial one.  In 
contrast, developed nations utilize high levels of energy and resources, with very strong 
dependency on fossil fuels (UNCTAD, 2012, Krausman et. al, 2008).  For example, in 
agrarian societies, energy use per capita is estimated to be approximately 40-70 
GJ/year/capita, and 150-400 GJ/year/capita in industrial societies.  Material use per capita 
in agrarian societies is approximately 3-6 tons/year/capita, while in industrial societies 
material use per capita runs up to 15-25 tons/year/capita (Krausman et. al, 2008). 
Central to the issue of ecologically unequal exchange, scholars have noted that 
international trade substantially affects the metabolic profiles of different types of 
economies. With industrialization, the material and energy requirements expand greatly 
and exceed domestic capacity. As a consequence, industrial countries require foreign 
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resource imports for production and consumption needs, particularly regarding fossil 
fuels and strategic metals (European Commission, 2006).  Concomitantly, countries 
incorporated into the world-system as resource exporters also reveal higher levels of 
material extraction rates and resource use. As a result, resource exporting countries that 
are also LDCs or developing countries can experience high levels of environmental 
pressure coupled with low levels of per capita consumption (UNCTAD, 2012). In this 
way, EUE theorists argue, industrialized countries shift the environmental burden away 
from their own territories through trade, and externalize it to the developing South.  
(Schutz et al 2003, Giljum and Eisenmenger, 2004).     
Unlike proponents of the theory of comparative advantage, who would conceive 
of this pattern as mutually beneficial, EUE theorists argue that this pattern is largely 
detrimental to peripheral environments, leading to problems of sustainability, declining 
environmental utilization opportunities, and the imposition of exogenous environmental 
burdens (Rice, 2010). They also point out that EUE tends to occur under global power 
imbalances, in particular through international trade whose structure originated under 
colonialism.   
 
Operationalizing societal metabolism:  material flow accounting and analysis 
Material Flow Accounting and Analysis (MFA) is an accounting system that 
measures resource flows in physical units, and is used as the operational tool for societal 
metabolism.   MFAs track resource use (usually in metric tons per year) from the 
extraction and production stages to the period of final use and waste disposal. In MFA the 
economy is conceptualized as a set of activities, extracting materials from nature, 
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transforming them, keeping them as society’s stock for a certain amount of time, and in 
the end of the production-consumption chain, disposing of them again in nature. The aim 
of an MFA is to draw a complete picture of the physical dimension of a social system by 
capturing all material flows driven by these systems activities at a point in time.
85
  The 
total amount and the progress through the economy of these materials are ideally reported 
within an accounting framework provided by MFA methodology, and where greater 
detail is needed, physical input-output tables [PIOT] can be constructed (Schandl and 
Shultz, 2000). Taken from the Eurostat 2001 ‘Economy-wide material flow accounts and 
derived indicators methodological guide’ Figure 1 illustrates the basic conceptualization 
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Material flow accounts measure resource flows in weight, usually metric tons.  As such, MFAs do not 
measure environmental impact, but environmental pressures. Pressures are considered socio-economic 
activities that imply changes or effects on the environment. For example, material extraction activities and 
consumption patterns imply certain physical uses. MFAs measure these uses in physical weight.  MFAs do 
not measure the impact of such activities on the greater environment, which depends on a host of factors, 
including type of material extracted, method of extraction, pollution associated with various economic 
activities, the particular ecosystem being affected by economic activities, and so on.  Impacts are thus direct 
changes in the natural system, changes of natural stocks for example like changes of the carbon 
concentration in the atmosphere or changes in nutrient balances in soil (email correspondence with Nina 
Eisenmenger, Institute of Social Ecology, Vienna on August 26, 2013).  
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Figure 1: Simplified general material balance scheme including water and air 
 
Source: Eurostat 2001 Economy-wide Material Flow Accounts and Derived Indicators Methodological 
Guide   
 
An economy-wide material flow account (EW-MFA) is based upon two 
boundaries.  The first boundary delineates the economic subsystem from the larger 
natural system.  All materials that are extracted from the larger natural system and enter 
into the economic process are counted within the EW-MFA.  The second boundary 
delineates the national economy from other national economies by distinguishing the 
flows of resources related to imported and exported materials.  In general, MFAs 
consider four major types of resources, which are accounted in terms of their weight 
(measured in tons): 
a.) Biomass (from agriculture, forestry, fishery, and hunting) 
b.) Fossil fuels (coal, oil, gas, and peat) 
c.) Minerals (industrial and construction minerals) 
d.) Metal ores 
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Material flows accounts have been constructed on the ‘material balance principle.’  The 
first law of thermodynamics states that matter, i.e., mass or energy, is neither created nor 
destroyed by any physical transformation (production or consumption) process.
86
  This 
material balance principle, according to the EUROSTAT 2001 compilation guide for 
material flows account, ‘provides a logical basis for the physical book-keeping of the 
economy-environment-relationship and for the consistent and comprehensive recording 
of inputs, outputs and material accumulation’ (EUROSTAT, 2001) For a given system 
such as production or consumption processes, in companies, regions, or national 
economies, the material balance principle leads to the following identity:   
Total inputs = total outputs + net accumulation of stocks 
This identity means that what goes into the system is either accumulated in the system or 
leaves the system again as an output.  As stated, for an economy-wide material flows 
account the first boundary delineates the national economic subsystem from the larger 
natural system.  All materials that are extracted from the larger natural system and enter 
into the national economic process are counted within the EW-MFA, and in this equation 
would be considered the ‘input.’  The second boundary for EW-MFAs delineates the 
national economy from other national economies by distinguishing the flows of resources 
related to imported and exported materials.  As such, all imports would be considered 
‘inputs’ in this equation.  ‘Outputs’ released to the environment means that society loses 
control over the location and composition of the materials. Waste, to the extent that it 
exits the economic process and is no longer utilized for economic purposes, is considered 
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 Material flows account record material flows based upon the material balance principle.  They do not 
record energy flows, such as energy inputs into the economic process and outputs that involve energy lost 
to the environment in the economic process.   MFAs are therefore to be distinguished from material and 
energy flow accounts (MEFAs) that do track energy flows.    
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an ‘output,’ as would be exports.  However, infrastructure, capital goods, and so would 
be regarded as a net accumulation of stocks as they continue to be used within the 
national economic process (EUROSTAT, 2001).  
 A number of indicators are derivable from material flow accounts that are helpful 
in providing an aggregate picture of a society’s metabolic profile.  However, to establish 
a full material balance account, one would need to account for the net output and net 
accumulated stock, which is a lengthy and complex procedure beyond the scope of this 
dissertation.  Still, certain indicators can be derived without the need to establish a full 
material balance account.  This study does not establish a full material balance account, 
and so only derives a limited set of indicators, as described below.  Also, it is important 
to emphasize that in this study only inflows that are used in the economy (used flows) are 
accounted for.  Hence the unused extraction- that is, materials that are moved without the 
intention of using them in the economy (e.g., overburden from mining)-  are left out.  
This does not diminish the importance of unused materials. However, the necessary 
coefficients for such calculations have not yet been established that would be suitable for 
Tanzania, as will be discussed in the conclusion when evaluating the limitations of this 
study. As such this study is therefore primarily concerned with the following indicators:   
a.) Domestic Extraction (DE)-  includes all the raw materials extracted within a 
country’s territory. 
b.) Domestic Material Consumption (DMC)-  calculated as DE plus imports minus 
exports.  DMC provides information on the quantity of the materials that remain 
within the national territory.   
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c.) Domestic Material Input (DMI)- comprises all materials that enter the economy 
for further use, in either production or consumption processes.  It is calculated as 
domestic extraction plus imports, and measures the direct input of materials for 
use into the economy. 
d.) Physical Trade Balance (PTB)- measures the physical trade surplus or deficit of 
an economy and is equal to imports minus exports.    The PTB reveals whether a 
country is a net importer or a net exporter in physical terms. 
Simron Jit Singh from the Institute of Social Ecology, Vienna, first proposed in 
his dissertation on the Nicobar Islands that the approach of societal metabolism, 
operationalized through material flow accounting and analysis, could be useful for the 
empirical investigation of ecologically unequal exchange.  As Hornborg had essentially 
argued concerning the issue of accumulation, Singh states, 
…regardless of the debate as to whether capitalism is 500 years old or not, 
or whether surplus is generated by means of production of accumulation, 
or whether value lies largely in the labor or in the resource itself, the 
crucial point remains that there is a net flow of materials and resources 
from one place to another (rural to urban, periphery to core) to allow for 
surplus to accumulate. Production could not occur without moving 
resources from their places of origin to the industrial centres where they 
are processed for added value, and surplus could not be generated without 
the exploitation of one by the other (Singh, 2003, p.68) 
 
Subsequently, other scholars, notably Eisenmenger and Giljum, have expounded upon the 
potential use of the concept of societal metabolism in order to further analyze, 
theoretically and empirically, the connection between international trade and ecologically 
unequal exchange (Giljum and Eisenmenger, 2004).  To date, a number of studies have 
been carried out using MFAs to investigate EUE, and it remains one of the major 
empirical methodologies in the EUE research agenda.  (Giljum and Eisenmenger, 2004; 
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Singh and Eisenmenger, 2010; Vallego, 2010; Perez-Rincon, 2006; Manrique et. al 2013) 
And, while not using the term ‘ecologically unequal exchange,’ a number of major 
reports have utilized MFAs to investigate the shifting of environmental burdens from 
industrial regions to developing countries through international trade (UNCTAD, 2012;  
UNEP, 2011).  
From net physical imports minus net physical exports, the Physical Trade Balance 
(PTB) aggregate indicator can be derived and a physical trade ‘surplus’ or ‘deficit’ can be 
indicated.   Countries that export more in physical units than import run a physical trade 
deficit, and vice versa, countries that import more than export run a physical trade 




In sum, in terms of measuring EUE, PTB indicators are arguably useful for 
several reasons. As discussed in Chapter 1, Hornborg argues that ostensibly fair monetary 
exchanges ‘conceal’ asymmetrical flows of resources in a manner that systematically 
deteriorates the (environmental) position of the periphery.  From the perspective of EUE, 
MFAs have an important advantage in that they reveal resource flows that are 
‘concealed’ by standard economic indicators which are typically rendered in monetary 
values only.  In addition, EUE theory posits an overall asymmetrical transfer of resources 
from periphery to core, not just the net transfer of a specific resource.  EW-MFAs are 
constructed to capture all material flows- biomass, metals, non-metallic minerals, and 
fossil fuels- associated with trade. 
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 As discussed in Chapter 1, Hornborg points out the necessity of examining flows of resources as opposed 
to solely monetary flows, especially in regards to EUE.  For example, countries can be experiencing a 
monetary trade surplus coupled with a physical trade deficit; gaining financially but being drained 
ecologically.  Or, even worse, countries can be experiencing both monetary trade deficits as well as 
physical trade deficits.   
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 There are, however, several shortcomings of EW-MFAs in regards to measuring 
EUE that are worth mentioning.  For one, MFA analysis aggregates many different 
qualities of material flows in order to derive aggregated indicators based upon physical 
weight.  As a result, aggregate MFA indicators can be dominated by particular materials 
that relatively weigh a lot, while other material groups with relatively less weight can be 
diluted or obscured.  Interpretation of MFA data therefore requires care, as well as 
discussion of disaggregated economic sectors and material groups.  Another major issue 
is the fact that weight-based MFA indicators do not reveal anything about actual 
environmental impacts.  Certain material flows may weigh very little, but have 
devastating impacts on the surrounding environment, be significant from the standpoint 
of sustainability, and be important in the overall discussion on economic development.  
Scholars such as Giljum (2004) have suggested linking the MFA framework to land-use 
accounting and comparing MFAs with other methods of environmental-economic 
accounting (Giljum, 2004). Finally, on a more specific note, in classical EW-MFAs, 
standard economy-wide material flow indicators of trade (such as are used in this study) 
only register the weight of traded commodities at the point of entry into or exit from a 
country. Indirect flows, or raw material equivalents (RMEs), are materials extracted or 
moved but do not enter the economy, such as overburden from mining.  These flows are 
important in determining both domestic resource depletion as well as environmental 
impact.  Additionally, indirect flows associated with extractive activities can be 
substantial, and sometimes equal to or higher than direct flows.  This is especially true for 
economies based on mineral extraction that extract large amounts of crude metal ores 
with low concentrations, but export highly concentrated ores (UNEP, 2011).  Without the 
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inclusion of indirect flows, the ecologically unequal exchange a peripheral country is 
experiencing may very likely be under-reported.  However, calculation of RMEs is still 
very much a work in progress in the MFA community. 
 
The societal metabolic structure of Africa: an overview 
Chapter 1 provided the literature review of empirical work on ecologically 
unequal exchange, including work that has utilized material flows accounting. It 
discussed the overall global trend of industrial countries tending to be net material 
importers, while developing countries tend to serve as net exports.  It is important to note, 
however, that exceptions do exist to this general pattern, such as Australia and Canada 
being net exporters and emerging economies such as China and India becoming net 
importers in recent years (UNEP, 2011). 
Recent work using material flows accounting has found that in terms of physical 
weight Africa as a region is also an overall net exporter of resources, though with 
nuances according to material category.  In 2012, UNCTAD released an economic report 
on African development, attempting to synthesize the approach of societal metabolism 
with more traditional issues such as economic growth.  The report highlighted the 
increasing salience of environmental factors in African development and discussed a 
number of important drivers of environmental degradation such as population growth.
88
    
Utilizing MFA and other methodology, the report presented an aggregate overview of the 
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 For example, land degradation is a major environmental sustainability problem in Africa. Population 
growth has been identified as a primary driver behind land degradation, as it is associated with rising rural 
populations and declining farm sizes, which has compelled people to move to more and more fragile lands 
particularly given the lack of substantially increased agricultural productivity.  This has led to high levels of 
deforestation, which has been exacerbated by fuel dependence on wood and charcoal, and in certain cases, 
civil unrest.  Desertification has been linked to climate change, overgrazing, and intensive cropping 
(UNCTAD, 2012).  
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metabolic structure of a large number of African countries and pointed out trends that are 
important to note.  First, growth in African economies is largely attributable to the 
extraction and exporting of resources rather than a structural transformation towards 
activities of higher productivity, either in the agricultural or industrial sectors.  Further, 
across most of Africa there has been a trend of deindustrialization, largely coinciding 
with the era of structural reforms (UNCTAD, 2012).     
 In terms of trade, Africa has experienced a significant increase in global trade 
volume, though the continent’s share of global material trade fell due to growth in trade 
in other regions of the world.  The following briefly overviews Africa’s trade profile in 
physical terms, in regards to Africa’s exports and imports to and from the rest of the 
world.
89
 The volume of Africa’s material trade in physical terms rose from almost 260 
million tons in 1980 to 506 million tons in 2008, however during same period, the PTB of 
most other world regimes rose more rapidly. From 1980-2008, both imports and exports 
increased.  African countries imported around 301 million tons of biomass, fossil fuels, 
and metals and non-metallic minerals, while they exported around 711 million tons of 
materials (UNCTAD, 2012). In physical terms, fossil fuels are the dominant material 
export of Africa, and they are also Africa’s main import. African countries account for 
about 10.5 % of fossil fuels supply to the world market in physical terms. Metals, 
dominated by iron ores and concentrate, followed by manganese and chromium ores and 
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 While the UNCTAD 2012 does not list Africa’s main trading partners in regards to physical terms, in 
monetary terms OECD partners (particularly from the EU) still dominate African trade and are growing. 
The share of OECD countries in Africa’s trade was approximately 60% in 2009.  However, trade between 
Africa and non-OECD countries, particularly China, India, and Brazil, has been growing most rapidly in 
the past decade.  The share of non-OECD countries in Africa’s trade has increased from 26% in 2000 to 
39% in 2009.  In 2009 intra-African trade was still small, comprising approximately 9% of total 




concentrates, are Africa’s second large export flows. Mineral exports are Africa’s third 
largest export group. Fossil fuels are also Africa’s dominant material imports, and 
biomass is the second most important material import.  Graph 1 shows the physical trade 
balance of all African countries, 1980-2008 (UNCTAD, 2012). 
 
Graph 1:  Physical trade balance of all African countries (thousands of tons), 1980-
2008 
 
Source:  UNCTAD report 2012 
 
Overall, Africa is a net exporter of non-renewables (for fossil fuels and metals, 
but not for non-metallic minerals) and net importer of renewables (biomass). Africa has 
become a net importer of food and agricultural products, along with biomass products 
such as cellulose and paper.  Studies have argued that this is a result of population 
growth, low and stagnating agricultural productivity, policy distortions, weak institutions 
and poor infrastructure.  For poor African countries, this has meant the difficulties in 
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paying for their food imports (Rakotoarisoa and Iafrate, 2011).
90
    In general, the report 
states, the PTBs of Africa reflect the endowment, production and consumption structure 
of the region and individual countries. Africa is endowed with significant amounts of 
fossil fuels and mineral resources, and its production and exports are dominated by 
resources and resource-based production (UNCTAD, 2012).    
Aside from the PTB, a number of other indicators also reveal Africa’s position in 
terms of unequal resource distribution in comparison with other regions, at least in terms 
of their consumption.  For example, domestic material consumption per capita in Africa 
is very low compared to the global average. In 2008, per capita DMC in the region was 
5.3 tons, compared to the global average of 10.4 tons (UNEP, 2013). While domestic 
material consumption per capita grew in Asia and Latin America, overall it decreased 
slightly in Africa from 5.6 tons in 1980 to 5.3 tons in 2008, largely due to high population 
growth. (See Appendix V for a brief discussion on demographic transitions and resource 
use in Tanzania).  Since 1995, Africa’s average per capita DMC has been the lowest, 
compared to all other regions of the world, though within Africa there are countries with 
very high DMC per capita like Seychelles and South Africa (UNCTAD, 2012).  
Further, energy use in Africa is low and has been increasing much less rapidly 
than material use. In 2009, per capita electricity consumption in Africa was only 561 
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 A 2011 FAO report revealed that, based on data between 2000 and 2005, 43 of 51 African countries are 
net importers of food. However, the state of food import dependency is different across the continent and 
varies according to levels of income. The relatively wealthy nations in Africa had the highest net food 
imports per capita (USD 185 per year in real terms), but they also had adequate means to pay for their food 
import bills using revenue from non-agricultural sources. The majority of the Africa’s low-income 
countries (mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa), where two-third of its population lives, had also been net food 
importers. However, while they imported far less food per capita (USD 17 per year) they had difficulty 
covering their food imports bills, as their export revenues were limited (Rakotoarisoa and Iafrate, 2011).  
What is interesting, as noted in Chapter 3, is that a major reason African governments initially rejected the 
World Bank reforms encapsulated in the Berg Report was because they feared that such reforms would 




kilowatt-hours (KWH) compared to 741 KWH for Asia, 1,884 KWH for Latin America, 
and 2,730 KWH for the world average. In 2009, the region was responsible for total CO2 
emissions of 928 million tons compared to 10,030 million tons and 12,045 for Asia and 
the OECD countries respectively. Africa accounts for only 3.2 percent of global CO2.  
The report attributes Africa’s low energy and material consumption to Africa’s low-
productivity, primarily agriculture mode of production (UNCTAD 2012). 
Concerning climate change, Africa is likely to become the most affected region of 
world due to geography, high level of dependence on agriculture, and low capacity to 
adapt. It is thus the region that has contributed the least to global climate change but 
potentially will be affected the most, a fact that highlights the salience of the concepts of 
ecological debt and environmental justice.  There is a projected reduction in agricultural 
yields in some countries as high as 50 percent by 2020, and the net crop revenue could 
decline by as much as 90 percent by 2100 in some areas. Further, the proportion of arid 
and semi-arid lands may increase by 5-8 percent by 2080 (UNCTAD, 2012). Land 
degradation (defined as a reduction in the capacity of the land to provide ecosystem 
goods and services over a period of time) has become a central sustainability issue in 
Africa (UNCTAD, 2012). Further, 65 percent of agricultural land, 31 percent of pasture 
lands, 19 percent of forests and wood lands are degraded, with associated high economic 
costs. For Tanzania, there has been a 19.4 percent depletion of forest area between 1990 
and 2010.  (Please see Appendix IV for more country specific statistics on the depletion 
of African forests). Deforestation, desertification, erosion, poor agricultural practices, and 
high population growth are listed as important drivers of land degradation. Africa suffers 
from a high rate of deforestation, and has lost about 10 percent of its forest area between 
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1990 and 2010. Desertification and loss of biological diversity are also increasingly of 
major concern with over 120 plant species in the region extinct and about 1771 under 
threat.  Further, of salience to the issue of EUE, African fish stocks are becoming 
depleted, largely due to illegal fishing by foreign vessels coupled with excessive fishing 
by local fishermen and legal commercial fleets (UNCTAD, 2012).  
Finally, water scarcity and stress have become major sustainability challenges in 
Africa. The UNCTAD report suggests that over 300 million people in Africa experience 
water scarcity, and by 2025 eighteen countries will experience water stress. An increase 
in consumption and withdrawal, due largely to population growth and decreasing water 
supply, are main reasons for water scarcity and stress in Africa.
91
 As noted in Chapter 3, 
critics have argued that the dynamics of land and water resource grabbing have 
exacerbated this problem.   
While the low level of resource use in Africa can be attributed to its largely 
agrarian mode of production, its depletion of resources and environmental degradation is 
due to both internal factors such as population growth and inefficient use of resources as 
well as the exporting of its resources (UNCTAD, 2012). What this seems to indicate is a 
situation where environmental stressors such as population growth and inefficient use of 
resources is being exacerbated with the exploitation of resources by its integration in the 
world economy, either through trade or FDI. This is especially obvious in the case of 
land.  Further, as the issue of climate change highlights, Africa suffers from the pollution 
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According to an Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report, climate change and variability have 
the potential to impose additional pressures on water availability, water accessibility and water demand in 
Africa.  However, the report notes, the impact of climate change on water resources across the continent is 
not likely to be uniform. According to climate change models, there is a likely increase in the number of 
people who could experience water stress by 2055 in northern and southern Africa.  In contrast, eastern and 
western African will be likely to experience a reduction rather than an increase in water stress. (IPCC 




of the global atmospheric commons by other regions without obtaining the same level of 
consumption and benefits.  Unfortunately, the UNCTAD report engages in no systematic 
discussion of the link between such environmental sustainability issues and foreign 
investment, though other scholars positing a ‘new scramble for Africa’ have made such 
links, as I had overviewed in Chapter 3 in regards to various African countries, and in 
Chapter 4 more specifically in regards to Tanzania. Overall, with variation among 
countries, Africa’s socio-metabolic profile appears to be subject to the very problems 
theorists associate with ecologically unequal exchange, especially when the unequal 
dynamics of FDI are taken into account as discussed in Chapter 3 and 4.   
 
Tanzania: socio-metabolic profile and the issue of ecologically unequal exchange 
Socioeconomic overview 
Tanzania is one of the world’s poorest economies in terms of per capita income, 
with the majority of the labor force’s livelihood’s dependent on low-productivity, 
subsistence farming.  As of 2007, approximately 37.4 percent of the rural population 
lived below the rural poverty line, and overall 33.4 percent of the population lived below 
the national poverty line.  The number of rural poor is approximated to be 12,353,175 as 
of 2010
92
, and in 2001, 92.1 percent of the urban population was estimated to be living in 
slums (UN statistic division, mdgs.un.org).  The lowest 10 percent of the population held 
only 2.8 percent of household income, while the highest 10 percent held 29.6 percent of 
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household income as of 2007.  As of 2009, life expectancy at birth was estimated to be a 
mere 56.6 years on average.
93
 
However, in recent years it has achieved high economic growth, driven largely by 
gold production and tourism. As Chapter 4 overviewed, the benefits of such growth are 
not inclusive (REPOA, 2012).  In Tanzania, between 2000 to 2007, the poorest 40 per 
cent, and most of the deciles in between, actually saw their share of income decline 
(Africa Progress Panel, 2013).  The economy continues to depend on agriculture, which 
accounts for more than one-quarter of GDP and employs about 80 percent of the work 
force. Tanzania also continues to depend upon the World Bank, the IMF, and bilateral 
donors to provide funds to rehabilitate Tanzania’s aging economic infrastructure, 
including rail and port infrastructure that are important trade links for inland countries.
94
  
Tanzania runs a deficit equal to -5.7 percent of its GDP as of 2012, and a current account 
















 Index Mundi Tanzania Economic Profile 2013 
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 IFAD website http://operations.ifad.org/web/ifad/operations/country/home/tags/tanzania 
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6.5%  $1,700  agriculture: 
27.1%  
industry: 24.1%  
services: 48.7% 
24.77 million total: 
80% in agriculture, 
20% in industry and 
services 
Source: Index Mundi 2013 
Manufacturing activities have grown at an average annual growth rate of over 4 
percent, and have contributed to GDP at an average of eight percent over the last decades 
and account for over half of government revenue collection.  Nonetheless, manufacturing 
activities in Tanzania are at a relatively incipient stage, and are concentrated in the 
manufacture of simple consumer goods such as food, beverages, tobacco, textiles, 
furniture, and wood allied products.  With the government’s decision to liberalize trade 
and investment policies since 1986, a number of firms, even those believed to be strong, 
were undermined by competition from imported manufactures.
96
 Services include 
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 Tanzania National Website 
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government services, finance and business services, transport and communications, and 
trade, hotels and restaurants.
97
  
In terms of its trade structure, Tanzania remains characterized by the export of 
primary commodities, with agricultural products including commodities such as coffee, 
cashew nuts, and cotton, but also including some low-level manufactures, such as 
agricultural processing, apparel, and processing of minerals such as salt, soda ash, oil, 
and fertilizers.   As discussed in Chapter 4, gold has become the dominant commodity in 
Tanzania’s exports.  It remains reliant upon imports for consumer goods, machinery and 
transportation equipment, industrial raw materials, and crude oil.
98
     
In many aspects, Tanzania’s socioeconomic profile fits the classic description of a 
peripheral economy; a dual economy whereby the majority of citizens are employed in 
rural subsistence farming, with a disarticulated, national economy largely based upon 
export of cash crops and extraction of preciousities and minerals, especially gold.  Graph 
2 displays Tanzania’s export structure by sector in 1997 and 2011, with each sector’s 
significance shown, in monetary terms, as a percentage of total exports.  Primary 
commodities from animals, vegetables, and basic derived products has decreased as a 
percentage of overall exports in monetary terms from about 70 percent in 1997 to 24 
percent in 2011. On the other hand metals, minerals and basic derived products have 
increased dramatically as a percentage of overall exports in monetary terms, rising from 
about 6 percent in 1997 to about 66 percent in 2011, reflecting the importance of gold 
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 (OECD http://www.oecd.org/dev/emea/40578365.pdf) 
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exports.  Precious stones and metals alone account for about 40 percent of total exports. 
The textile sector also saw a drop from its 1997 levels of about 22 percent to only about 
4.5 percent in 2011 of total exports.  Higher level manufactures, including various 
machinery and parts thereof, rose marginally from 1.4 percent in 1997 to about 4.7 
percent in 2011 of total exports.   
Graph 2:  Tanzania export sector by percentage of total exports in monetary terms, 
in 1997 and 2011 
 
 
Source:  UNCOMTRADE export data. UNCOMTRADE data is relatively disaggregated. Data has been 
aggregated by author according to sector, to demonstrate the theoretical concept of a peripheral trade 
structure.  In dependency theory, peripheral economies are marked by low forces of production.  As such, 
typical peripheral export structures include the export of cash crops, mineral and metal extractives, and 
low-value added manufactures that do not necessitate high levels of technology.  On this basis, the data 
was organized into the following categories:  Animals, vegetables and basic derived products category, 
which includes live animals, animal products, animal and vegetable fats and oils, and cleavage products, 
prepared foodstuffs, raw hides and derived products, vegetable products, and wood products;  Metals, 
minerals and basic derived products which includes fossil fuels, articles of stone, plaster, glass, ceramic, 
base metals and articles of base metals, mineral products, precious stones, precious metals, plastics and 
articles, products of chemical or allied industries. Textiles and other clothing, which includes textiles, 
clothing and other gear, and Higher VA manufactures which includes arms and ammunitions, 
instruments, optical, photographic, medical, clocks, musical, or part thereof, machinery and mechanical 
appliance, miscellaneous manufactures, and vehicles such cars, boats, airplanes, and parts thereof. 
*Comparison with official government figures for the year 2009 show agricultural products, including fish 
and horticulture, to account for approximately 21 per cent of total exports; minerals to account for 
approximately 36 percent of total exports, manufactured goods to account for approximately 16 percent of 
total exports, ‘other exports’ and ‘re-exports’ to account for approximately 12.6 percent of total exports; 
and ‘unrecorded’ trade at approximately 15 percent.  It should be noted that in government reports the 
manufactures category includes a broad range of manufactured goods, with the most important being low 
level manufactures, in particular cement, cooking oil, copper products, and tobacco products. (United 
























In contrast, as Graph 3 shows, as a percentage Tanzania’s imports are dominated 
by metals, minerals (importantly including fossil fuels) and derived industrial products, 
and higher level manufactures.  In 2011, the two single largest import categories in 
monetary terms were vehicles and mineral products, including fuels, minerals ores, 
stones, and plastering materials.  Tanzania’s import structure reflects a general peripheral 
structure in its reliance upon imports of higher level manufactures, such as machinery and 
vehicles, but it also shows physical reliance on the import of minerals and fossil fuels. In 
particular, Tanzania imports oil at a cost of an estimated $1.3-$1.6 billion per year, 
accounting for up to 25% of total foreign exchange earnings (Tanzania Natural Resource 
Forum, 2009). Imports have continued to increase, at a faster rate than exports, due to 
increasing demand for capital and intermediate goods (REPOA, 2012). 
Graph 3: Tanzania import sector by percentage of total imports in monetary terms, 
in 1997 and 2011 
 
Source:  UNCOMTRADE import data.  Data has been aggregated by author, to demonstrate theoretical 
concept of a peripheral trade structure.  In dependency theory, peripheral economies are marked by low 
forces of production.  A typical peripheral country imports structures include the higher value added 
technology, various forms of machinery and capital goods, as well as luxury items like cars for elites.  On 
this basis, the data was organized into the following categories, which are the same categories for the 






















products, animal and vegetable fats and oils, and cleavage products, prepared foodstuffs, raw hides and 
derived products, vegetable products, and wood products,  Metals, minerals and basic derived products 
which includes fossil fuels, articles of stone, plaster, glass, ceramic, base metals and articles of base 
metals, mineral products, precious stones, precious metals, plastics and articles, products of chemical or 
allied industries. Textiles and other clothing, which includes textiles, clothing and other gear, and Higher 
VA manufactures which includes arms and ammunitions, instruments, optical, photographic, medical, 
clocks, musical, or part thereof, machinery and mechanical appliance, miscellaneous manufactures, and 
vehicles such cars, boats, airplanes, and parts thereof.  
 
Tanzania Resource Use 
Domestic Extraction 
Domestic Extraction (DE) includes all the raw materials extracted within a 
country’s territory. Graph 4 shows that all categories of Tanzania’s domestic extraction 
have witnessed an increase in the absolute amount of domestic extraction from the years 
1970s-2010.  Tanzania’s domestic extraction is dominated in terms of physical weight 
primarily by biomass, reflecting Tanzania’s largely agrarian- based economy. Metals are 
the second largest category of DE, and the increase from the late 1990s to the 2010 has 
been driven largely by gold production. Copper production began in 2001 and continues, 
and silver production began again in 1998 and continues until now, after a lull in 1973. 
Non-metallic minerals is third largest category, with the bulk of materials in this category 
construction materials. The smallest category in terms of physical weight is fossil fuels. 
Tanzania is not a significant producer of fossil fuels. However, it is a minor producer of 
coal.  Also, since 2004, it has become a minor producer of natural gas, and there has been 
a small increase in fossil fuel domestic extraction, from 4.634 thousand in 1970 to 664 
thousand tons in 2010. 
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Graph 4:  Tanzania Domestic Extraction (1000 tons)  
 
Source: author’s calculations 
Physical Trade Balance 
In the MFA method, the PTB is the most widely used indicator to analyze 
biophysical aspects of international trade.  As discussed, physical trade surpluses and 
deficits have been used to indicate global patterns of ecologically unequal exchange 
between developed and developing countries respectively.   One calculates the PTB as 
the inverse of the monetary trade balance- that is, by subtracting exports from imports.  In 
the following PTB, only direct flows (direct weight of imports and exports and not 
including indirect flows) were included.
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For imports (Graph 6), in terms of physical weight all categories have witnessed 
overall increases since 1987. In terms of physical weight for 2011, imports were 
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 On a methodological note, for the purposes of EW-MFAs, traded goods are grouped into material groups 
similar to the classification of material flows for domestic extraction, that is, biomass, minerals, metals and 
fossil fuels.  This classification is needed in order to enable the addition/aggregation of domestic extraction 
and trade components in order to derive indicators.  The MFA community recognizes this grouping as very 
crude, because products are composed of many different materials.  As the closest approximation, trade 
products have to be grouped into those material classes which form the main component of the respective 
good (e.g. motor vehicles are grouped into a class termed products mainly from metals) (EUROSTAT, 
2009). Hence, whenever ‘net metals exports’ is referred to, this implies the aggregate of all exports that are 
in raw metal form as well as all exports that are primarily composed of metal, and so on for the other 
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dominated by fossil fuels (approximately 40.1%), reflecting Tanzania’s heavy reliance on 
external sources of energy, especially oil. Biomass is the second largest category of 
imports in terms of weight, accounting for approximately 20 percent of imports.  The 
bulk of biomass imports are mainly cereals, raw and processed, sugar crops, raw and 
processed, and fibers, raw and processed.  Similar to the rest of Africa, Tanzania is 
increasingly becoming reliant upon imports of foodstuffs.  Metals constitute 
approximately 11 percent of imports in terms of weight (mainly iron ores and 
concentrate, iron and steel, raw and processed, and products mainly made from metals), 
and non-metallic minerals approximately 15.4 percent (mainly mining and quarrying 
materials, chemical fertilizers, clays and kaolin, and products made from non-metallic 
minerals).  The last remaining category was ‘others’ at 4.5 percent, a category that 
includes highly processed goods from various materials.
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For exports (Graph 5), all categories witnessed growth as well since the early 
2000s, though there was little increase in export of fossil fuels given Tanzania’s low 
production.  Tanzania’s main exports in terms of weight are biomass, accounting for 
about 57.3 percent of exports and comprising mainly cereals, veggies, timber, and 
processed foodstuffs. Non-metallic minerals were the next largest category (mainly 
mining and quarrying materials, chemical fertilizers, clays and kaolin, and products made 
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 Allocation of foreign trade categories to the EW-MFA categories not unambiguous because the trade 
classifications always distinguish between different goods, whereas the EW-MFA classification 
distinguishes between different types of materials.  As goods are often a mixture of different materials no 
unequivocal correspondence between these two classification systems is possible.  Despite this conceptual 
incompatibility between EW-MFA and trade classifications it is possible to determine for most goods the 
main material component , or main raw materials used in production.  For others, it is only possible to 
classify the good as either of biomass, mineral, or fossil fuel origin.  In these latter cases, the commodities 
are assigned to material categories such as e.g. products mainly from biomass. The remaining goods, 
mostly commodities that are highly processed and consist of a complex mist of materials for which it is not 




from non-metallic minerals).  Despite their importance in monetary terms, metals 
comprised only 14.4 percent, with exports including iron ores and concentrates, gold, 
precious metals and products from metals.  If indirect flows were included, this category 
would most likely be much higher.  This is an important issue and will be discussed 
below.  Fossil fuels contributed only a small amount of 2 percent of overall exports, 
reflecting the lack of endowment of fossil fuels.  The residual category of highly 
processed goods was only 4.6 percent in terms of physical weight.  The growth of both 
imports and exports demonstrates Tanzania’s increased integration into the world 
economy during the neoliberal era. 
Graph 5: Tanzania physical exports (tons) from 1976-2011 
 
















Graph 6: Tanzania physical imports (tons) from 1976-2011
  
Source: author’s calculations     
 
In terms of physical trade balances (Graph 7), in contrast to the broader trend on the 
African continent and the overall trend of the developing world, Tanzania is a net 
importer of all material categories, meaning it has a net physical trade surplus for all 
material categories.  Further, Tanzania’s physical trade surplus in tons has increased for 
the years 1976-2011 (for available data, not all consecutive years available), with the 
exception of biomass, which has shown more erratic increases and decreases since 1980.  
Tanzania socio-metabolic profile thus runs counter to many developing nations. Since 
2000, many developing nations have monetary trade surpluses and physical trade deficits, 
while industrialized countries have monetary trade deficits and physical trade surpluses 
(UNEP, 2011).  In contrast, Tanzania has a monetary trade deficit and a physical trade 
surplus, indicating its reliance upon external resources to fulfill its consumption and 
production needs, with implications for EUE theory as will be discussed below.  It should 
be noted, however, that though Tanzania has a physical trade surplus, overall its surplus 
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Graph 7: Tanzania Physical Trade Balances by Material Category (tons) from 1976-
2011 
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Source:  Author’s calculations 
 
Domestic Material Input and Domestic Material Consumption  
Graph 8 shows a comparison of the relative weight of imports and exports as a 
percentage of domestic material input.  Domestic material input (DMI = DE + imports), 
includes all materials entering the economy for use and is the sum of tons of domestic 
extraction plus tons of imports.   Graph 8 shows that Tanzania is increasingly relying 
upon material input from global markets.  
 
Graph 8: A comparison of the relative weight of imports and exports (in % share of 
Direct Material Input, DMI) for Tanzania, 1976-2010 
 















































Domestic material consumption (Graph 9) provides information about the 
quantity of materials that remain within the national territory.  That is, it measures the 
total amount of materials directly used by an economy.  The DMC indicator provides an 
assessment of the absolute level of the use of resources, and allows one to distinguish 
consumption driven by domestic demand from consumption driven by the export market.  
DMC does not include upstream hidden flows related to imports and exports of raw 
materials and products. 
One calculates DMC by subtracting direct physical exports from DMI.  For 
example, DMC metals = net domestic extraction of metals + net import of metals – net 
export of metals.   DMC measures the total amount of material directly used in an 
economy, excluding indirect flows.
102
 Although termed consumption, this indicator 
differs from how economists would define consumption in the sense that DMC includes 
not only those materials that make up the final product, but also those intermediary 
resources needed for its production, either for domestic consumption or for exports 
(Eurostat, 2001).  Data for the years 1982 to 1994 were unavailable.   
Graph 9:  Tanzania domestic material consumption, total and by category (1000 
tons), from 1976-2010 
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Source:  author’s calculations 
The relation of DMC to DMI indicates to what extent inputs of material resources are 
used for own domestic consumption or are exported to be consumed in other economies.  
When the gap is large, it indicates that inputs of material resources are used largely for 
export and consumption in other economies.  When the gap is small, it indicates that 
inputs of material resources are largely used for domestic consumption.   For Tanzania, 
the relatively low weight of exports for all categories has meant that, in terms of weight, 
the difference between DMC and DMI is very little; in terms of weight, most material is 
used for domestic consumption.   
DMC per capita (Graph 10) does not show much variation, only a slight 
increasing trend since 1997, but overall decrease since 1976.  Population has steadily 
increased from 16,480,000 in 1976 to 45,030,000 in 2010, and it appears that DMC has 
not kept pace with population growth, decreasing from 3.77 in 1976 to 3.21 in 2010, 
despite some increase since 1997.
103
 (See Appendix V).  It should be noted that DMC per 
capita remains very low compared with the global average, at approximately 3.21 tons 
per capita in 2010, well below the global average of 10.4 tons and the average in Africa 
of 5.3 tons per capita in 2008.  It is also important to note that DMC per capita may not 
even indicate the average material standard of living for economies based on mineral 
extraction, such as Tanzania.  In such economies an important share of DMC ends up as 
waste in mineral industry.   
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 Population growth has also contributed to a host of environmental and social problems.  Population 
growth has put further pressure on the land, resulting in deforestation.  With deforestation, villagers, 
(especially women) are forced to walk further distances to gather firewood, and the price of wood derived 
fuel has increased. The problems from population pressure on land seem to be exacerbated by the land 








Source:  author’s calculations 
 
Material intensity of Tanzania’s economy 
This section discusses two methods typically used to assess de-materialization 
trends and the position countries hold in the global economy by the societal metabolism 
and EUE literature. To begin with, some scholars have argued that it also possible to 
calculate the material intensity of an economy by relating DMC to GDP, that is, the 
amount of domestic material consumption needed to generate a unit of GDP (Russi et. Al 
2009). The goal of sustainability requires that countries undergo a process of ‘de-
materialization,’ that is, increased decoupling of economic growth from material usage.  
Many resource exporting countries exhibit high levels of material intensity, while 
resource importing countries often exhibit lower levels of material intensity.  The 
argument, in relation to EUE, is that resource importing countries are able to obtain lower 
levels of material intensity by shifting the more materially intensive economic activities 
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economic burdens through international trade.  This also implies that through increased 
economic integration peripheral economies should experience the opposite of de-
materialization, that is, relatively higher levels of material intensity.    
 In terms of kilograms of domestic material consumption per US dollar Gross 
Domestic Product, in 1995 Tanzania used approximately 10.6 kg domestic material 
consumption of matter to produce 1$ of GDP, a very high amount of material per unit of 
GDP.  For instance, Chile in 2000 required 9 kilograms domestic material consumption 
of matter to produce $1 of GDP, and Peru required about 8 kg. Both countries are 
considered to have high material intensity levels.  In contrast, the EU-15 material 
intensity level was only 0.8 kg per dollar in 2000 (Russi et. Al 2009). However, Tanzania 
shows an ostensibly favorable de-materialization trend (whereby more GDP is generated 
with less materials used), as by 2010 it’s level had dropped to approximately 7.2 kg per 
US dollar.   
This ‘de-materialization’ trend, while potentially pointing towards a positive 
development, must be interpreted cautiously however. First, it is a minor drop in 
comparison with EU levels, but more importantly, the use of DMC as an indicator is 
problematic as Tanzania’s mining sector has grown, as discussed above, absolutely in 
physical terms.  As shown above, metals as a biophysical category metals have increased 
absolutely in terms of domestic extraction from 195,581 tons 1995 to 19,565,558 tons in 
2010. DMC, as a reminder, is equal to domestic extraction plus imports minus exports, 
and does not include hidden flows or unused domestic extraction. However, mining 
activities often involve large amounts of materials that are moved during the mining 
process, but they do not physically enter the economic process, and are therefore not 
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included in the DMC indicator.  Such material, in societal metabolism terminology, is 
known as ‘unused domestic extraction’ and mining overburden is a class example. 
Without recourse to the calculation of unused domestic extraction, it is difficult to assess 
whether or not Tanzania has actually undergone a de-materialization trend.   
Such indicators do exist in the MFA framework, including the Total Material 
Input (TMI) which equals DMI plus unused domestic extraction, or Total Material 
Requirement (TMR), which equals TMI plus any hidden flows that might be associated 
with imports.
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  In addition, as discussed in Chapter 4, gold mining and other forms of 
mining are associated with substantial levels of pollution.   Neither domestic extraction 
nor DMC captures associated outputs (pollution or waste) in the environment with 
mining activities.  As such, in Tanzania’s case as an increasingly ‘extractive’ economy, 
relating DMC to GDP is limited as a methodology to assess de-materialization trends.  
In the societal metabolism and EUE literature, scholars have also used indicators 
to assess trends in the position a country holds in the international markets (Russi et. Al 
2009).  In order to do so, they calculate prices of imports and exports per unit of weight.  
It has been noted that peripheral countries often export high levels of resources for 
relatively less monetary value and import relatively less amounts of resources of high 
value.  In contrast, core economies often export relatively lower amounts of resources for 
high value, and import relatively greater amounts of resources of lower value.  In 
Tanzania in 1997 this trend was true, as the price per ton of exports was 852.50 USD, 
compared to an import price of 1020.62 USD.  By 2011, however, this trend had 
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At the time of writing this, suitable coefficients to calculate indirect flows for Tanzania were not 
available, otherwise indirect flows would have been included in this study. In email conversation with the 
Institute of Social Ecology, Vienna, some raw material equivalent coefficients have been derived, but are 
based upon European production standards.  As such, I was advised not to apply such coefficients to 
Tanzania.   (email correspondence with Nina Eisenmenger, May 3, 2013). 
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reversed, as price per ton of exports was 1351.51 USD, while imports were only 1178.94 
USD.  However, it is important to contrast these numbers with the EU-15, which in 2000 
imported 3.4 times more materials than it exported, with an average price of 1,559 USD 
for an imported ton in 2000 and about 5,306 USD for an exported ton.  The value of an 
EU-15 export in 2000, therefore, was still significantly higher than the value of 
Tanzanian exports in both 1997 and 2011, reflecting the position of the industrialized 
region in the upper value-added segment of the world market.     
In the case of Tanzania, again, interpreting this indicator needs caution.  Again, it 
should be noted that the contribution of precious stones and metals as percentage of 
exports in monetary value has increased from about 3.6 percent in 1997 to about 39 per 
cent in 2011, a substantial increase. This trend reflects the growing importance of 
precious stones and metals such as gold in Tanzania’s exports.  As discussed above, 
while higher manufactures have grown as a percentage of exports, the growth has been 
substantially slow, from only about 1.4 percent of total exports, to 4.7 percent of total 
exports.  In contrast, overall metals, minerals and basic derived products have grown to 
66 percent in 2011, of which 39 percent is attributable to precious stones and metals 
alone (Graph 11).  Because precious stones and metals command high prices per unit of 
material, it is not surprising that the value of Tanzanian exports should increase.   Further, 
standard trade data only measures the weight of traded commodities at point of entry and 
exit of country.  For precious stones and metals this weight is nominal. Trade statistics do 
not capture ‘hidden’ flows- materials that are extracted or moved but do not enter the 
economy.  According to the UNEP decoupling report, the biggest difference between 
direct trade flows and trade flows including indirect flows can be observed for countries 
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that extract large amounts of crude metals ores with low concentrations, but export highly 
concentrated ores.  In the case of Chile, the world’s biggest exporter of copper, the 
physical trade balance in the year 2003 changes from net exports of 1 million tons in 
terms of direct flows to net exports of 634 million tons if calculated including indirect 
flows for the same year (UNEP, 2011). In the case of Tanzania, precious stones and 
metals as percentage of exports weigh relatively very little at the point of exit compared 
to the amount of mining overburden. Thus, it is possible that if indirect flows were 
accounted for, Tanzanian exports would not show an increase in the price commanded 
per unit ton.  Therefore, it is highly dubious if the (relatively marginal) reversal, whereby 
Tanzanian exports command a somewhat higher price than its imports, reflects  any 
substantial climb up the global value chain.   
 
Graph 11:  Precious stones and metals as percentage of exports in monetary terms 
(US$), from 1997 to 2011 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
In many aspects, Tanzania’s socioeconomic profile fits the classic description of a 
peripheral economy; a dual economy whereby domestically the majority of citizens are 
employed in rural subsistence farming, and a ‘disarticulated’ national economy based 
largely upon export of extractives and low level manufactures.  In 1997, Tanzania’s 
exports were dominated by the export of cash crops and basic derived agricultural 
products, and since then it has become increasingly dominated by the extractive sector, 
especially gold. To the extent that the sector of higher manufactures has grown, it has 
done so at a pronouncedly slower pace than the extractive sector, and the textiles sector 
has shown a marked decline in terms of its overall percentage of total exports. The 
majority of citizens, as subsistence farmers, remain alienated from the national economy, 
as well as most of the proceeds from it- except for the urban elite whose interests, as 
discussed in Chapter 4, often coincide with foreign investors over their rural counterparts.
 Counter-intuitively, however, Tanzania’s socio-metabolic profile does not match 
the broader trend of peripheral countries, especially of the African continent which as 
discussed is, overall, a net exporter of resources, in particular metals and fossil fuels.  
Tanzania is a net importer across all material categories. This trend has increased- again 
counter-intuitively- during the neoliberal years.  Its socio-metabolic profile therefore 
contrasts with the socio-metabolic profile of many peripheral economies in Latin 
America and Africa, as the empirical section of Chapter 1overviewed.  Additionally, it 
contrasts with ecologically unequal exchange theory in that increased economic 
integration has been met with an increasing physical trade surplus rather than deficit.   




Methodological issues and challenges of measuring EUE 
Beginning with methodological issues, the EW-MFA has been useful in 
evaluating the trend of EUE (or lack of EUE) in certain ways, while in other ways the 
indicators used above are too limited to draw firm conclusions.  In terms of usefulness, 
the EW-MFA has indicated, as well as the monetary data, that Tanzania is a net importer 
of biomass and this reflects an increasing reliance on imported foodstuffs.  It has also 
indicated that Tanzania is a net importer of fossil fuels.  Tanzania does not produce oil, 
and only in recent years has discovered and begun to produce natural gas.  While 
subsistence farmers depend largely on wood and charcoal for their energy needs, the 
national economy is heavily reliant upon the import of fuels.  In this material category, it 
can be said rather unambiguously that Tanzania is not subject EUE, and for this material 
category, its metabolic needs require a shifting of environmental burdens onto whatever 
oil exporting countries it is reliant upon for imports.   
Such a finding is useful, as it points to an inevitable variation in socio-metabolic 
profiles across peripheral countries due to even geological factors alone. This is 
important, because an implicit assumption in EUE theory is that with increasing 
economic integration, peripheral economies should increasingly become net exporters of 
materials.  But because of differences in geological endowments, this physically cannot 
be the case for all countries.  Tanzania is reliant upon fossil fuel imports, because it does 
not produce oil, and increasing economic integration has apparently brought increased 
demand for fossil fuels.   
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Such variation also points to the need for ecologically unequal exchange theory to 
address a fundamental issue that it has yet to do so.  That is, EUE may characterize the 
overall movement of resources at a global level,  in terms of an overall asymmetrical 
transfer of resources from peripheral regions to core regions, but how do we assess 
whether individual countries are subject to EUE or not?  Most individual peripheral 
countries are likely show significant variation in terms of their socio-metabolic profiles.  
Certain peripheral countries will most likely be net importers of particular material 
categories, but net exporters of other material categories.  
How do we evaluate which material category wins out?  If a country net imports 
biomass, but net exports fossil fuels, is that a case of EUE? By what standard? Given the 
incommensurability of different materials in terms of environmental impact, global 
competition over, exergy, and so on, judging by weight alone seems too arbitrary. This is 
real theoretical issue that needs to be addressed if further empirical work is to be done.  A 
possible direction for future research of EUE would be to compile a set of core indicators 
that would capture various aspects of EUE, indicators that would capture the degradation 
of sink capacity, the draining of resources, various forms of pollution and waste, and so 
on.  As a reminder, the definition of EUE is actually quite broad:   
As stated in Chapter 1, Rice defines EUE as 
….the environmentally damaging withdrawal of energy and other natural 
resource assets from the periphery and the addition or externalization of 
environmentally damaging production and disposal activities within the 
periphery of the world system. It constitutes ‘both the obtainment of 
natural capital or the stocks of natural resources that yield important goods 
and services and the usurpation of sink-capacity or waste assimilation 
properties of ecological systems in a manner enlarging the domestic 
carrying capacity of industrialized countries to the detriment of peripheral 
societies (Rice, 2009, p. 221).   
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Hornborg’s concept of EUE as an asymmetrical transfer of productive capacity highlights 
a more essential quality of EUE, but if translated into concrete examples, would cover no 
less a broad range of ecological goods and services.  
A group of core EUE indicators, perhaps compiled from all the various studies of 
EUE including but not limited to material flow accounts, could then be applied to 
individual countries, which would give a more comprehensive picture of whether or not 
EUE is occurring.  The EUE empirical research agenda could then move away from 
studies that apply singular indicators towards studies that begin to apply sets of core 
indicators.  PTBs would remain important in such a set of indicators, as they help 
demonstrate when a country is reliant upon particular material categories- such as fossil 
fuels in Tanzania. They can also demonstrate whether countries are being drained of 
particular resources.  They can therefore indicate whether EUE is occurring in certain 
categories, but for all the reasons discussed above, cannot determine if EUE is occurring 
overall.  For example, in Chapter 3, I had overviewed in qualitative terms the ‘new 
scramble for African resources.’  This ‘new scramble’ had included foreign investment in 
a wide variety of resources, some of which are picked up by MFAs such as metals and 
fossil fuels.  But many other important resources including land, water resources, African 
fisheries, either do not show up on MFAs, or like timber, are washed out by materials 
with higher weight.  Yet obviously, for all the reasons described in Chapter 3, the new 
scramble for Africa very much concerns the issue of ecologically unequal exchange.    
On a more specific note, another important methodological issue concerns the 
incompleteness of the indicators used in this study.  In terms of identifying EUE, or lack 
thereof, the results of the metals category is inclusive given the particular indicators used.  
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The above study- and many other studies utilizing MFA- do not account for indirect 
flows embodied in trade.  Indirect flows, or raw material equivalents (RMEs), are 
materials extracted or moved but do not enter the economy, such as overburden from 
mining.  These flows are important in determining both domestic resource depletion as 
well as environmental impact. Tanzania’s export economy is increasingly dominated by 
trade in preciousities- precious stones and metals whose weight at the point of exit are 
miniscule (UNEP, 2011).  
As discussed above, lack of accounting for indirect flows, especially for 
economies dominated by light-weight, high-value preciousities, may also greatly affect 
indicators that combine monetary and physical data, such as the indicators used for 
studying de-materialization trends, or the changing position of countries in the global 
economy. It may also greatly affect PTB, as such preciousities register nominal weight at 
the point of exit.  Unfortunately, at the time of writing, the necessary coefficients for 
calculating such indirect flows for Tanzania were not available.  However, theoretically, 
a full MFA would include all such indirect flows, associated with domestic extraction, 
exports, and imports (UNEP, 2011).  The limiting factor is that this is a work in progress, 
and for this dissertation, beyond its scope.  Overall, it seems that for economies 
dominated by trade in mining activities-  and especially mining activities of preciousities- 
care must be taken not to draw hasty conclusions from aggregate MFA indicators.   
 
Theoretical issues:  ecological imperialism, EUE, and Tanzania 
In Chapter 1, I had defined ecological imperialism, broadly, as the subjugation of 
the economic, political, and/or social institutions of a (generally peripheral) country for 
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the biophysical, metabolic needs of the (generally core or semi-periphery), and 
inextricable from the purposes of making such resources accessible and amenable (in the 
right quantities and for the right price) to the needs of capital accumulation.  I found this 
definition to be useful as it emphasizes the political economic dimension to global 
environmental distributional issues and issues of environmental justice above and beyond 
just resource flows. It embeds these issues in concrete historical context, and emphasizes 
that the major mechanisms of transfer of resources from periphery to core are, in a global 
capitalist economy, inextricable from the workings of capital accumulation.  I had then 
spent Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4 in developing further this concept of ecological imperialism, 
pulling from the works of others scholars, and exploring this concept in the case of FDI 
in Africa, and more specifically, in Tanzania.   
If the spirit of EUE is to bring the fields of ecology and social science together in 
order to better understand issues of environmental distribution inequality, rather than to 
simply replace the one by the other, then it remains important to examine history, policy, 
case study analysis, local impact, and so on, and to avoid reductionist evaluations based 
solely on aggregate indicators.  It is especially important not to assume a peripheral 
economy is not being exploited based on aggregate environmental indicators alone.   For 
these reasons, a theory of ecological imperialism is essential.  Exploitation is a broad 
term, but ecological imperialism, as defined in this dissertation, points towards 
exploitation as subjugation, the subjugation of economic policies (like FDI taxation 
regimes), political structures (such as support of peripheral elites in a manner that fosters 
corruption), and social structures (such as the displacement and dispossession of village 
land, despite social conflict and disruption). Such subjugation, as discussed, is linked to 
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the metabolic needs of core or emerging economies, as well as the accumulation of 
capital.  It operates, as discussed in all previous chapters, in a world-system of unequal 
power imbalances, originating in the forcible integration of the periphery under 
colonialism.  For all such reasons, the study of ecological imperialism complements the 
discussion on EUE and other theories that seek to address global environmental 
distributional inequalities. 
 Whether ecological imperialism leads to ecologically unequal exchange, 
however, is ultimately an empirical question.  As discussed, even according to geological 
endowment alone, variation will exist among individual countries.  In this sense, 
Tanzania being an anomaly is not too surprising, as a number of anomalies have already 
been found to exist according to MFA studies.  In the case of Tanzania, ecological 
imperialism may not have resulted in EUE, but as Chapter 4 pointed out, this doesn’t 
mean Tanzania isn’t being exploited for its natural resources, particularly as regards FDI 
in its land and mining sectors. There is an undeniable ecological dimension to Tanzania’s 
situation, and ecological indicators such as MFAs do not capture these complexities (nor, 
of course, are they intended to).  It does not capture the alienation, loss of control and loss 
of access to resources experienced by villagers, as was discussed in-depth in Chapter 4. 
Nor does an MFA capture profit flows, or power struggles between investors and 
governments over levels of taxation.  Such issues must be addressed more broadly by 
ecological imperialism, and by even broader issues of dependency.   Hence it is important 
to examine the relation between EUE and ecological imperialism, but to keep the two 
analytically distinct, particularly in empirical studies.  Otherwise, one runs the risk of 
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conclusions based solely on aggregate indicators for resources without examining 
























Chapter 6: Conclusion  
 Much has been written on the subject of imperialism, and when writing a 
dissertation on such a topic contributing something novel is daunting. When the theorist 
of imperialism Harry Magdoff iterated the five conditions for a satisfactory theory of 
imperialism, to a great extent he already grasped the fundamentals of imperialism; the 
restless expansion of capital accumulation as the driving force of capitalism; the origin of 
capitalism as a world-system that strongly influences its entire course of its development; 
the grafting of the capitalist mode of production upon the rest of the world by the core 
countries; the emergence of the international division of labor and the creation of a 
hierarchy in which the overwhelming majority are dependent on a few centers of industry 
and banking; and the constant reproduction of the international division of labor and 
hierarchy. Yet with the alarming levels of global environmental distress increasing yearly 
and the glaring inequalities in environmental resource distribution among different social 
groups it becomes worthwhile to bring the ecological dimension into the discourse on 
imperialism more explicitly.   
 On the one hand, it becomes worthwhile as an addition to the increasing attempts 
of the social sciences and policy world to incorporate the environmental dimension.  
Mainstream discourses on sustainability often lack systematic discussions of the political 
and economic dimensions, and fail to address issues of power imbalance and inequities.  
Effort must be made to trace and uncover the sources of accumulation in one place, and
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the political economy, policies, and ideologies that support it, while also examining the 
socio-ecological impacts that such accumulation may have in another place. But analysis 
also remains limited, even if it includes the political ecology component, if it does not 
name the current global mode of production- industrial capitalism. Otherwise the socio-
economic system remains a black box, an economic system that intakes resources and 
processes them entropically, about which can be said only vague generalities, apparently 
driven by unknowable processes rather than any specific logic or pattern.  Critical 
political ecology, Marxist ecology, and theories of ecologically unequal exchange and 
imperialism, and the study of specific aspects of the global political economy can 
contribute to bridge these gaps.  
In addition, the study of ecological imperialism and ecologically unequal 
exchange also integrates many of the standard debates in political economy discussions 
with the pressing issues of the sustainability sciences, through the use of the latest socio-
ecological indicators, localized studies, and within the broader theoretical framework of 
ecological economics.  In contrast to earlier theories of imperialism that were created 
during a very different global ecology, the study of ecological imperialism and EUE now 
raises such questions as how can all countries be net importers of materials?  If earlier 
attempts of socialism and import substitution required industrialization of the periphery, 
is such global industrialization now even ecologically possible given the limits of the 
Earth’s carrying capacity?  If it isn’t possible, how does this change our concept of 
development?  (And if it isn’t possible, why doesn’t it seem to be changing our standard 
concepts of development?)  How does the mounting global ecological crisis change the 
nature of imperialism, as it expands the variety of ecosystem goods and services needed 
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by core and now the emerging economies? Further, it allows empirical investigation, such 
as to what extent are peripheral countries concretely being exploited? To what extent 
does ecological imperialism or EUE entail problems of sustainability in the periphery, 
with issues of environmental degradation or resource depletion?  Such vital questions are 
often overlooked, or only briefly addressed, in the more orthodox discussion of 
imperialism and unequal exchange. 
It is my hope that this dissertation on ecological imperialism, ecologically unequal 
exchange and foreign investment in Africa contributed to these trans-disciplinary efforts. 
Broadly, this dissertation aimed to contribute to the construction of a theory of ecological 
imperialism, a concept that is often used rhetorically but not always clearly defined. In 
many ways it was only a preliminary effort rather than a fully completed theory.  But at 
the minimum it provides a working definition for future studies that seek to investigate 
the political economic dimension of global environmental distributional inequalities. 
More specifically, this dissertation sought to contribute towards a greater 
understanding of the role of FDI in ecological imperialism, with a focus on Africa, a 
region of the world, if not the primary peripheral region, that is attracting global attention 
in a plethora of ecological goods and services, from its mining sectors, to its land, 
fisheries, forests, and even as a planetary sink with carbon sequestration strategies.  To so 
do, the research took a mixed methodology approach, examining history, policy, utilizing 
Marxist ecological theories and other critical theories, as well as undertaking a case study 




The aim of the empirical research was to utilize one of the main empirical tools 
used to operationalize EUE to-date, an economy-wide MFA time series, and investigate if 
Tanzania was engaged in EUE, and if so, what the effects of neoliberalism were over 
time.  Together with a chapter on ecological imperialism and FDI in Tanzania’s mining 
and land sectors, the empirical section sought to analyze if there is a link between EUE 
and ecological imperialism in the political economic realm.  Finally, the empirical 
research sought to evaluate EW-MFAs as an adequate measure of EUE, and to contribute 
to the general discussion on the challenges and potentialities of quantitatively measuring 
EUE.   
In terms of the EW-MFA, Tanzania was counter-intuitively a net importer across 
all material categories, in contrast to the broader trend of most African countries that are 
net exporters of resources.  Further, this trend seems to have increased, not decreased, 
during the neoliberal years.  On the one hand, these results point out that care must be 
taken to recognize considerable variation at the individual country level- not every 
extractive economy may be a net exporter of materials. Equally important, a peripheral 
country may be subject to ecological imperialism but not ecologically unequal exchange.  
The two concepts are interrelated, but should be kept analytically distinct as they are not 
synonymous.  On the other hand, in terms of EUE, Chapter 5 also demonstrated the 
challenges with empirically measuring EUE.  On a methodological level, the empirical 
results from the Tanzanian EW-MFA pointed towards the need a nuanced, complex, 
comprehensive view of EUE and ecological imperialism, and to caution over-reliance on 




Recommendations for Further Study: A Call for Reviving and Greening Dependency 
Theory  
Aside from the methodological limitations with the empirical work as discussed 
in Chapter 5, this dissertation has a number of other limitations worth discussing.  From a 
theoretical standpoint, the study of FDI in Africa only touches upon the surface dynamics 
of ecological imperialism and makes at best a preliminary effort at an overall very 
complex issue.  While foreign investment regimes and trade policies in the Global South 
are indeed important channels through which resources and profits are transferred from 
periphery to core or emerging economies, they are embedded in greater structures of 
global imbalances of power and dependency, as previous theories of imperialism and 
dependency have theorized.  Understanding the more fundamental dynamics of 
ecological imperialism would involve delving into why peripheral countries become 
vulnerable to accepting grossly imbalanced FDI and trade policies in the first place, 
beyond the initial primitive accumulation that occurred under colonialism through the use 
of force.   The following are some initial ideas on important directions for further study. 
In particular, the revival of concepts of dependency and Gramsci’s concept of hegemony 
could be very useful in conceptualizing the broader structures that ecological imperialism 
is embedded in.  
To begin with, unpacking the links between technological dependency and 
peripheral resource exploitation is necessary, and one avenue would be a more in-depth 
study of the era of economic nationalism.  Surprisingly, this era and its connection to 
ecological imperialism seems to have garnered little attention from critical political 
ecologists and Marxists ecologists, despite the fact that this time period was the overt 
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attempt by post-independent nations across the Global South to end neocolonial control 
over their resources, however limited or flawed the efforts.   Given the extent to which 
the Global South was aware of these issues, as demonstrated by the NIEO, OPEC, 
nationalizations, commodity cartels, and so on, what made the South so vulnerable and in 
such a weak bargaining position that it had to essentially reverse its policies?  Critics 
have long pointed out that such policies were enacted under the duress of economy-
crippling debt, and FDI and trade policies were consequently part and parcel of neoliberal 
re-structuring. According to orthodox logic, such policies were necessary to reinvigorate 
the failed nationalized industries, rendered inefficient by state control and stifling 
socialist policies.  Both stances rest on considerable evidence, but fail to answer a more 
fundamental question of why economic nationalist policies failed.   
Undoubtedly, the answer is complex and varied, country-by- country, economic 
plan-by- economic plan, but the issue of technological dependency seems to be a key 
factor. In the case of many African countries, one major contributing factor is that 
African countries remained largely reliant upon Western technology and capital goods 
and were unable to break this dependency despite the ideological push for self-reliance 
and import substitution.  As such, when African countries like Tanzania went into debt 
and BOP crisis they were unable to finance the capital goods imports needed for import 
substitution.  In particular, what was so crippling about such debt was that it rendered 
Tanzania unable to continue the import of the capital goods upon which it depended for 
its development path, a development path which for all its stated purposes of African 
socialism and self-reliance nonetheless remained heavily reliant on external technology 
and foreign aid.  As such, technological development was, and remains, dependent upon 
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technology from exogenous sources, and financing had to be met with export of 
biophysical resources, even if the eventual goal was self-reliance through import 
substitution.  This dynamic begs a revival of dependency theory, one that unpacks the 
interconnections of technological dependency (or dependency of any other kind, be it 
external knowledge, norms and ideologies, social organization, aid, or whatever), debt, 
power imbalances, and resource exploitation that underlie ecological imperialism.  The 
concepts of dependency, and dependent growth, remain highly important despite 
orthodox insistence that such concepts are dead.  Dependency facilitates an imperialism 
that more often rules by consent and not direct force; without concepts such as 
dependency and dependent growth it becomes very difficult to understand continuing 
primitive accumulation and neocolonialism.  Hopefully, the historical analysis of FDI 
regimes in Africa can offer a first step in this unpacking.  Work by Marxist ecologists has 
been done to uncover the ecological drivers of capitalism’s expansion, it remains vital to 
understand why the Global South continually accepts policies that allow this expansion.  
Along these lines, no less important is the need to more explicitly incorporate the 
political and social aspects, the ‘super-structure,’ into the issue of ecological imperialism.  
Class analysis has long been part of dependency/world-systems theory and theories of 
imperialism, and can be revived more specifically to address the issue of ecological 
aspect of imperialism, especially as they provide theories that help explain the 
overlapping interests of the peripheral elite and the capitalist class in the core countries. 
This dissertation had begun that discussion, in particular when looking at the issue of 
elite control over resources in Tanzania, but more work could be done.  One such entry 
point would be to systematically investigate across a number of countries who the 
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primary actors are that facilitate the transfer of resources to foreign investors, whether 
they are governmental or private actors, and to understand the legislation that obstructs 
social control of resources.  Different countries would vary, but most likely a broader 
pattern would emerge.   Class analysis, as dependency and world-systems theorists 
realized, needs to be placed in the broader structural context of the world system to 
explain the ‘comprador characteristics’ of peripheral elites, and how such elites support 
extraction and predation of peripheral resources as the main sources of foreign exchange 
under the rhetoric of economic growth and development.   Class analysis is also 
potentially important in understanding the failure of economic nationalism, and the 
transition to neoliberal structural adjustments.  For example in Tanzania, as noted briefly 
in Chapter 3, radical scholars such as Rodney and Shivji argued that the bureaucratic 
bourgeoisie grew in economic power under the nationalizations of the Arusha 
Declaration.  Further research for Tanzania could be aimed such following questions:  
what were the connections between the bureaucratic control of the state-economic 
apparatus and the failure of economic nationalism? Where there conflicting class interests 
in the adoption of neoliberal policies? Did the bureaucratic elite maintain dependence on 
the metropolitan bourgeoisie in the core countries, and did this dependency contribute to 
the adoption of neoliberal policies?  What was the effect on class configuration during the 
neoliberal period, and how did this affect resource extraction?   It is the internal political 
context in terms of the state or domestic capitalists, as Chapter 2 emphasized, that 
provide the amenable context for making resources widely and reliably available, and at 
the right price, for capital.   
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Finally, also beyond the scope of this dissertation but of equal importance to 
understanding the dynamics of ecological imperialism and dependency is the ideological 
aspect. This is an aspect which is difficult to perceive when relying upon empirical 
studies, or abstract theory, but becomes eminently apparent when living in-country or 
conducting field research.  Here, combined with dependency theory, Gramsci’s concept 
of hegemony provides an important theoretical tool for understanding the ideology that 
justifies aspects of ecological imperialism.  In essence, by hegemony Gramsci had meant 
that dominant groups in society maintain their dominance by securing the spontaneous 
consent of subordinate groups, including the working class.  Not only through their 
economic power, but also through their intellectual and moral leadership, the ruling class 
is able to achieve political leadership based on the consent of the led.  This consent is 
created when the ruling class successfully propagates an ideology that subordinate classes 
believe to be in the universal interest, while in actuality promulgating the class interests 
of the ruling class.   This consent, though never fully secured, ensures that to the extent 
the ruling class attains ideological hegemony the necessity of force is lessened. Gramsci’s 
hegemony could be extended beyond the nation-state to include the dominant/subordinate 
positions of core/periphery.     
The concept of development, with industrial capitalism as the primary, desirable 
mode of production to be supported by the relevant political and economic institutions as 
defined largely by Western countries, has been exported across the entire globe.  Much 
has been written on the concept of development, and will not be repeated here, but one 
factor immediately apparent when doing field research is the extent to which both 
discourse and policy are defined (and funded) in peripheral countries like Tanzania by 
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First World donors, to the point where it seems almost every major institution, political or 
social, can be traced in its funding to outside agencies.  Such funding often comes with 
strings attached, the most salient example in this case being the restructuring of FDI 
regimes.  But when development is defined by another, always an exogenous source, it 
inevitably fosters an overall dependency, one that often translates into economic, 
psychological, and practical reliance on innumerable NGOs and foreign-funded projects 
that consistently shape the discourse on what the overall goals of a society should be 
rather than indigenous and grass roots solutions. Having both researched and worked in 
Tanzania as a volunteer for a number of years, these issues have come up on innumerable 
occasions, as many Tanzanians I have known have expressed their uneasiness over the 
undue foreign influence in the overall direction of their development. 
Not all NGOs necessarily disseminate a world that benefits the ruling class of 
core countries, obviously- even if they do inadvertently foster a psychological and 
economic dependency.  The ideological bents and missions of the innumerable NGOs in 
the Third World are quite diverse, and some of them are at odds with hegemonic 
discourse.  But certainly, there has been enough propagation of discourse and ideology by 
enough development institutions and NGOs to reiterate a worldview in which natural 
resources are commodities.  That is, peripheral economies have been encouraged to view 
their resources as commodities to be utilized, as foreign exchange for foreign capital 
goods and manufactured goods, for their development.  Further, the bias remains towards 
export-led growth. And this is now viewed as entirely natural, acceptable, and inevitable, 
though the origins of the subsumption of peripheral resources into the world-system as 
commodities had involved force, violence, and conflict.  Such a discourse creates the 
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ideology by which peripheral resources justifiably become the natural capital in the 
means of production for first world and emerging economy capital.  Effectively, such a 
discourse provides the ideological basis for ecological imperialism, and it is very much 
bound up with a concept of development emanating from the First World.   
But when the dynamics of poverty, commodification of nature, and ecological 
imperialism are combined, sustainability suffers.  The effects rebound from the top to 
bottom of a society- from major officials who sell off large portions of land to 
communities that acquiesce to selling off their land to investors for promises of economic 
growth and development.  In peripheral economies that often lack developed industries, 
the commodification of nature and poverty interact and the primary trend is towards one 
of extraction, poaching and predation. The ideology, norms, and attitudes that identify 
nature as a resource to be commodified, while more difficult to measure empirically, is as 
important as official economic policies, and affects the decision-making of individuals 
from the ministry elites to rural villagers.  A comprehensive study of ecological 
imperialism must address these issues as well. 
Concerning further directions for the study of ecologically unequal exchange, as 
noted in Chapter 1, EUE theorists should begin, at minimum, to incorporate a semi-
periphery into their theoretical model.  As emerging economies develop along the 
industrial capitalist path their metabolic processes are beginning to outstrip their national 
carrying capacity, and many such as Brazil, China, South Africa and India are becoming 
net importers of resources with a strong presence in African countries.  However, such 
countries are also plagued by degradation of their sink capacity, linked to the 
manufacture of goods often consumed in core countries.  Emerging economies most 
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likely fit into the category of semi-periphery (some may even be rising towards ‘core’ 
status).  As such, they occupy a more ambiguous role in the discussion on EUE as well as 
in world-systems theory in general.  The systematic inclusion of a semi-periphery and its 
relation to both core and periphery into the discussion on EUE would create a more 
nuanced and realistic world-systems ecological model.  Even better, EUE theory should 
endeavor to incorporate an international division of labor as it currently exists under 
globalization.  This may require an even more nuanced set of categorizations above and 
beyond core, semiperiphery, and periphery. 
In terms of the empirical aspect of this research, for the Tanzanian EW-MFA case 
study, the empirical work done was limited, with greater quantitative work beyond the 
time and scope of the dissertation. As noted in Chapter 5, the EW-MFA study would 
have benefited greatly if complemented with other environmental indicators that were 
able to assess the environmental impact of FDI and trade policies.  As discussed, EW-
MFA indicators only capture total resources flows into the economy; they do not assess 
the impact of those flows on the surrounding environment.  Further, as suggested in 
Chapter 5, the addition of calculations of raw material equivalents would have given a 
more realistic picture of total material usage in Tanzanian exports.  Along empirical lines, 
as discussed in Chapter 5, the EUE literature at large could benefit from applying a core 
set of empirical indicators to future studies. 
Overall, I would argue that for the study of EUE to become increasingly accurate 
and nuanced, it must endeavor to fulfill two requirements.  First, it must endeavor to 
incorporate a current and accurate international division of labor.  Core versus periphery, 
developing versus developed- such categories are too rough and can easily lead to 
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confusion in interpreting empirical results.  Second, based upon a more accurate division 
of labor, it must endeavor to apply environmental indicators that can appropriately assess 
the environmental degradations likely to occur with particular economic activities in 
particular positions within the international division of labor.     
  
Recommendations for practice/policy 
 From an ecological Marxist perspective, industrial capitalism as a mode of 
production contains intractable internal contradictions between the endless drive for 
capital accumulation and the sustainability of the Earth’s ecosystems.  This is 
compounded with capitalism’s tendency to generate an unequal distribution of 
environmental burdens among differing social groups.  From this perspective any 
solution within the market framework would be at best partial, and any total solution 
would necessitate an entirely different means of production in terms of both social 
relations of production, as well as the technological nature of industrial capitalism. At a 
broad ideological level an ideal mode of production would be predicated upon 
development based on equity, social control of resources, whereby the internal needs of 
the people, in accordance with the cultural and developmental needs of the people, are the 
prime directive for all economic policies, and not dictated by the demands of capital.  
This would mean, in an ideological sense, much of what Nyerere meant by African 
socialism; self-reliance, equality, and dignity for the human being based on socialized 
means of production, with, this time a much heavier emphasis on environmental 
sustainability.  In terms of EUE and ecologically imperialism, policy-wise it would entail 
the reversal of the current neoliberalization of nature.    
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Yet the broader structural dynamics of dependency are unlikely to change in the 
near future. Even if alternative forms of social organization can be brought about, the 
current conception of development and the dependency this engenders are deeply 
embedded, even if calls for greater internal redistribution of wealth succeed. The 
dynamics of this dependency were not solved during the era of economic nationalism, 
and, as discussed, were at least partially responsible for the debt crisis of the developing 
world.  If this dynamic is not acknowledged and approached cautiously, in all likelihood 
it will continue.  What this means is that it is unlikely that the dynamic of EUE is going 
to be overcome easily or quickly, with the general lack of other means of obtaining 
foreign exchange, or in lieu of an entirely different concept of development not based on 
technological growth and industrial capitalism.  At least for the near future, African 
nations most likely will be caught as exporters of natural resources pending major 
technical advances and substantial movement up the value chain.  And even if this were 
to happen, the issue of environmental sustainability would not necessarily be unsolved 
unless major technical advances utilized clean energy.  
However, there are a number of interim policies that could potentially improve 
the situation. The first would involve changing the neocolonial character of natural 
resource exports through improving the terms of trade and making FDI policies less 
skewed towards benefiting foreign investors.  There were numerous attempts to achieve 
this during the era of economic nationalism as discussed in Chapter 3, and such policies 
could provide a blueprint.  This would entail substantial changes domestically, and also 
in terms of external relations. Internally, obviously corruption must be effectively 
addressed.  But corruption cannot be addressed alone, and current development orthodox 
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tends to treat solving corruption as a panacea. For one, for corruption to end, state control 
over resources as elite control must end, which necessitates greater social control in 
actuality over resources.  Top-down, bureaucratically run nationalizations alone would be 
ineffectual in increasing social control over resources, given existing unequal class 
configurations. They would risk the emergence of bureaucratic elites, as some had argued 
had happened in Tanzania during the era of economic nationalism.  Instead, increased 
efforts at decentralizing power from executive or ministry control would be useful, and 
plans for this already occurring, for example, in Tanzania, with proposed changes in the 
constitution.  Since resources are the sovereign property of the state, and the state is 
supposed to represent the people, all deals between investors and the state should be 
made public, as well as all profits made from investors and revenue given to the state.  
The public should have legal decision and oversight over national resources, and access 
to information concerning environmental, social, and economic costs and benefits.  They 
should also have a say in what are acceptable terms through direct votes and referendum. 
For the issue of land, this would necessitate greater regulation and clarity in terms of 
customary versus state law.  Of especial importance, it should be restricted for any 
government officials to individually profit from resources, as resources are national 
property and the proceeds from them are supposed to benefit the citizens at large. For 
example, in Nyerere’s time, ministry officials in the mining and energy sector were 
prohibited from having shares in mining industries, and as mentioned in Chapter 4, the 
change under neoliberal reforms has been linked with corruption.  However, such greater 
social control over resources is unlikely to happen without greater collective action from 
grassroots and civil society organizations.  Such organizations seem restricted in 
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countries like Tanzania, but potentially have very important roles to play in disseminating 
knowledge and organizing.  Finally, and significantly, foreign investor complicity in 
corruption must be addressed.   
In terms of external relations, the FDI regimes brought under neoliberal policies 
must be largely reversed. This would mean several things. First, at a minimum, African 
countries need to renegotiate for better terms to keep profit from flowing outward.  This 
may translate as nationalizations as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition.  Where this 
is impractical, the state may own the majority share, as the 2010 Mining Act seems to be 
moving towards, and as the Bolivarian nations have attempted to undertake.  Obtaining 
greater proceeds from their natural resources, however, may take peripheral economies 
reviving concepts of period of NIEO, such as commodity cartels, nationalizations (with 
social control), and other forms of collective action to prevent capital strikes against 
individual nations.  
In terms of collecting more money for natural resources, countries could also 
engage in the more recent, helpful recommendations of UNCTAD’s Economic Report on 
Africa 2012 to give monetary valuation of ‘underpaid’ ecosystem goods and services.  
Such valuation, based on informed, technical knowledge, would give peripheral 
economies leverage in demanding higher prices for their resources, for example, by 
giving monetary valuation to the environmental degradation associated with mining, and 
to charge higher for those degradations.  Valuation of environmental goods and services 
are potentially helpful, though in practice if relied upon solely, can raise a number of 
problematic issues.  For one, such valuations encourages putting a dollar price on the 
environment, which in itself is based on logic that ecosystem goods and services are 
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seamlessly exchangeable with money or man-made goods and services.  This concept is 
highly debatable, and remains a major debate within ecological economics. Further, with 
current levels of inequality and poverty, the money may end up just going to elites.  Like 
the issue of nationalization, such monetary valuation of environmental burdens would be 
useless without greater democratic control over resources and public scrutiny of funds.  
Further, an issue that would have to be addressed would be how to value the resources.  
One common way of valuing resources is in terms of economic services lost- but if this is 
the case, invariably peripheral incomes are much lower than incomes in core economies.  
As such, the valuation of peripheral ‘underpaid or unpaid’ peripheral resources would be 
lower, thereby helping to replicate the very inequality this method would seek to reduce.   
On a final note, from a political perspective, such changes will be difficult to 
make without an organized progressive political organization, one normatively 
committed to the ideals of equality, justice, and rights for workers and peasants- and, 
importantly, committed to ecological sustainability.  Such a party must supply the 
‘counter-hegemonic’ ideology, in Gramscian terms, as well as leadership and 
representation in the political process.  Again in the case of Tanzania, environmental 
issues, women’s issues, workers’ and peasants issues, the problem of foreign investment, 
and so on, are often dealt with separately, in a piece-meal fashion.  More importantly, 
there is no coherent ideology that illuminates how these issues are connected to 
capitalism or imperialism, as there is in Latin America- a surprising finding from the field 
research conducted.  Additionally, through leadership and organization a political party 
can provide some ethical stance as well, an issue not commonly addressed in the political 
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sciences but of importance nonetheless.
105
 Civil society is unarguably important, but it 
can only bring about so much change without political representation- unless protests 
grow so large and violent that they topple the state.  Even then, without a progressive 
political party to offer a coherent alternative, in-fighting and chaos is a highly likely 
outcome.
106
  A progressive political party, with regional solidarity as in the case of Latin 
America, would be a necessary actor in facilitating change.  
In terms of the ecological dimension, the concept of sustainability must be 
rigorously applied to peripheral countries as much as in core economies. The concern of 
sustainability must direct economic policy.   Ecological economists have offered helpful 
notions of sustainability, as discussed in Chapter 1.  Overall, sustainability requires 
society maintaining intact its natural capital to ensure that future generations have the 
same production and consumption possibilities that are available to the current 
generation. Such notions of sustainability need to be translated into concrete policies, and 
where potential conflict exists between existing economic policies and sustainability, 
such policies should be reversed or replaced. To date many of the activities involved in 
international trade and foreign investment cannot be seriously regarded as sustainable.  
From a structural standpoint, to address the issue of sustainability, peripheral 
countries must systematically diversify their trade structures away from the export of 
non-renewable and non-sustainable use of resources, and this would necessitate finding 
                                                 
105
Many Tanzanians I interviewed felt that though Nyerere made a lot of practical mistakes, nonetheless he 
provided a moral backbone to the country.  Indeed, Nyerere is respected as one of the most morally upright 
leaders post-independence, one whose personal philosophy stressed higher ideals of community and 
altruism over individual gain. In contrast, from field research, many Tanzanians seem to hold cynical and 
bitter views over the corruption of the political elite. 
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 In fact, with the pressures of poverty, population growth, and corruption, discontent is bubbling in 
Tanzania, and not in the most healthy way- religious tensions between the Christians and Muslims have 
grown, and urban centers are becoming increasingly dangerous in terms of crime. 
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other sources of foreign exchange.  This is especially true for vital resources like land 
where livelihoods, national security, food security, and so on, depend.  Land, in general, 
should not be commodified, unless there is strong evidence that such land is being clearly 
unused, and even then, the issues of use by future generations and shared resource use 
with surrounding communities, and environmental degradation, must be addressed. Even 
still, the extremely low price of land in the periphery, in comparison to the price of land 
in core economies, underscores an inequality that merely perpetuates EUE, along with the 
host of economic, social, environmental and political conflicts associated with large scale 
land investments.  In general, policy makers must address the central schism that 
currently exists in regards to peripheral economies and their environments, that is, on one 
hand repeating the rhetoric of sustainability, while on the other hand promoting the 
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Appendix I:  Taxation definitions for mining sector 
Royalties (Sturmer, 2011) 
 The most common and widely-used instrument for taxing the extractive sector 
 Royalties tax the fiscal dues on the basis of either the volume (unit royalty) or the 
value (ad valorem royalty) of production or exports 
 Royalties have the advantage of being easy to assess and apply even though 
calculation can be complicated if value is adjusted to omit cost of transport, hand, 
and so on 
 Royalties ensure a relatively stable revenue stream to the government, since 
production and sales normally vary much less than profits 
 For producers, royalties constitute additional costs that have to be paid 
irrespective of profit levels 
 Very high royalties are major deterrent to investment, especially in the case of 
minerals from low-quality resource endowments and of minerals whose world 
market prices are highly cyclical 
Corporate income taxes (Sturmer, 2011) 
 Corporate income tax is based on profits, due only when annual revenues exceed 
some measure of costs and allowances 
 In general, corporate income tax avoids problem associated with royalties of 
companies having to pay taxes even when they make losses 
 For governments, corporate income tax is much more difficult to compute 
because profits have to be assessed;  further, yield from corporate income tax 
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fluctuates far more than yield form royalties since profits fluctuate far more than 
volume or output or sales 
Windfall profit taxes (Sturmer, 2011) 
 Windfall profit taxes cream off an above normal supposed level of profit by 
taxing gross revenues 
 As a rule, the tax is levied only when a certain threshold, such as a given world 
market price, is reached. Some countries also apply a progressive tax regime, 
using stepped tax rates linked to world market prices 
Government participation (Sturmer, 2011) 
 Another means of extraction is government participation free of charge or on 
concessional terms;  government acquires a carried interest and pays for its share 
out of future earnings from the project, or it demands a minority equity share free 
of charge at time of original investment decision  
 Dividends from government participation do not play an important role in 
government revenues 
 Various other taxes and charges can include concession charges, duties on 








Appendix II:  Land investment deals in Tanzania (source Land Matrix database) 
Location 
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Appendix III: Data and Sources 
Production statistics, for which calculation of domestic extraction and 
corresponding indicators such as domestic material consumption and domestic material 
input depended, were taken from the following sources: 
1. Biomass production statistics were compiled using FAOSTAT production 
statistics Tanzania for agricultural products, ForesSTAT (a subdivision of 
FAOSTAT) for timber products, and FAOSTAT’s fisheries statistics for fish and 
other aquatic animals.  While national biomass production statistics were 
available, upon advice of the Tanzania National Bureau of Statistics agricultural 
officer, FAOSTAT statistics were used instead.  (FAOSTAT statistics are already 
based upon national statistics, but compiled in such a manner online as to be more 
readily accessible). 
2. Mineral production statistics were compiled using US Geological Survey (USGS) 
production statistics for Tanzania, British Geological Survey (BGS) production 
statistics for Tanzania, and national sources from the Tanzania Bureau of 
Statistics.  All three sources had gaps in years for various minerals, and 
comparison of all three sources revealed certain levels of discrepancies between 
all three sources.  In choosing which data source to use, the following criteria 
were applied: a.) consistency, that is, which data source consistently covered the 
longest span of years, b.) consistency between data sources, that is, the data 
source was selected that included the most consistent number of years as well as 
most consistently matched the other data sources. Limestone, cement, and sand 
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estimates were compiled using statistics from the World Statistical Review World 
Cement Market in figures 1913/1995 
3. Metal production statistics, in the same manner as mineral production statistics, 
utilized USGS data, BGS data, and national data from the Tanzania Bureau of 
Statistics.  
4. Fossil fuels production statistics utilized USGS data, BGS data, and national data 
from the Tanzania Bureau of Statistics.   
Physical trade statistics were compiled from UNCOMTRADE export and import 
trade data in weight, SITC 1, third level aggregation, world as partner, based upon all 
years available.  Where gaps existed between certain years, data for the net physical trade 
balance was used from www.materialflows.net, the online portal for material flows data. 
(Data from this website was used only in a limited manner. For one, PTB data 
disaggregated according to material category was not available from this website, only 
the aggregate PTB indicator. Also, data from the 1970s is not available from this 
website).  For purposes of convenient categorization and data availability, monetary trade 
statistics were compiled from UNCOMTRADE export and import trade data in monetary 
value, HS 92, second level aggregation, world as partner, based upon all years available.   
The Institute of Social Ecology in Vienna had calculated DMC for the specific 
years of 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2005.  When compared with my own 
DMC calculations for those years, the results were within 10 percent range of difference.  
After communication with Nina Eisenmenger from Vienna, I postulate this margin of 
difference to be relatively small, especially given the use of national level data.    
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It is worthwhile to make a comment on data reliability.  All data used was 
national level data, or international data compiled from national data.  There are reasons 
why national level data is not wholly reliable.  For one, in conversation with the Tanzania 
National Bureau of Statistics (TNBS), I was informed that trade statistics, before the year 
2000, were recorded by hand and not computer. According to the TNBS, this undermines 
trade statistics reliability.  Perhaps even more troubling, Tanzania has been plagued with 
accusations of illegal exports of certain commodities, for example timber. According to a 
National Geographic Report, in 2007 Tanzania’s government failed to effectively 
regulate customs officials, who were accused of bribery and allowing the use of invalid 
export documentation.  Illegal export of timber has led to profound destruction of 
Tanzanian forests, estimated to be up to 98,000 hectares annually (National Geographic, 






















Appendix V: Tanzania Demographic Trends and Resource Use  
 
 


















Life expectancy over time
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Tanzania’s total domestic material consumption has grown in absolute terms from about 
64,103,000 tons in 1977 to 144,549,000 in 2010, reflecting a dramatic increase in 
population over time.  Though from a world-systems perspective, Tanzania appears to be 
developing into an extractive economy, this is still a form of industrialization.  
Tanzania’s demographic indicators such as increasing population and life expectancy 
over time, in contrast to decreasing infant mortality and fertility rates over time, are also 
typical of demographic transitions that occur from pre-industrial to an industrialized 
economic system.  However, as is also normal in the early stages of industrialization, in 
Tanzania’s case, population growth has outpaced consumption, so DMC per capita has 













Infant mortality per thousand births over time
Year
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